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The industry architecture of the fuel retailing sector in SE Asia varies both within 
and across countries, with roles distributed among the oil companies and other 
players. These variations, or multiple levels of industry architecture, represent the 
vertical disintegration of the sector to different degrees. Although the regulatory, 
technological, infrastructure and social constraints of the different countries may 
force oil companies to use different industry architecture, these constraints alone 
cannot explain why even a single oil company would operate with multiple levels 
of industry architecture within a country. The existing literature, which models the 
sector simplistically as a dyadic relationship between the oil company and their 
dealers, does not adequately explain this phenomenon. My This research suggests 
that the emergence of multiple levels of industry architecture in SE Asia is a result 
of oil companies using different organization structure depending on different 
institutional environments to manage the risk of operating in this sector. The study 
shows that oil companies manage risk by distributing roles within the sector to 
strike a balance between reducing exposure to risk under respective institutional 
environments and minimizing the impact should an adverse event occur. It is this 
balancing act of oil companies varying organization structure to manage risk, even 
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This research argues that the multiple levels of industry architecture in Southeast 
Asia (SE Asia) reflects the different approaches that oil companies use to deal 
with the risks of operating in this sector. The fuel retailing sector is the part of the 
oil industry’s fuel distribution infrastructure. The sector serves the motoring 
public through the ubiquitous fuel retail station which is known by many names 
such as fuelling station, filling station, gas station, petrol station, service station 
and retail outlet. The multiple levels of industry architecture are the various 
combinations of independent economic players and relationships between these 
players coexisting within a sector and thus the multiple levels represent varying 
degree of vertical disintegration. From empirical evidence gathered from 
interviews with professionals in the sector, this research suggests that the varying 
degree of vertical disintegration is the result of efforts by oil companies modifying 
the industry architecture to manage risk and uncertainty, that is, by lowering the 
probability of risk as well as reducing the impact from risk events. 
  
Fuel retailing appears to be a simple task of selling the finished products of 
refineries mainly gasoline and diesel for motor vehicles. The fuel retailing sector 
consists of networks of multiple and seemingly identical fuel retail stations spread 
across a wide area with each network managed from a central location. This 
service sector is assumed to be relatively straightforward to organize as compared 
to the industrial sectors. In the academic literature, the organization structure of 
the fuel retailing sector is modelled with two economic players. One player is the 
oil company supplying the fuels to a network of fuel retail stations. The other 
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player is the set of dealers or station managers deployed for the network, with 
each dealer or station manager managing a fuel retail station. The typical 
organization structures from the combination of these two economic players are:  
 
(1) oil company operating its fuel retail stations directly with its own 
employees  
(2) oil company operating its fuel retail stations through dealers  
(3) independent dealer operating dealer-owned fuel retail stations  
 
In reality, the fuel retailing sector has evolved to be increasingly complex and 
there are many more economic players than just the oil companies and the dealers 
participating in the sector. With rising oil prices, the margin from selling fuels is 
often not enough to offset the fixed operating costs of the fuel retail station. The 
income for the operator has to be supplemented with earnings from having a 
convenience store, lubrication bay or car wash within the fuel retail station, but 
these businesses also bring in new players into the sector. The increasing use of 
technology allows many manual tasks to be simplified and automated. These 
automated systems bring in players that can carry out these tasks remotely and 
allow help-desk and support functions to be outsourced and fuel inventory and 
fuel leak alarms to be centrally monitored. Changing consumer habits also allow 
for new and faster ways to pay at the pump. The adoption of the fully unattended 
self-service model brings in payment specialists and eliminates the needs for 
pump attendants and cashiers. There are also increasing requirements to comply 
with regulations, especially those to meet global environmental standards. 
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Environmental specialists are roped in to monitor fuel retail stations regularly to 
ensure compliance with these standards.  
 
To address these evolutionary changes to the fuel retailing sector, oil companies 
modify the organization structures to introduce the new players into the sector, 
divide tasks among players and realign the relationships between players. 
Therefore, the academic model of the organization structure based on the two 
economic players, the oil company and the dealer, is inadequate for this research 
that seeks to understand why the fuel retailing sector has multiple levels of 
industry architecture involving multiple players. The basic academic model can 
only be the starting point for analysing the fuel retailing sector. It has to be 
extended to include the additional roles and other players in the sector.  
  
To understand a sector that has evolved with new economic players inserted into 
the value chain, Jacobides suggests an inductive analysis of a sector that allows 
new analytical insights on how vertical disintegration emerges (Jacobides, 2005). 
He claims that the study of industry architecture, that is, the “way to divide and 
organize labour in each sector” (Jacobides, 2008, p. 259), shows us “how some 
companies manage industry architectures to their advantage” (Jacobides, 2009, p. 
71). He suggests studying the “different ways in which roles are distributed 
among a set of interacting firms” (Jacobides, Knudsen, & Augier, 2006, p. 10).  
Analysis based on this approach is a practical way of looking at the nature of an 
industry as opposed to the “generalist preoccupation with macro-trends” 
(Jacobides, 2008, p. 268). This research scrutinizes the various roles in the fuel 




Figure 1 Oil industry value chain 
and eliminated by the oil companies and how this changes have resulted in the 
multiple levels of industry architecture of the sector. 
 
 Industry background of the fuel retailing sector 1.1
 
The oil industry is one of the biggest industries in the world and is usually 
described to consist of the four vertically integrated processes, namely exploration, 
production, refining and distribution. The vertical integration of oil industry 
means that the same oil company is involved in these four processes: searching for 
crude oil; extracting the crude oil from the ground; shipping this crude oil to 
refineries to be processed into useful naphtha, kerosene, diesel, gasoline and fuel 
oil; and distributing these petroleum products to customers.  
 
The petroleum products are delivered in bulk as feed stocks to petrochemical 
industries, power stations and factories or delivered to large storage tanks in ports 
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and airports that supply the fuels for ships and airplanes. A not too insignificant 
amount of gasoline and diesel is dispatched by barges, pipes and tank trucks1 into 
storage tanks, mostly underground tanks, deployed in designated locations around 
the countries. These locations are either the commercial fuel outlets or the fuel 
retail stations. The gasoline and diesel are delivered to commercial outlets that are 
usually owned by companies that have to provide the fuels for their own fleet of 
buses, taxis and trucks. The gasoline and diesel delivered to the fuel retail stations 
are sold to the motoring public. This last segment of the value chain that brings 
the fuels from terminal to fuel retail stations to be sold to the motoring public is 
the fuel retailing sector and is the subject of this research (Figure 1). 
 
As the oil industry evolved and grew in complexity, the oil companies subdivided 
the activities of the oil industry into smaller but sizeable chunks (Frankel, 1953) 
so that these can be easily managed internally by the oil companies. Many of these 
activities, individually insignificant in comparison to the whole value chain 
(Figure 1), have since been taken over by specialized players and the industry is 
no longer as vertically integrated as in the past. This is also the case for the fuel 
retailing sector which has a complex sub-division of activities that are usually not 
described and incorrectly lumped together as oil companies’ integrated activities.  
 
The fuel retailing sector consists of fuel terminals or depots and the fuel retail 
stations spread across the country. There are at least half a million fuel retail 
stations in the world. Each fuel retail station has an expensive underground fuel 
                                               
1
 Tank trucks, also known as tankers, tanker trucks and bowsers, are motor vehicles specially 
designed to carry fuels from the terminal to the fuel retail station. 
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system stuck at a dedicated location. The fuel system consists of buried steel tanks, 
pipes and pumps connected to fuel dispensers. The fuel dispensers are the units 
commonly referred by customers as “pumps”. A set of specialized controls and 
automated monitoring systems ensure that all these components work efficiently 
and safely for the “pumps” to deliver the correct amount of fuel to the customer’s 
vehicle. The whole system is also engineered to ensure that the fuels do not leak to 
the ground or into the atmosphere. On a regular basis, either by a request initiated 
by the dealer of a fuel retail station or an automatically triggered instruction from 
a central planning centre, the nearby fuel terminal or depot will be alerted to 
dispatch tankers to replenish the tanks at the fuel retail stations. The location of 
each fuel retail station is selected for the convenience of customers but the 
location in some countries may be specifically approved exclusively for the 
retailing of fuels. Once the fuel retail station is built on it, the location will likely 
remain as a fuel retail station for the next thirty years or more.  
 
It is usually the oil companies that owned the land and built these fuel retail 
stations to their own exact specifications. With these specialized assets installed 
permanently in a fixed location for extended periods and without alternative use, 
the organization structure for the fuel retailing sector would be vertically 
integrated, that is, with all the specialized assets owned and value-adding 
activities done within the oil company. However, the reality is that the fuel 
retailing sector in SE Asia has varying degrees of vertical disintegration ranging 
from one extreme with all the activities done within the oil company to the other 





Figure 2 Shell's fuel retail stations in SE Asia 
Source: Shell’s online station locator (www.shell.com) 
 
Another characteristic of the fuel retailing sector that shaped its organization 
structure is the way fuel retail stations are deployed. Fuel retail stations are useful 
to customers only when these are well spread out across a country. However, a 
network of thousands of fuel retail stations branded by one oil company and 
deployed across an archipelago like the Philippines can be difficult to manage. 
Figure 2 shows the extent of the deployment of Shell’s 2,650 fuel retail stations 
across SE Asia. Each number shown in each box indicates the number of fuel 
retail stations around a location, typically a city. This spread of fuel retail stations 
across a country is also the typical deployment for the other oil companies. It is 
therefore not hard to imagine the complexity of organizing the industry 
architecture for such a widespread network of fuel retail stations. 
 




The organization structure of the fuel retail sector in SE Asia was originally put in 
place by foreign oil companies and subsequently adapted by national and 
independent oil companies in response to the regulations and standards, 
technology and social norms of each country.  
 
When the fuel retailing business in SE Asia was started by the major oil 
companies and their predecessors, they could not deploy their existing 
organizational arrangements over to SE Asia and had to seek different ways to 
operate networks of fuel retail stations in each country. Since then, these 
executives of Shell, Stanvac2 and Caltex that set up the network of stations in 
many of the SE Asian countries have been replaced by new breed of executives 
and thus the industry architectures of this sector have evolved to be very different 
from their predecessors and each other. 
 
By 1990’s, national oil companies such as Petronas and PTT that started their 
networks much later than the major oil companies began to establish new ways to 
organize the fuel retail business as they gained leadership position. Independent 
oil companies, freed by deregulation to participate in the fuel retail sector, also 
extended the organization structures based on the niche areas from which they 
originated in order to compete with the other players. The fuel retail sector in SE 
Asia was also transformed during this period through the rebuilding the fuel retail 
stations with standardized design incorporating features to enhance safety and 
environmental protection, the use of sophisticated electronic-based equipment so 
that these can be automated and the streamlining of operating procedures such as 
                                               
2
 Stanvac was the joint venture of Socony-Vacuum (Mobil) and Jersey Standard (Esso). 
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introducing self-service and card payment to increase the throughput of each 
station. This modernization of the fuel retail sector resulted in a change to the 
industry architecture in that many new players were introduced into the sector.   
 
However, with the eleven countries in SE Asia at different stages of economic 
development and governed under very different political regimes, some countries 
do not progress fast enough to have the physical and technological infrastructure 
to support this modern way of operating a fuel retail network. Countries made up 
of many islands such as Indonesia and Philippines were limited by the 
telecommunication and road or rail infrastructure to support efficient delivery of 
fuels to the fuel retail stations spread across the country. Thus the heterogeneous 
characteristics of the countries in SE Asia were factors for the different forms of 
organization structure that were put in place for the fuel retail sector.  
 
There was more than one form of organization structure in use in each country. In 
Singapore, the network was operated directly and with the fuel retail stations 
owned by the oil companies. In Indonesia, the fuel retail stations were 
predominantly owned and operated by dealers. In the other countries such as 
Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand, there were a mix of these two types of 
organization structure as well as one other type that has the fuel retail stations 
owned by the oil company but operated by an independent dealer appointed by the 
oil company.  
 
The different mix in each country was not because each oil company was 
employing its choice of organization structure to meet the constraints of the 
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country’s institutional environment. In fact, each oil company implemented more 
than one organizational structure in each country. At the superficial level, the 
same type of organizational structure may appear to be similar across different 
countries. A more detailed examination of the contractual arrangement for the 
same type of organization structure shows that there were differences, say, 
between the direct operation used in Thailand and that used in Singapore. These 
differences were present even for the same oil company operating across the 
different countries of SE Asia. For example, ExxonMobil contracted with an 
individual manager to manage each fuel retail station directly in Singapore. In 
Thailand, ExxonMobil set up a separate business entity, Thai C-Centre, to operate 
the company-owned fuel retail station directly.  
 
The operations of some of the fuel retail networks in SE Asia grew increasing 
complex as the business evolved to include convenience store, self-service 
operation and card payment. These additional activities could no longer be 
managed by in-house by the oil companies. Instead, specialists in these areas of 
business were roped in to take up these roles.    
 
 Objective of the research 1.3
 
The fuel retail sector has existed for more than 100 years, yet there was limited 
research to understand how it was organized and how the organizational structure 
has evolved. Some researchers claimed that this was due to lack of data or detailed 
description of the organization structure for qualitative or quantitative analysis 
because the oil companies were very protective of their information. The literature 
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review also shows why the existing academic literature, based on the 
characteristics and constraints in North America cannot be used to explain the fuel 
retail sector in SE Asia that has evolved to include multiple players within the 
sector. One reason for the inadequacy of existing theories is that these studies on 
organizational structure were based on a model with two economic players. The 
other reason is that there was no attempt to explore the effect of risk management 
on organization structure of the fuel retail sector.  
 
Based on the background on the fuel retail sector in SE Asia and the inadequacy 
of academic literature to explain the organization structure that has evolved with 
multiple players, the research question raised is “Why are there multiple levels of 
industry architecture of the fuel retail sector in SE Asia?”  The multiple levels of 
the industry architecture represent the vertical disintegration of the sector to 
different degrees. 
 
The aim of the research is to uncover the underlying cause that has led to the 
varying degree of vertical disintegration of the fuel retail sector in five countries 
in SE Asia.  To answer this, the research collected the data from five countries in 
SE Asia including the background on how the organization structure was put in 
place and the changes made to the organization structure during the period 2000 to 
2013 as the fuel retail sector evolved.  
 
As this study looked at five countries with different political, cultural, social and 
economic characteristics, the analysis took into account the impact of the different 
institutional environments on the organizational structure. The analysis also 
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evaluated the organization structure implemented by the different types of oil 
companies, a factor that was omitted in academic literature.  
 
The study also seeks to understand how the oil companies organized to manage 
risk. This risk management by players in the fuel retail sector was analysed by 
using the risk matrix, an engineering tool that is used to determine not only the 
probability of the occurrence of risk but also the impact should the risk event 
happens. 
    
 Organization of the thesis 1.4
 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. The second chapter of this thesis reviews 
the existing literature covering the fuel retailing sector and argues that the 
literature is too limited in scope and simplistic to adequately explain the multiple 
levels of industry architecture that have emerged in SE Asia. The third chapter 
describes the methodology used for this research and how the data for the fuel 
retailing sector in SE Asia was collected for the research. The fourth chapter 
analyses each of the five cases and details how oil companies changed their 
organization structure in response to the constraints within each country. The fifth 
chapter performs an analysis across the cases by examining the fuel retailing 
sector along two categories or dimensions, the type of oil company and the type of 
organization structure. The sixth chapter argues that the emergence of multiple 
levels of industry architecture in SE Asia is a result of oil companies using 
different organization structures to deal with the risks of operating in this sector. 
This chapter also discusses the contributions of th
13 
 
some limitations of this research. I conclude in the seventh chapter by 
summarizing the study and suggest how the study can be extended by analysing 
recent industry developments in greater depth. I also suggest how similar studies 
can be conducted for other business sectors.   
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Existing literature on the fuel retailing sector is generally restricted to the North 
American market and models the sector simplistically as a dyadic relationship 
between oil companies and dealers. Such a description of the sector is inadequate 
for explaining the multiple levels of industry architecture that have emerged in SE 
Asia. British economist Penrose (1988), famous for “The Theory of the Growth of 
the Firm”, commented that “even by the late 1950s there had been no serious 
economic study of the international oil industry”. She claims that energy 
economists are more likely to use hard data and quantitative analysis than the 
“messier, less precise world of qualitative change and its impact” on the oil 
industry (Penrose, 1988, p. 19). The study of the fuel retailing sector was also in 
similar state of being unstudied as this sector is considered a small and 
insignificant part of the oil industry.   
 
From the 1960s, the literature started to address the economic issues and 
characteristics of the fuel retailing sector and its organization structure. However, 
these economic issues addressed in these journal papers are on the issues and 
characteristics specific to North America and Europe (Lin & Seetharaman, 2013). 
These issues and characteristics are generally not those encountered by the fuel 
retailing sector in SE Asia. For example, the literature analyses the impact of the 
full-service model on the governance structure for fuel retailing sector because the 
self-service model is banned in two USA states, New Jersey and Oregon 
(Vandergrift & Bisti, 2001; Johnson & Romeo, 2000; Scott, 2007). The literature 
also analyses the impact on pump prices and operating hours from the prohibition 
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of refiner-controlled operations of fuel retail stations (Barron & Umbeck, 1984; 
Vita, 2000). In SE Asia, self-service is not banned. Instead, the self-service model 
is enforced in the case of Malaysia to reduce the use of foreign workers and 
encouraged in Thailand by the government through the raising of the minimum 
wage for low-skilled workers. With the exception of Malaysia, all other countries 
in SE Asia permitted oil companies to operate their fuel retail networks directly. 
Although Malaysia limits each oil company (or refiner) to one operating licence 
and in a way prevents the oil company from operating the network directly, the 
pump prices for the country are set by the government and there is no rule as to 
who can control the operating hours.  
 
The lessons gained from the insight into the USA’s fuel retail network cannot be 
generalized and used for SE Asia’s fuel retail network. The basic characteristics of 
the fuel retailing sector such as franchising and leasing arrangements, price 
control and service models are also very different between USA and SE Asia. In 
the USA, prices at the pump are controlled by the dealers and this is used as a key 
characteristic to analyse the sector (Slade, 1986; 1987; Borenstein, Cameron, & 
Gilbert, 1997; Png & Reitman, 1994). In SE Asia, prices are set by the 
government or by the oil companies even for the fuel retail stations that are owned 
and operated by the dealers. Furthermore, the governments of two countries, 
Malaysia and Indonesia, have the pump prices set so low that they have to 
subsidize the fuel retailers and the oil companies.  
 
Another characteristic in these studies is the absence of a national oil company in 
USA. Although the government of Canada started Petro-Canada, it was no longer 
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a majority owner of the oil company by the 1990s. Even then, PetroCanada is 
excluded by Slade (1998) in her study of strategic motivation of oil retail 
companies because “it may have different objectives” (p. 93). In contrast, the 
national oil companies, PTT of Thailand, Petronas of Malaysia and Pertamina of 
Indonesia are state-owned enterprises that are prominent players in the SE Asia’s 
upstream and downstream petroleum activities and protective of their domestic 
markets (Doshi, 1993). The motives of these important players and the special 
connections with their respective governments cannot be ignored when analysing 
the fuel retailing sector of SE Asia (Sklair & Robbins, 2002).  
 
The analysis of the issues and characteristics that are unique to North America’s 
fuel retailing sector and their effects on organization structure are still useful for 
this research. The organization structures in SE Asia are adopted from the North 
American market since the majority of the fuel retail networks here are started by 
the American oil companies. The literature serves as a guide by showing up the 
differences in the SE Asia’s fuel retailing sector that does not have these issues 
and characteristics.   
 
 Fuel retail firm versus market 2.1
 
Fuel retailing does not involve a production process and is merely the activity of 
selling fuels to the motoring public by delivering the volatile and combustible 
liquid safely and efficiently into a motor vehicle. According to economic theory, 
this activity can be done efficiently through the market with the oil companies as 
the producers of the fuels taking the role of the wholesaler. The economic 
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efficiency of the using the market mechanism means that the optimal number of 
fuel retail stations, the ideal location of these fuel retail stations and the prices of 
fuels can be determined from supply and demand of the market. This wholesaler 
approach is the original method when fuels were sold in two-gallon cans from 
hardware stores, blacksmiths or pharmacies (Melaina, 2007). This was the 
accepted practice of getting gasoline for cars before 1907.  
 
The dedicated fuel retail station started when someone placed pumps on the curb 
of the road to serve drive-by customers (Dixon, 1964; Beckman, 2011). It was 
someone’s great foresight to set up a dedicated location for cars to drive right up 
to a pump to get fuel and the fuel retail station became the dominant method of 
fuel retailing (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Anderson & Tushman, 1990). The 
fuel retail stations were set up as independent firms reducing the number of 
players which has widened to include coal, lumber and ice dealers and eliminating 
the other methods of retailing fuels. Since there is no production cost involved in 
fuel retailing, consolidating to a network of fuel retail stations would reduce the 
oil company’s effort of having to deal with the greater number of hardware stores, 
blacksmiths or pharmacies.  
 
There are many definitions of the “market” and the myriads of hardware stores, 
blacksmiths or pharmacies will fit one of these definitions as the “market” 
(Rosenbaum, 2000). The change from “market” to the dedicated fuel retail station 
fits the case for the existence of firm, the fuel retail station, as the result of the 
reduction in transaction cost. Transaction cost is the cost of making an economic 
exchange in the market instead of doing it within a firm. Hence, transactions will 
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be performed within the firm when the costs of doing so are lower than the costs 
of using the market (Coase, 1937). Another view extending this economic 
function of the retail firm is one “offering at least one product to consumers at an 
observable market price, and providing services that can reduce the distribution 
costs which consumers would incur if they were to transact directly with 
producers” (Betancourt & Gautschi, 1988, p. 133).  
 
 Vertical integration and asset specificity 2.2
 
How should these networks of fuel retail stations be organized by the 
manufacturers of the products, in this case, the oil companies? Independent 
entrepreneurs could set up these dedicated fuel retail station and take supplies 
from the oil companies to distribute. Indeed this was the case when fuel retailing 
sector first started in the USA and in UK  (Dixon, 1963; 1964). However, the 
history of the fuel retailing sector in the USA tells us that by 1926, most of the 
fuel retail stations in the urban cities were set up and operated by oil companies. 
There are referred to as company-operated stations (Blass & Carlton, 2001), 
company-owned stations (Shepard, 1993; Taylor, 2000)  or direct stations (Slade, 
1998). This is more accurately described later as company-owned and company-
operated fuel retail stations3 (Lafontaine & Slade, 2007). Teece (2010) claims that 
at that time “there was not a large population of experienced candidates qualified 
to be independent dealers; so the integrated companies had to hire and train 
employees to manage and operate their retail outlets” (p. 278). Hence, the oil 
                                                
3
 Gasoline stations are classified in this literature as owned and operated by the oil company (CC contracts), owned by the 
company but operated by the dealer (CD contracts), or owned and operated by the dealer (DD contracts).  
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company refiners integrated forward into retailing to raise quality, improve 
standards and establish their brands. Thus fuel retailing became integrated into the 
larger oil industry.  
 
Many theories explaining vertical integration are based on the transaction cost 
concept. Transaction cost was first mooted by Coase who suggested that “the 
operation of a market costs something and by forming an organization and 
allowing some authority (an "entrepreneur") to direct the resources, certain 
marketing costs are saved” (Coase, 1937, p. 5). This concept of transaction cost as 
the basis for the existence of firm was developed and expanded further by 
Williamson (1981; 1988).  The difficulty has been to measure transaction costs 
directly. Instead, uncertainty, frequency and asset specificity are identified as 
critical dimensions and these dimensions are used to analyse the impact on 
organization, with asset specificity being considered as the most important 
dimension (Williamson, 1981). 
 
High asset specificity, which led to significant transaction costs owing to 
“opportunism”, is frequently cited as the reason for vertical integration. According 
to this theory, firms will be integrated when asset specificity is high and firms will 
not be integrated when asset specificity is low. The question therefore is whether 
the fuel retailing sector is integrated into the oil company because of high asset 
specificity. Not all the literatures on fuel retailing address this question directly, 
even when they cite Williamson and describe the vertically integrated nature of 




Lafontaine and Slade (2007) believe that asset specificity is far less important for 
retail contracting than for transacting between firms for intermediate inputs. They 
claim that the largest gasoline stations were high-volume self-service stations that 
were the least specialized and that owner of such a station, if terminated by one 
refiner, could easily switch to another refiner’s brand. In arguing against Dnes’ 
view (1993) that fuel retail stations in cities are high value and thus highly assets 
specific, Lafontaine and Slade (2007) argue that the high asset value is a reflection 
of the economic value of those city locations and they fail to find a direct 
relationship between high asset value and high asset specificity. Teece (2010), 
however, alludes to asset specificity of fuel retail stations when he claims that the 
forward integration by refiners into retailing is also “to avoid opportunism by non-
creditworthy independent operators” (p. 278).  
 
In SE Asia and North America, a fuel retail station may be owned by the oil 
company or the dealer. The dealership agreement for the oil company to supply 
fuels and the dealer to operate the fuel retail station may entail further investment 
by either party so that there is sharing of the total investment. While the share of 
the dealer may be small in comparison to the total investment, it is a big 
investment from his point of view. It is therefore unlikely for dealers to jeopardize 
their investment by antagonizing their respective oil company. With the small 
number of oil companies and the inadequate number of fuel retail stations in most 





There is no ad-hoc brand switching by individual dealers in SE Asia and fuel retail 
stations are rebranded usually when the whole network are sold by one oil 
company to another. Brand switching is not cost-free and most oil companies 
taking over fuel retail stations are reluctant to absorb the risk of using the existing 
underground fuel system. In line with the observations of Lafontaine and Slade 
(2007), asset specificity is also not an important consideration for determining the 
organization structure of the fuel retailing sector in SE Asia. 
 
 Vertical integration and dealership agreement 2.3
 
The fuel retailing sector in North America is not exclusively operated by oil 
companies. Dixon (1964) also described the evolution of the independent dealers, 
a group of entrepreneurs that owned the lands that were developed into fuel retail 
stations. These independent dealers offered multiple brands of fuels and were free 
to set the prices sold to the end customers, the drivers. Retailing multiple brands 
means selling fuels branded by the different oil companies from one fuel retail 
station. This freedom to offer multiple brands of fuels and set prices for these 
fuels is problematic for the oil companies that believe branding the fuel retail 
station and price control are important elements in fuel retailing. One method by 
the oil company to secure exclusive use of the fuel retail station, specifically to 
sell only its brand and to exert price control, is to assist the independent dealer 
financially to build the fuel retail station and for the independent dealer, through a 
contract, to assign part of the fuel retail stations to the oil company. This 
arrangement evolves subsequently to other dealer agreements with varying terms 
coined by the different oil companies such as “Commission Agency Agreement”, 
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“Pump and Property Lease”, “Lease and Agency”, “Lease and License” and 
“Commission Retail Plan”. These arrangements and the agreements between oil 
companies and dealers were subsequently simplified and consolidated and 
established in SE Asia as the dealer-owned dealer-operated fuel retail stations.  
 
The primary aim of the contractual arrangements with dealers is for the oil 
companies to exert control over the sector especially on the pricing and quality of 
the fuels sold at the fuel retail station without having to own the station and the 
assets of the station. Another development resulting in another form of dealership 
was driven by regulations in the USA from the 1930s to limit the growth of chain 
stores and stop oil companies from controlling pump prices (Borenstein & Gilbert, 
1993; Borenstein & Bushnell, 2005). As a result, many of the company-owned 
and operated sites were turned over to dealers to operate (Dixon, 1964). These 
fuel retail stations became the company-owned dealer-operated stations, a model 
that is also a common organizational arrangement in SE Asia.  
 
So with this bit of history, we have the three base organization arrangements 
established in the North American market and adopted in SE Asia, namely (1) 
company-owned company-operated stations, (2) company-owned dealer-operated 
stations and (3) dealer-owned dealer-operated stations. 
 
 Franchising model 2.4
 
Researchers studying the organization structure of fuel retailing took two different 
tracks. One track took the choice of contractual arrangement as given and studied 
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the impact from other variables such as price setting (1997; Borenstein & Shepard, 
1996; 2002; Slade, 1992) and service time (Png & Reitman, 1994). Another track 
tried to explain the contractual arrangement from the characteristics of the fuel 
retail network such as the size of the fuel retail station, penetration of the 
convenience store tie-in and the observability of the retailer’s effort (Vandergrift 
& Bisti, 2001; Johnson & Romeo, 2000).  
 
One research approach is to treat operating fuel retailing through a dealer as 
traditional franchising. Traditional franchising is different from the business-
format franchising. Business-format franchising, such as those applied for fast-
food restaurant and hotel, involves a franchisor without production capability, 
selling a way of doing business and a trademark to a franchisee. Traditional 
franchising involves an upstream manufacturer, the producer of the products such 
as gasoline and diesel, contracting with a downstream retailer such as station 
dealers, to distribute those products (Lafontaine & Slade, 2007).  
 
The agency theory has been used to predict the choice of contractual form for 
franchising. Agency theory refers to a contractual agreement with the principal as 
one party and the agent as the other that stipulates that the principal rewards the 
agent to carry out certain activities (Eisenhardt K. , 1988). This theory assumes 
that individuals will maximize their own self-interest and need to be monitored, 
which may be costly and ineffective (Perrow, 1986; Brickley & Dark, 1987; 
Brickley, Dark, & Weisbach, 1991). Gasoline retailing is considered an example 




Shepard (1993) applies the principal-agent analysis to understand the oil 
company’s choice of contractual form of the fuel retail stations in Massachusetts. 
She finds evidence that stations with service bays tend to be dealer-run because of 
higher monitoring costs by the principal, while stations that mainly sell gasoline 
and convenience store products tend to be company-operated because of lower 
monitoring costs. She implies that the choice of organizational form is selected by 
assuming that the type of backcourt services is chosen first. This cannot be true as 
backcourt services can be changed or added later by the appointed dealers. 
 
Taylor (2000) uses data from Los Angeles’ fuel retailing sector from 1992 to 1996 
to confirm using the vertical principal-agent framework, noting that “as the 
unobservability of effort becomes more important, refiners offer contracts to 
downstream retailers that include relatively more performance incentives, but less 
direct control” (p. 163). In the study, the retailer’s effort to maintain cleanliness, 
stock shelves, keep operating hours and reduce theft with accounting controls can 
be observed for stations with convenience stores. The retailer’s effort for those 
stations with full service offering automotive repair is treated as unobservable. 
This method of analysis cannot be applied to understand organization structure in 
SE Asia’s fuel retailing sector because fuel retail stations with convenience stores 
are not as well developed as those providing repair services. Convenience stores 
within fuel retail stations are successful only in a few countries and are not a 
practical option in many fuel retail stations in SE Asia. These two types of 
backcourt services cannot be compared to determine the choice of organizational 




 Fuel retail station configurations 2.5
 
Over the years, the simple activity of selling fuels to the car has evolved into 
various retail configurations. The academic literature analyses the effect of the 
difference in retail configuration comprising of full-service, no-frill self-service, 
24-hour operations, service bay, and convenience store (Goberman, 1978; 
Mitchell, 1980; Png & Reitman, 1994; Scott, 2007). Full service in North America 
means that the fuel retail station will have pump attendants to pump gasoline, 
check oil and clean windscreens for the customers and as such these pump 
attendants can provide the additional service of changing lubricating oil and 
offering repair services. This selling of lubricating oil and vehicle-related products 
at the forecourt is known in the fuel retailing sector as forecourt business. In this 
description, the forecourt using pump attendants to pump gasoline is known as 
forecourt with attended service. Backcourt business, if offered, consists of the 
combination of convenience store, lube-bay and car wash.  
 
The difference between full-service and self-service has become less distinct with 
the increased marketing mix of forecourt and backcourt businesses. This is 
because backcourt businesses always have to be supported by service personnel. 
The fuel retail business with and without attendants is further complicated by the 
different ways to pay. Payment can be done indoor to a cashier, outdoor to a 
cashier at a booth, outdoor to a pump attendant or directly through a payment 
device on the pump. This is especially relevant when analyzing the organization 
structure in SE Asia’s fuel retailing sector with different retail configurations 
within a country and across the countries that has implemented the different ways 
to pay. The fuel retail stations with fully attended service and providing exclusive 
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forecourt business will have staff to pump the fuel into the car and collect 
payment from the customers at multiple payment booths set up within the 
forecourt to speed up the payment process. In the partially attended service model, 
customers have the choice of pumping fuel or leaving this activity to pump 
attendants. This arrangement frees the customers to shop at the convenience store 
and make payment directly to the cashier indoor. In the fully automated fuel retail 
station that provides self-service, payment using credit or fleet card can be done 
directly at the “pump”. This “pump” is usually a more technologically 
sophisticated model incorporating a payment device that customers can handle 
intuitively and safely without any chance of them causing leaks or fire.  
 
To accommodate these different configurations, new players especially those 
specializing in the other areas of retailing are added into the sector. For example, 
Walmart, the well-known American general retailer, became a fuel retailer by 
owning some fuel retail stations, but it also has different contract relationships 
with refiners or other retailers for other fuel retail stations (Zacks Equity Research, 
2012). The use of credit card payment when transacted directly at the pump with 
the self-service configuration has resulted in higher drive-off and credit card fraud 
(Peretti, 2009). This brought in the banks and credit card associations with their 
entourage of fraud and security specialists to reduce these operational risks. Even 
the no-frill self-service stations were subjected to regulations governing safety, 
health and environmental protection that have surpassed the skills of the average 
dealers. For example, the leak protection requirements would require specialists to 
manage the underground tanks to ensure compliance with environmental 




Although these reconfigurations add new players and change the roles of existing 
players including the duties previously handled by the dealers, academic studies 
address only the role of the dealer and ignore other players supporting the dealer 
in the fuel retailing sector (Shepard, 1991; Mitchell, 1980). In addition, these 
papers also assume that the no-frill self-service model is easier to support than the 
full-service model and that a convenience store needs less skill to run than a 
service bay. In the study of price discrimination, the full-service model and self-
service model are treated as different forms of products such that stations offering 
both types of services are treated as multiproduct stations (Shepard, 1991; Barron, 
Taylor, & Umbeck, 2001). 
 
 Industry Architecture of fuel retailing 2.6
 
The fuel retailing sector started with the independent dealer, typically a mechanic, 
as the sole party selling fuels manually by decanting from a barrel of gasoline or 
diesel into two-gallon petrol cans and collecting cash from customers (Dixon, 
1963). Selling fuel was treated as a secondary business to his main business of 
repairing vehicles. This has since evolved to the modern fuel retail station with 
forecourt and backcourt businesses. The forecourt business of selling of fuels is 
now the main business line but running just forecourt business is increasingly 
difficult for the dealer to maintain profitability. The reduced profit margin is 
brought on by the increasing costs of selling an essential commodity that must be 
“provided at the lowest possible cost, with great reliability and security of supply, 
while still ensuring a cleaner environment” (West, 2003, p. 47). Thus, the 
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forecourt business has to be supplemented with secondary or backcourt businesses, 
which can be any combination of convenience store, lubrication bay and 
automatic car wash.  
 
There are also different ways of serving customers, either as full service with 
attendants or self-service with payment booth located at the forecourt or 
unattended self-service with customers interacting with payment device 
incorporated into the pump. Depending on the size of the forecourt and the 
operating hours, there could be more than 2,000 motor vehicles to be served each 
day. The dealer alone can no longer cope with such volume and the fuel retailing 
sector is organized to have many other players, many of them behind the scenes 
but playing increasingly important roles. For example, the roles that support the 
automated payment device at the pump ensure that the station system, the 
communication network, the central data switches and the front-end and back-end 
processors are functioning securely and quickly. These roles are more critical in 
keeping the fuel retail station operating non-stop than that of the dealer’s much 
reduced role.   
 
With many of these roles inserted between the oil companies and the dealers, the 
fuel retailing sector is also no longer vertically integrated. Jacobides (2005) 
notices the vertical disintegration occurring within the sectors when he studied the 
mortgage banking industry. He analysed the division of labour in the mortgage 
banking sector and saw how the industry evolves to include different participants 
and new rules connecting them.  He claims that this happened in sectors even 
when “the underlying products, services, and core technologies remain the same” 
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(Jacobides, 2005, p. 465). The fuel retailing sector has been in existence for more 
than a hundred years. While there have been changes and improvements, the main 
business line of fuel retailing has remain essentially the same. Yet the 
organization structure is evolving not only to include new players but that the 
existing players had their roles modified.   
 
Thus the networks of fuel retail stations cannot simply be grouped into a few types 
of direct-operation, franchise-operation and dealer-operations for in-depth analysis. 
Even the term franchise operations is ambiguous in that there are many variations 
as can be seen in the legal cases in the US between franchisees and oil companies, 
where the definition of the term “franchise” under US legislation was being 
contested (Every, 1984). The concept of industry architecture recognizes that the 
“even players who, from a distance, seem to cover the same spot in the value 
chain, are really quite distinct species” (Jacobides, 2008, p. 259).  
 
Jacobides, Knudsen and Augier suggest that “participants along the value chain, 
with a distinct view of how the industry architecture should be structured, fought 
to be the guarantors of quality” (Jacobides, Knudsen, & Augier, 2006, p. 9).  They 
cite historical examples of the case of Port wine in which the shippers gained a 
reputation over the growers to be the guarantors of quality. Similarly, the 
producers won against the importers to be the guarantors of quality for French 
Claret. This fight to be the dominant player in each sector continues today because 
the guarantors of quality can shape the industry architecture so as “to keep a large 
part of the industry profits by carving out a comfortable position in their sector” 
(Jacobides, Knudsen, & Augier, 2006, p. 11). This jostling for position is not new 
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in the oil industry because it is well-known that multinational oil corporations as 
“chain keepers are in a position to negotiate better deals and, consequently, extract 
high profit shares in the value created, while the weak participants are content 
with the leftovers” (Bougrine, 2006, p. 35). 
 
In the fuel retail sector, the oil companies are assumed to be the guarantor of 
quality or the chain keepers. Existing literature implicitly agrees with this 
assumption by placing the oil companies as the principals in the study of agency 
problems of franchising and as the dominant parties in the different dealership 
arrangements. There is no academic study to assess whether the oil companies can 
remain in the dominant position especially when the sector evolves. Trade 
literature shows the attempt by hypermarkets to usurp this dominant role which 
will lead to a change in the profitability for the existing players in the fuel retail 
sector  (Morris, 2002; Leto, 2001). Hypermarkets have the strategy of offering 
gasoline almost at cost to drive volume so as to increase the sales of the higher 
margin products in their store (Reid, 2004). It is thus necessary that oil companies 
maintain their dominant role in the industry architecture as the sector evolves to 
include many new players. These players are taking up critical roles that may be 
recognized as more important that the roles of the oil companies and the dealers. 
 
 Risk and uncertainty  2.7
 
Theories of the firm, organization structure and vertical integration that are based 
on transaction cost economics automatically adopted risk – or rather, uncertainty – 
as a core assumption. This is because Coase states that it is “improbable that a 
31 
 
firm would emerge without the existence of uncertainty” (Coase, 1937, p. 5).  
Williamson also places uncertainty with frequency and asset specificity as critical 
dimensions for determining the choice of organization structure (Williamson O. E., 
1979). However, both Coase and Williamson did not explain how uncertainty 
would lead to different organization structures (Slater & Spencer, 2000).  
 
“Uncertainty” is distinguished from “risk” by Knight (1921) in his book, Risk, 
Uncertainty and Profit. He defines “risk” as a measurable quantity such that a 
decision maker will make the same prediction when given the same information 
and “uncertainty” as unquantifiable such that required the decision maker to 
decide based on intuition. He wrote that there were several methods for humans to 
deal with uncertainty, among them, consolidation and specialization. Thus, 
Knight’s version of organization structure is that uncertainty will lead to the 
“tendency of the groups themselves to specialize, finding the individuals with the 
greatest managerial capacity of the requisite kinds and placing them in charge of 
the work of the group, submitting the activities of the other members to their 
direction and control” (Knight, 1921, Paragraph III.IX.10). 
 
Some researchers classify uncertainty into different types and compare how the 
different types of uncertainty impact organizational structure. These comparisons 
include the study of volume uncertainty versus technological uncertainty (Walker 
& Weber, 1987), supply versus demand uncertainty (Carlton, 1979) and 
commercial versus technological uncertainty (Schilling, 2002). Another study into 
the firms’ environments divided uncertainty into primary, competitive and 
supplier uncertainty and tested hypotheses as to how these different forms of 
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uncertainty affect the extent of vertical integration (Sutcliffe & Zaheer, 1998). 
However, the empirical results by classifying uncertainty differently give mixed 
results with no clear implications for the boundaries of the firm and the extent of 
vertical integration. 
 
Cheung (1969) noticed that there were a variety of contractual arrangements under 
the same constraints of competition. He studied “three main forms of contracts in 
agriculture, namely, a fixed-rent contract (rent per acre stated in cash or in crop), a 
share contract and a wage contract” (p. 25). The wage contract, that is using farm 
hands, represents the vertical integrated model. The other two, fixed and share 
contracts, are vertically disintegrated models with different share of risks among 
parties. He explains that one type of contract is chosen over the other to disperse 
risk-bearing and minimize transaction cost. In times of higher uncertainty, he 
claims that share contracts would be chosen.  
 
However, another researcher, Hanumantha Rao (1971) presented data from India 
that shows, unlike China, high uncertainty led to fixed contracts. From these two 
researchers and many others, Allen and Lueck (1995) argue that risk aversion is 
not useful in explaining contracts. They claim that risk preferences are arbitrarily 
assumed in the principal-agent model, that the risk sharing model is difficult to 
test and that it is inappropriate to measure incentives from contracts of varying 
diverging goods. They claim that there are other important forces shaping 
contracts. In other words, risk aversion would not help to explain the different 




The literature on fuel retailing sector does not address the relationship of risk and 
uncertainty and organization structure directly, but risk and uncertainty are 
addressed by researchers studying similar organization structures used in non-fuel 
retailing sectors. One researcher claims that the industry can use superior control 
over the assets and capabilities in a vertically integrated structure to achieve 
superior responsiveness under uncertainty. He claims that in the fashion apparel 
industry, the bigger players use their vertically integrated structure to respond 
quickly to mitigate the risk due to volatility inherent in the industry (Richardson, 
1996). Martin (1988), in a study on franchising and risk management, claims that 
“uncertainty does matter in the franchising choice. Given various sites with 
different risk and expected return characteristics, the firm will take advantage of 
the opportunity to diversify the risk and to shed locations with higher risk-induced 
monitoring costs (p. 965)”.   
 
This approach to diversify risk can explain why fuel retail stations are converted 
to different organization structures when a network is purchased by another oil 
company. This reason is often not highlighted as risk management is often buried 
in the tactics of management practice. Knight’s distinction between risk and 
uncertainty is also not important in the practice of risk management  (Corvellec, 
2009). In Hasting’s study (2004) of the purchase of the independent retail gasoline 
chain, Thrifty, by ARCO, she reported that even though there was no remodeling 
or station expansion done, some of the Thrifty stations were converted to lessee-
dealer stations, some were converted to dealer owned company-supplied or 
jobber-supplied stations, and some were converted to company-operations. 
Hasting did not offer a reason for the conversion but risk management could have 
34 
 
explained for these conversions since risk assessment exercise is usually done as a 
due diligence activity for taking over a fuel retail network. 
 
 Institutional environment and organization structure 2.8
 
North (1991) defines institutions as the “the humanly devised constraints that 
structure political, economic and social interaction”. The institutional environment, 
which is shaped by these constraints, can impact organization structure in several 
ways. Henisz (2000) described the choice of market entry mode by multinational 
firms on the effects of political hazard, theorizing that multinational firms can 
partner local firms to alleviate the threat of expropriation in the face of increasing 
political hazards but warned that this hazard-mitigating benefit may be diminished 
by increasing contractual hazards with the local firms. This research separates 
local firms into national and independent firms as these two types of firms are 
impacted differently by political hazards.   
 
Gulati and Nickerson (2008) suggests that “high levels of pre-existing inter-
organizational trust increased the probability that a less formal, and thus less 
costly, mode of governance was chosen over a more formal one”. In other words, 
higher levels of trusts may support the increase in vertical disintegration by 
allowing players to cooperate informally. Trust is a form of social norms or 
informal rules among people and can be used in small community to mitigate 




Oxley (1999) found that in studying the governance modes adopted by firms in 
countries with weak intellectual property protection is that the use of equity joint 
venture structure “mitigates appropriability hazards by more closely aligning the 
incentives of the partners, and providing enhanced monitoring and control 
capabilities”.  
 
 Summary and theoretical gap 2.9
 
The purpose of the literature review is to search for the existing theories that can 
be used to explain a phenomenon in this case why the fuel retail sector is 
organized with multiple independent economic players in various combinations 
and relationships coexisting within a sector. There are several academic studies 
that address the organization structure of the fuel retail sector but these are based 
on the model with two economic players and analysed on the characteristics 
peculiar to the North American markets. These theories are inadequate to explain 
organization structure of the fuel retail sector in SE Asia that has evolved to 
include multiple players within the sector. 
 
The impact on the organization structure under constraints such as the restrictions 
on operating hours, setting prices and operating with the self-service arrangement 
is easier to explain with two economic players. This model of two economic 
players has one player represented by the group of oil companies supplying the 
fuels and the other player represented by the group of dealers operating the fuel 
retail stations. The literature also uses agency theory to explain the choice of 
contractual form for franchising. Agency theory treats franchising as a model with 
two players, the principal as one player that rewards the other player, an agent to 
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carry out certain activities. This theory claims that the choice of organization 
structure is based on whether the effort of the agent is observable and 
unobservable and on whether the principal will have to incur higher monitoring 
costs.  
 
The fuel retail sector has evolved to include more than just the two players. Yet 
the academic literature fails to recognize the other players supporting the fuel 
retail sector as important. For example, the roles of the pump attendants and 
cashiers are eliminated when operating the fuel retail stations under self-service 
but this operating mode has to be supported by a different group of players, the 
system support and the banking system specialists that need not be physically 
present at the station. However, to keep to the model of two players, one academic 
analysis treats self-service and full service as different product offerings (Shepard, 
1991).   
 
Uncertainty, frequency and asset specificity are identified as critical dimensions in 
transaction costs and used to analyse the choice of organization structure 
(Williamson O. E., 1981). But literature on the fuel retail sector does not consider 
the asset specificity of the fuel retail stations as an important dimension in 
determining the choice of organization structure. The dimension of frequency is 
also not a characteristic of the fuel retail sector since players are tied down with 
long term contracts. This leaves uncertainty as the critical dimension left to 




Uncertainty is evaluated in the studies on the choice of organization structure by 
identifying different types of uncertainty, but this approach does not give clear 
causality (Walker & Weber, 1987; Carlton, 1979; Schilling, 2002; Sutcliffe & 
Zaheer, 1998). Another academic approach to uncertainty is to relate the risk 
preferences of players to the choice of organization structure, but the result from 
these studies is inconsistent (Cheung, 1969; Hanumantha Rao, 1971). One 
approach that has not been used is to relate risk and uncertainty to organization 
structure is the application of risk management. Risk management does not 
separate risk and uncertainty as the purpose of risk management is to reduce the 
exposure to all types of risk and minimize the impact of a risk event should it 
occur.  
 
In summary, existing theories cannot explain why the fuel retail sector operates 
with multiple independent economic players in various combinations and 
relationships coexisting in the sector. One reason for the inadequacy of existing 
theories is that these are based on a model with two economic players. The other 
reason is that there was no attempt to explore the effect of risk management on 
organization structure of the fuel retail sector. Jacobides suggests that an industry 
evolves to include different participants and new rules connecting them within a 
sector. Yet the process of vertical disintegration, the emergence of new 
intermediate markets, is not understood. He suggests that “on the empirical side, it 
is desirable to better document and explain vertical disintegration and market 
creation, as this process has significant implications for industries and the firms 




3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This research is a multiple-case study using qualitative data, inductive logic and 
the case study approach. The aim of this research is to build theory to explain the 
cause of the multiple levels of industry architecture in the fuel retail sector.  There 
are many case study research methods but many researchers cited the process of 
building theory from qualitative case study by Eisenhardt (1989). Her framework 
on inducing theory from case study is detailed over 8 steps. While this research 
would have benefitted from using all these steps, this study cannot claim to have 
followed her research method. Eisenhardt discourages researchers from claiming 
to follow a particular method. Instead she suggests using “processes that are 
reported with transparent description, particularly regarding how the theory was 
inducted from the data (e.g., description of cross-case comparison techniques)” 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 30).   
 
While I do not claim to have followed her framework, I wrote three of the 
chapters along the logical path described by her research methodology. These 
three chapters are the a) Within-case analysis, b) Cross-case analysis and c) 
Discussion. She suggests that the detailed case-study write-up be written as 
“simply pure description” and that the within-case analysis follows a process to 
“allow unique patterns of each case to emerge before investigators push to 
generalize pattern across cases. For cross-case analysis, she suggests “searching 
for patterns” and not to “leap into conclusions based on limited data”  (Eisenhardt 
K. M., 1989, p. 540). The development of the theory, conclusion, contributions 




For research that has cases spanning multiple countries in SE Asia, there are 
several issues on gathering information and data for the within-case analysis. 
While many of our contacts in these countries can speak conversational English, 
trying to understand the reasons behind organizational changes entails more in-
depth discussion. There are also cultural barriers and customs that made it difficult 
for even for someone coming from one country in SE Asia to understand someone 
in another SE Asian country. I am glad that my colleagues are from various part of 
SE Asia and have been the ones to gather data and information for the research. 
This is described in the chapters below.     
 
While it is relatively easier to get data to show that the sector operates with 
multiple levels of industry architecture in SE Asia, it is much harder to obtain 
information that can explain the underlying reasons for the sector to be in such a 
state. Only a careful analysis of a wide range of case studies can reveal patterns in 
the organization structures within the sector that may point to a plausible 
explanation. 
 
Information and data on the oil industry including the fuel retailing sector are 
often shrouded in secrecy (Stevens, 1995). Researchers quickly realized that the 
amount and quality of information and data released by oil companies vary 
“depending on their degree of cooperation and their concerns over disclosing 
proprietary information” (Grant, 2003, p. 498). This disclosure of information is 
even worse for national oil companies especially on the reasons behind the 
decisions made by the governments. The applied economist analysing the oil 
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industry will find “decisions are even more arbitrary, whimsical and difficult to 
unravel” (Stevens, 1995, p. 130).  
 
To know the underlying reasons for organizational changes, it is necessary for a 
researcher to immerse himself completely in the fuel retailing sector to know the 
players and the relationship between them, the daily and ad-hoc activities, the 
planning, reporting and monitoring processes (Grant, 2003) and learn the specific 
terms used between players in the sector. He can then interact and discuss with 
these players at multiple levels using industry terms so as to understand the 
motives behind each change in organization structure. To meet this requirement of 
being immersed in the sector, I am fortunate that I have been working in the oil 
industry from 1979 and to be involved specifically in the fuel retailing sector since 
1989.  
 
 Period covered  3.1
 
The period covered by this research is mainly from 2000 to 2013. Since many of 
the base organizational structures were established prior to 2000, some as early as 
the start of the fuel retailing sector in SE Asia, the reasons governing the choice of 
the base organization structures used in the fuel retail network in SE Asia cannot 
be easily established. Thus this research searches for the reasons behind the 
modifications made to the organization structure rather than the reasons for the 
choice of the original organization structures. It is these modifications to the 





Although this research focuses on uncovering the underlying reasons for the 
organization changes that were implemented after 2000, some organizational 
adjustments implemented between 1990 and 2000 are included. These 
implementations are added to the analysis as they remain relevant beyond 2000. 
However, the information prior to 2000 came from interviewing the older veterans 
and details of some of these implementations are obtained from single source. The 
details of the implementations after 2000 are easier to verify among multiple 
interviewees. Some of the implementations can also be observed in the field and 
checked against archived documents given by interviewees. 
 
 Leveraging on work experience 3.2
 
This chapter described how I obtained the information for this research by 
leveraging on my colleagues’ work experience and network in the fuel retail 
sector. My past and present work also gave me the access to the participants in 
fuel retailing sector and the data in my current company (Table 1).  I will describe 
in a later paragraph on why and how these data were obtained from the field by 
my colleagues in my current company, Gilbarco Veeder-root.  
 
My initial involvement in organization structure of fuel retailing was as an 
implementer in Esso Singapore from 1989 to 2000. This background and 
immersion have been helpful in the research, especially in learning the terms 
specific to the fuel retailing sector. However, this knowledge cannot explain the 
choice of a particular organization structure to be implemented or reveal the 
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underlying reasons for the incremental changes to the organization structure that 
came later. Truly, I was no different from the fish in the proverb – “I don’t know 
who discovered water, but I’m pretty sure it wasn’t a fish.”  
 
In 1989, I was part of a small team with project management experience in the 
refinery tasked to modernize Esso’s network of fuel retail stations in Singapore. 
Similar modernization programmes were also carried out by the other oil 
companies, Mobil, Caltex, Shell and BP, for their networks across SE Asia. 
Following the completion of the modernization programme, these oil companies 
then competed by implementing harmonization and optimization programmes, 
lowering costs to improve efficiency and reducing risk exposure that might bring 
down the operation of a fuel retail station or the whole network. Esso Singapore 
implemented Retail Site Operation Initiative (RSOI) to simplify station-level 
activities, outsourced non-essential tasks and reduce faults, frauds and accidents.  
 
Safety, health and environmental policies and enforcements are prominent in all 
oil companies. These programmes are given different acronyms – SHE, HSE, 
HES and ESH – by different oil companies but are similar in nature. This 
responsibility was delegated down the management hierarchy and one of the roles 
Time 
period 




- Esso refinery 
Project Engineer/Business 
Analyst/Financial Analyst 





- Esso Marketing  
Project management and 
operations of Esso Singapore’s 
fuel retail network.  






General manager  Retail automation of fuel retailing in 







Technical Director for Asia 
Pacific.  
Participated with colleagues in many oil 
companies programmes in improving fuel 
retail networks across SE Asia. 





in retail operations was to implement and enforce the company’s SHE policies. 
One prominent change to the SHE programme in the operation of the fuel retail 
network is to use leading instead of lagging indicators. Lagging indicators 
measure incidents that have happened such as the number and types of injuries in 
a month. Leading indicators measure training programmes, audit sessions and 
incidents such as near misses so that counter-measures can be put in place.  
 
There were many other programmes involving risk management of the fuel retail 
sector. Two of the programmes specific to Esso are the “Control and Integrity 
Management System” (CIMS) and the “Operations and Integrity Management 
System” (OIMS). Another programme undertaken by all major, national and the 
bigger independent oil companies was the “Underground Risk Management” 
(URM). The URM programme is to ensure that the underground fuel system is not 
leaking and the integrity of the underground system was assessed using the risk 
matrix.  
 
After leaving Esso Singapore in 2000, I worked for Crossecom for two years 
before joining Gilbarco Veeder-Root (Gilbarco Veeder-Root, 2013). Crossecom 
was the system solution provider while Gilbarco Veeder-Root (GVR), an 
American multinational company is the world’s largest supplier of equipment and 
automation systems for the fuel retail network  (Gilbarco Inc, 2013).  
 
My colleagues in Gilbarco Veeder-root have to support the equipment supplied to 
most of the oil companies in Asia. This provided them with the direct access to the 
executives in these oil companies. Through interactions with these executives, my 
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colleagues had the opportunities to observe and understand the decisions made by 
the oil companies in organizing their network. These observations were 
documented as trip reports in the company. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the information from this research is taken with permission 
from my current company (see Appendix A). The information on the 
organizational changes in the sector was collected by my colleagues in Gilbarco 
Veeder-Root. Why would a supplier of fuel retail station equipment be collecting 
this information and trying to understand the organization of the sector? In 2002, 
my new colleagues were faced with difficulties working in a sector that was 
undergoing significant structural changes. For example, BP had sold its fuel retail 
networks to independent oil companies, SPC in Singapore and BHPetrol in 
Malaysia. These two new owners had to scale up their own organizations to 
maintain their enlarged fuel retail networks. ExxonMobil, formed from the merger 
of Esso and Mobil, introduced many organizational changes in order to optimize 
the management of the combined fuel retail network. ExxonMobil and 
subsequently Shell started to use asset management companies, SKM (Sinclair 
Knight Merz) to construct fuel retail stations and JCI (Johnson Control, 
Incorporated) to maintain fuel retail stations. Previously, these construction and 
maintenance activities were managed by in-house engineers using local 
contractors. This meant that the existing relationship established between 
equipment suppliers and oil companies was broken and that the suppliers, like 
Gilbarco Veeder-Root, had to sell their equipment through the asset management 




The oil companies have also reduced their support selectively for the fuel retail 
stations within the network. My colleagues had to understand the different 
organization structures of the fuel retail networks in order to identify the decision-
makers who were responsible for buying equipment and services. For example, a 
dealer owning and operating a fuel retail station will make his own decisions 
about buying equipment and maintaining his station. This is not that clear when 
the land is owned by the oil company but the fuel retail station is operated by a 
dealer. Some equipment such as the fuel dispensing pump and site automation 
system were mandated by oil companies and these had to be purchased from 
nominated suppliers. However, some oil companies passed the rights to choose 
equipment and service suppliers to the dealers under schemes such as the 
“branded marketer” arrangement. This is to prevent the consequence of any 
adverse events arising from faulty equipment at the fuel retail station being linked 
to their mandated choice.    
 
With the structural changes to organization that affected the relationship between 
players in the sector, it was important for all the players such as equipment 
suppliers like Gilbarco Veeder-Root to know the organization structures in the 
different country. With such knowledge, these suppliers can then establish 
business relationships with the right parties. It is for this reason that my colleagues 
gathered information including details of special programmes implemented by oil 
companies that impacted players in the sector. This information is the source of 
numerical data that I have tapped on for this research. 
 




This research is based on formal and informal interviews and observing what was 
put into practice by the oil companies. My colleagues that are Filipino, Thai and 
Malay helped to overcome the difficulties with language, custom and culture in 
the different countries. In the last decade, my colleagues and I travelled around 
and beyond SE Asia working with fuel retailers to improve their infrastructure and 
business operations. The prolonged engagement in the field made us “human 
instrument” for data collection which allows for more detailed and accurate 
information to be gathered for analysis. In the chapter “Collecting Evidence”, Yin 
(2002, p. 94) mentioned that “the most distinctive opportunity is related to your 
ability to gain access to events or groups that are otherwise inaccessible to 
scientific investigation.”  
 
My colleagues in Gilbarco Veeder-root were also invited by oil companies to 
participate in a number of programmes, convention and seminars, for example 
ExxonMobil’s CRUSO (Company Retail Unattended Site Operations) programme, 
Petronas’ 2011 Technology Showcase, Pertamina’s LPG seminar and Chevron’s 
branded marketer deployment. They have also attended exhibitions and 
conventions arranged annually by PetrolWorld and PEI/NACS (NACS, 2013; 
Petrolworld.com, 2013; PEI, 2013). 
 
Many of my colleagues travelled extensively, averaging more than one trip a 
month each. Most trips to Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Philippines were on 
regular basis as we have established businesses but there were also exploratory 
trips to Myanmar, Vietnam and Cambodia. Many oil companies in these new 
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developing nations were interested in improving their fuel retail network and 
consulted Gilbarco Veeder-root for its expertise. These trips were not limited to 
meeting the oil company’s executives at the head-office but included trips to fuel 
retail stations and terminals.   
 
The visits to the fuel retail stations and terminals provided opportunities to interact 
with the dealers and terminal operators. These dealers typically operated under the 
major oil companies’ company-owned dealer-operated model. They explained that 
their roles were set out by restrictive terms in the contract and that they had to 
absorb the risks posed by third-party service providers engaged by the oil 
company. Those dealers operating under dealer-owned dealer-operated model 
shared about the lack of support and trust between them and the oil company.  My 
colleagues participation on these trips reinforced their “ability to perceive reality 
from the viewpoint of someone ‘inside’ the case study rather than external to it” 
and “such a perspective is invaluable in producing an ‘accurate’ portrayal of a 
case study phenomenon” (Yin, 2002, p. 94).   
 
In addition, my colleagues made numerous field trips beyond SE Asia and 
countries visited include Pakistan, India, China, Japan, Taiwan, HK and South 
Korea. These trips allowed them to understand the ways networks of fuel retail 
stations were organized and controlled under different regulations, technological 
constraints and social norms in Asia. For example, the fuel retail networks of were 
operated similarly in developed countries like Hong Kong and Singapore. Both 
countries have fuel retail networks owned and operated by major oil companies 
with the Hong Kong’s networks managed from Singapore as the regional head-
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office. It is only from such visits and interactions with the staff that my colleagues 
and I can understand the reasons for the differences in the two fuel retail networks. 
In contrast, in developing countries such as Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar, 
the trips provided us the chance to experience and observe first-hand the use of the 
dispersed fuel retail methods (Melaina, 2007) that predated the dedicated fuel 
retail stations. 
 
One of the problems in collecting numerical data on organization structure is the 
difficulty of just getting someone out there to make a count. This includes getting 
general information such as whether it is dealer-operated or company-operated. 
Many fuel retail stations regardless of operations are similar in appearance, the 
dealers are frequently absent from station and the hired professional station 
managers at the station cannot tell the difference between their operational 
structure and that of the fuel retail station next door. Fortunately, Gilbarco 
Veeder-Root, the global leader in fuel dispenser technology and integrated 
fuelling solutions, was often called to participate in the specialized programmes 
held by the oil companies and we were given details of the organization structure 
of the network during these exercises. 
 
One of the programmes implemented by all oil companies and in which we 
participated was the “Underground Risk Management” (URM) programme. Under 
this programme, we were given the list of fuel retail stations that were operated 
directly by oil companies, since only company-owned fuel retail stations were 
nominated for the URM programme. The mitigation of underground risks for 
dealers was different from those operated directly by oil companies. This was 
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because company-owned company-operated sites were exclusively installed with 
more sophisticated models of leak monitoring equipment so that they can be 
centrally monitored. Chevron provided the list of dealer-owned dealer-operated 
stations that would be aggregated under the branded marketer programme. The list 
of fuel retail stations was given to us as the programme of reducing asset 
ownership meant that equipment and service providers like Gilbarco Veeder-Root 
had to sell equipment to the owners and operators of the fuel retail stations 
directly. 
 
Over the years and by working with oil companies that provided details of their 
programmes, we built up a database of the types of organization structures for fuel 
retail networks across SE Asia and how these networks were operated. These were 
summarized into tables for the different countries for this research.  
 
However, while analysis of the numerical data shows differences in organization 
structure across and within the countries, these data cannot provide the reasons as 
to why and how these differences arose. The case studies, which also gather the 
opinions of the professionals working in the fuel retailing sector in their respective 
domains, are then used to interpret and explain the causes of these differences. 
 
 Selecting cases 3.4
 
The use of multiple-case qualitative studies is to emulate the scientific research 
process of conducting multiple experiments. The cases have to be chosen so that 
the phenomenon would be uncovered through pattern-matching logic that can be 
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replicated across these cases by treating each case as an experiment (Eisenhardt, 
1989; 1991). This approach means that the cases cannot be chosen by sampling 
such as picking and studying a random sample of the more than twenty thousand 
fuel retail stations across SE Asia. This is because fuel retail stations are grouped 
by oil companies into networks that have to operate similarly. For example, an oil 
company will group and control a network of company-owned company-operated 
stations with station managers following a strict set of procedures. In the case of a 
network of dealer-owned dealer-operated stations, the same oil company will 
control the station operators through contractual arrangements leaving the day-to-
day operating procedures to the dealers.   
 
Since samples taken from within the same network in a particular country and 
under the same oil company will have features that are easily replicated and could 
thereby suggest a wrong theory, I grouped the 20,000 fuel retail stations in SE 
Asia into the 60 different networks that were operated by the 40 different oil 
entities. In this count of entities, Shell in Singapore was counted as a separate 
entity from Shell in Malaysia because they were organized differently under the 
constraints imposed by the respective countries. The best approach thus is to 
choose the cases based on countries and to analyse each country at a deeper level 
based on the different entities. It is also necessary to recognize that these entities 
could be major, national and independent oil companies and that some of these 
entities may have fuel retail networks that in multiple countries.  
 
Of the five cases chosen, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand have an 
average of about 4,200 fuel retail stations each. Singapore was added even though 
51 
 
it has a small number of fuel retail stations because it hosted the operational head-
office of most of the major oil companies operating in SE Asia. The size of the 
country or its economic position does not really influence the type of organization 
structure. For example, Singapore and Brunei are of comparable size and level of 
economic development, but the organization structure for fuel retail was totally 
different. Brunei has one major oil company, Shell, and has almost all the fuel 
retail stations operated as dealer-owned dealer-operated stations. Singapore has 
four major oil companies that owned and operated fuel retail stations directly.  
The five cases with the key oil companies chosen for the research are tabulated in 
Table 2. 
 
The five cases have contrasting or overlapping features. Singapore and Indonesia 
were on polar ends of organization structure with Singapore operating exclusively 
with company-owned company-operated stations and Indonesia operating mainly 
with dealer-owned dealer-operated stations. Malaysia and Indonesia controlled 
pump prices so as to provide subsidized fuels to its citizens. The full-service 
model from Thailand with pump attendants and cashiers was in sharp contrast to 
the practically empty forecourt in Malaysia using the self-service model. 
 
Table 2 Case study countries with key oil companies 
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Philippines and Indonesia have similar geographical constraints in that they have 
to support networks of fuel retail stations on multiple islands.  
 
One concern with the chosen cases would be whether there are replicating features 
across these heterogeneous countries and with the different oil companies. 
Surprisingly, there are. For example, all the oil companies, including the 
independent oil company in Singapore, SPC, used the same organizational 
arrangement to outsource tanker truck operations and to contract professional 
station managers. Across the countries, major oil companies enforce similar 
operating models. For example, Chevron Philippines and Chevron Malaysia 
implemented the branded marketer scheme under the different constraints of the 
host countries. There were also organizational changes that were not unique to 
specific countries or oil companies in the samples that have replicating features. 
For example, PTT of Thailand formed a separate entity, PTTRM, and kept the 
existing organizational structure unchanged after taking over ProJet network. This 
approach was replicated by Pertamina that took over the Petronas network in 
Indonesia and Petron that took over the ExxonMobil network in Malaysia. 
  
The oil companies in the five case-study countries are also classified into major, 
national and independent oil companies. Originally, I wanted to treat these groups 
as another three cases. However, case study based on this classification is difficult. 
Only major oil companies have sizable networks across countries. National oil 
companies, Petronas of Malaysia and PTT of Thailand, have networks overseas 
making them technically regional oil companies but their small network overseas 
have insignificant impact in the overseas market. Petron which was taken over by 
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private non-oil company SMC was an anomaly of transiting from a national oil 
company to an independent oil company. The low profile takeover of SPC by 
PetroChina has also elevated SPC to an ambiguous position. SPC operates as an 
independent oil company but it is controlled as if it is under a major oil company.  
 
The major oil companies operating fuel retail networks in SE Asia and chosen for 
the research are Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell and Total. The national oil 
companies chosen are Petronas in Malaysia, Pertamina in Indonesia, Petron in 
Philippines and PTT, PTT-RM, Bangchak in Thailand. There are many 
independent oil companies operating in SE Asia and those used in this research 
are SPC of Singapore, BHPetrol of Malaysia, Paktai Oil of Thailand and SeaOil, 
Flying V and Phoenix of Philippines.  
 
 Information gathering 3.5
 
This research employs many methods to obtain information such as interviews 
with oil executives, direct observations of the oil company staff and dealers at fuel 
retail stations, informal discussions with other players in the fuel retail sector, 
seminars and conferences set up by oil companies and email exchanges. Modern 
communications provide additional ways of collecting and verifying information 
through the use of Linkedin, Facebook and instant messaging. Appendix A 
provides a transcription of an interview and an exchange using Facebook to verify 




The data and information for the research was taken from Gilbarco Veeder-Root 
and were collected by my colleagues. I wrote to the local managing director at the 
start of the PhD programme for permission to have access to the data (see 
Appendix A). Since the interviewees are customers of Gilbarco Veeder-Root, I 
have also written to them formally under company’s email to seek permission to 
interview them. However, follow-up questions and informal discussion sessions 
with these interviewees were done on private basis. These informal sessions were 
done face-to-face in the evenings when I visited them in their countries.    
 
This research uses numeric data which are based on a classification of the types of 
fuel retailing models. Each oil company has its own definition of the different 
operational structures including different names for them, but these are subsumed 
under three base organization structures which are elaborated later in the thesis. 
The numerical data is collated with a reasonably consistent definition of the base 
organization structures for the analysis.  
 
The interviewees are the oil company executives that manage the network of fuel 
retail stations (Table 3). They are the engineers, engineering managers, system 
engineers, network planners and area managers who are tasked to build, operate, 
manage and maintain the fuel retail stations. A number of interviewees are 
regional managers or managers that have moved from one oil company to another 
oil company. These interviewees share their views on the differences in their roles 
operating in the different countries and with different oil companies. All the 
interviewees have been in the fuel retail industry for more than 10 years. A 




The formal interviews with professionals in the industry were transcribed for 
analysis (see example in Appendix A). A number of players, such as dealers and 
site operators, were not comfortable with being interviewed formally. Instead, 
informal discussions with these players before and after the formal interviews 
were used to build up the cases. Some of the interviewees have difficulty 
expressing in English the reasons for making organizational changes to their 
network. For example, when I met the operations, construction and procurement 
managers of Paktai Oil together with my Thai colleague, these managers provided 
the requirements of what they needed to transform their network but they could 
not explain the motives for making the transformation. These motives were 
answered only when my colleague met them separately and over several sessions 
and as such information under these circumstances was obtained through my 
colleagues or partners. I have indicated these colleagues in the list of interviewees. 
To ensure accuracy, the translated information was taken from two or more 
colleagues and partners. 
 
In chapter 4 of Yin’s book (2002) on Case Study Research, Design & Method, the 
author suggests that the interviews follow “a set of questions derived from the 
case study protocol” as a way to guide conversation (p. 90). The following 
questions were developed for the interviews. 
 
a) Background of the interviewee so that the information obtained could be 
deemed  accurate 
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Interviewee Job Title Oil Company Type Countries covered 
Mr GP Regional Engrg manager**  Chevron MOC Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand 
Mr. SS Regional System Manager** Chevron MOC Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand 
Mr. RA Area manager (Malaysia)** ExxonMobil MOC Singapore, Malaysia 
Mr. LSH System operations Mgr** ExxonMobil MOC Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand 
Mr. GJL   Retail Manager (1989-2004) Shell MOC Singapore 
Mr. KS Retail Manager (2004-2006) Shell MOC Singapore 
Mr. WKK Network Manager** Total MOC Philippines, Indonesia 
Mr. KT Engineering Manager** Total MOC Philippines, Indonesia 
Mr. RI Engineering Manager Petronas NOC Malaysia 
Ms. SY VP (Procurement)** Petron NOC Philippines, Malaysia 
(Pa. IS)* (Hanindo) Pertamina NOC Indonesia 
(K. PPS)* (Flowco Thailand) PTT NOC Thailand, Philippines 
Mr. WVP VP, Marketing BHPetrol Independent Singapore, Malaysia 
Mr. TYH Engineering Manager SPC Independent Singapore 
Mr. AM  Business Manager SeaOil Independent Philippines 
(K. PJ) (Gilbarco Thailand) Paktai Oil Independent Thailand 
Table 3 Interviewees   
* These interviews conducted with the help of translators, who are also part of the industry. 
** These interviewees chosen for MOC have responsibility or information for the region.  
 
b) History of the oil company in the country. This was verified from archived 
materials. 
c) Type of Industry Architecture used in fuel retailing (past, present and 
future) 
d) Reason(s) for the change in fuel retailing structure 
e) Reason(s) for outsourcing activities (if any) to third party and the choice of 
third party players 
f) Responses to changes in safety and environmental rules (if any) 
g) Responses to the introduction of Auto-LPG, CNG, Biofuel and Electric 
Vehicles  
 
Latest news was also obtained from PetrolPlaza (2013) and Petrolworld (2013), 
two organizations that collate news and events on the fuel retailing sector.  I have 
also joined several fuel retail groups organized under Linkedin. Some contacts in 
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these groups are former colleagues and friends who are based in countries across 
Asia. These contacts have also given me insights into the fuel retailing sector in 
their respective countries.    
 
 Analyzing data 3.6
 
The analysis of the research is covered in two sections, a section on within-case 
analysis and a section on cross-case analysis. This is followed by a discussion 
consolidating the information from the within-case and cross-case analysis. 
 
The numerical data gathered for the individual oil companies in SE Asia are based 
on the three types of organization structure namely the company-owned company-
operated, company-owned dealer-operated and dealer-owned dealer-operated. The 
data was first compared against each other to look for common patterns among 
them but this did not reveal a consistent way oil companies organized their 
networks in SE Asia. 
 
The data were next collated and compared within each country. There were 
different numbers of oil companies operating in each country, from one oil 
company, Shell, operating in Brunei to ten oil companies operating in Thailand 
and Philippines. The comparison was narrowed to the five case-study cases, each 
case having more than four oil companies operating in the country. The 
comparison based on types of oil companies was difficult as each country 
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typically has only one national oil company4 and a few SE Asian countries did not 
have a national oil company5 . Although there were more than one major oil 
companies in each country, the major oil companies were not represented in every 
country. For example, ExxonMobil was not present in the Philippines and 
Indonesia and Chevron was not in Indonesia. Notwithstanding this, the 
comparison reveals differences between the types of oil companies operating in a 
country. The mix of organization structures used by the different types of oil 
companies indicated that they reacted differently to the same country’s specific 
constraints, a view supported by the interviewees.  
 
The oil companies do not use the same name and acronyms for three base 
organization structures but the professionals are all familiar with the three 
common arrangements. They reported the variations within the three types of 
organization structures such as how the site staff and the station manager were 
employed and how maintenance, support and administrative tasks were organized. 
The analysis shows that there are many variations implemented for the network 
even when this analysis is based on the forecourt business. There are even more 
variations when the backcourt businesses were taken into consideration. There are 
also differences in the support services provided by the oil companies for the 
different base organization structure. For example, the support services were 
arranged in full for their direct operations and partially for the company-owned 
dealer-operated stations. The dealer-owned dealer-operated stations were excluded 
                                               
4
 Thailand has two national oil companies, PTT and Bangchak. PTT also operated another entity, 
PTTRM that manages the network acquired from Conoco.  
5




and were selectively given the provision to opt in to use the services arranged by 
the oil companies. 
 
The analysis scrutinizes the roles beyond that of the dealer and the oil company. 
These roles are hidden as functions within the oil company or buried as the 
multiple tasks given to the dealer. The oil company’s functions such as those 
managing support services or providing network-based processing of payment 
cards have become distinct roles for the larger network. As the sector evolves, the 
oil companies have also deemed many roles, traditionally part of corporate 
functions, to be non-core activities that need not be kept internally. Even the task 
of managing the network of fuel retail stations is treated as a non-core activity to 
be given away. Other roles were spilt from the tasks of the dealer that exceeded 
his skill due to the increased complexity from the backcourt businesses. There 
were different reasons given by the interviewees for the changes to the roles and 
why these roles were given to other players. The analysis assembles all the data 






4 WITHIN-CASE ANALYSIS 
 
An in-depth study of each case reveals the complex regulatory, technological, 
infrastructure and social constraints that compel oil companies to adopt different 
organization structures, sometimes even within a single country. The background 
and the organization changes for each of the five cases are described in detail. 
Many interviewees mentioned risk management when they were describing the 
organizational changes and as such I am using the risk matrix template to show 
visually the relationship between organizational changes and risk management. 
Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) suggest the “use of extensive tables and other 
visual devices that summarize the related case evidence are central to signalling 
the depth and detail of empirical grounding” (p. 29). 
 
For each case, the players in the fuel retailing sector – namely the oil companies 
and the dealers – operate within the boundaries of a particular country and 
therefore are bounded by common constraints of the institutional environment 
such as being restricted by the same regulations, limited equally by the common 
technological infrastructure and subjected to the usual social practices. The 
analysis discusses the organizational changes by the three types of oil companies 
and how these changes relate to risk management. I will elaborate on the three 
types of oil companies – namely the major, national and independent oil 
companies – and how risks impact them differently in the following chapter.  
 
The risk matrix template treats risk as having two dimensions. One dimension, 
represented by the horizontal axis on Figure 3, is the risk exposure, which is the 
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probability of adverse events happening. The other dimension, represented by the 
vertical axis on Figure 3, is the risk impact or the severity of the event should an 
adverse event occur. A two-by-two risk matrix is used to describe qualitatively 
and visually the effects of the organizational changes. The four quadrants, moving 
clockwise from the top left, are (1) the high-risk zone, (2) the high-impact low-
exposure zone, (3) the low-risk zone and (4) the high-exposure low-impact zone.  
 
The risk matrix is used to show the relationship between organizational changes 
and risk management. Organizations can either reduce risk exposure or risk 
impact. On the one hand, organizations can reduce risk exposure through the use 
of specialized staff, regular training, spot auditing and remote monitoring usually 
to supplement the added hardware. However, there is a limit to this approach as 
profitability may be reduced by the greater investment and recurring expenses. On 
 
 




the other hand, organizations can reduce the impact of risk events by sharing the 
business with specialist players, outsourcing non-core activities or allowing fuel 
retail stations to be owned and operated by unaffiliated dealers. This approach 
also reduces profitability by allowing more players into the sector.    
 
I will demonstrate how this relationship between organization changes and risk 
management can be visualized using the risk matrix template with the example 
shown in Figure 3. In this risk matrix sample, the three oil companies start in the 
high risk zone marked by the white triangle, square and circle. The independent 
oil company represented by the white triangle does an organizational change say 
by outsourcing its cash handling activity to a specialist to reduce the impact of a 
risk event. This is shown by the arrow marked “E1” in moving downwards from 
the start position as the white triangle to its final position marked by the black 
triangle (Example E1 - Figure 3). Both the major and national oil companies make 
organizational changes say by investing in chip-based payment system and setting 
up an internal payment processing centre so as to reduce their exposure to credit 
card fraud. This is shown by the arrow marked “E2” moving right from the white 
square, representing the national oil company to the black square (Example E2 - 
Figure 3). The major oil company that makes the same organizational change is 
shown as moving from the white circle to the grey circle. The grey circle is an 
intermediate move meaning that the major oil company has not completed the 
organizational changes. The major oil company does a further organizational 
adjustment say by outsourcing part of its card processing on fraud handling to the 
bank. This is to reduce the impact of credit risk as this will be absorbed by the 
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bank. This is shown by the arrow marked “E3” moving downwards from the grey 
circle to its final position as a black circle (Example E3 - Figure 3).  
 
This example explains how the three different types of oil companies that started 
in the same quadrant on a risk matrix ended up in the different quadrants after 
undergoing organizational changes. The changes are tagged as E1, E2 and E3.  
The organization structure of the three types of oil companies following the 
changes will obviously be different even though the services and offers to the end 
customers remain essentially the same. This example shows how risk management 
by oil companies leads to different organizational structures. In the cases below, 
the organizational changes for each case are tagged similarly for easy reference, 
S1, S2 and S3 for Singapore, I1, I2, I3 for Indonesia, M1, M2, M3 for Malaysia, 
T1, T2, T3 for Thailand and P1, P2 and P3 for Philippines.  
 
The case analysis scrutinizes the details of each case to understand the reasons for 
the organization changes made by the oil companies. The first step was to place 
the fuel retail organizations at the starting point on the risk matrix framework. 
This is based on the historical information for each case which I have gathered 
from sources such as archives and interviews. This initial position is also based on 
the institutional environment, that is, the constraints from regulations, technology 
and social norms faced by the oil companies operating in each country. There is 
more than one starting position in some cases as the three different types of oil 
companies implemented more than one organization structures concurrently under 
the same constraints in a country. The positions following these organization 
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changes plotted on the on the risk matrix are based on the evidences gathered 





Oil industry veterans interviewed claimed that the fuel retail networks in 
Singapore were mostly organized with dealer-operated fuel retail stations at the 
end of 1980s. These fuel retail stations were owned by five international oil 
companies – Esso, Mobil, BP, Shell, Caltex and one independent oil company, 
SPC. These companies supplied fuels and lubricants to unaffiliated dealers 
contracted to operate the fuel retail stations. The fuels were supplied to the dealers 
“at 18 to 24 cents per gallon below the pump price so that the dealer was protected 
from price fluctuation”. The fuels and lubricants were supplied strictly on cash-
on-delivery basis and the dealer paid a monthly license fee as rental of the fuel 
retail station.  
 
Under the dealership agreement, “the dealer took all the risks of operating the 
station but he has a free hand to do whatever he needed to get more profitability 
Oil Company No. of Sites COCO CODO DODO 
S P C 40 40  0 0 
Chevron 30 30  0 0 
Esso / ExxonMobil 65 65  0 0 
Shell 58 58  0 0 
Total Count 193 193 0 0 
Table 4 Stations by type of operations in Singapore 




out of the site. Most of them operated mechanic shop providing tyre and battery 
replacement and air-conditioning repairs for vehicles and made lots of money 
from these side businesses”.  A salesman of that era told me that the head office of 
the oil company needed only a retail manager and two salesmen to look after all of 
Esso’s 40 fuel retail stations. The two salesmen’s role was to collect the monthly 
rental fee and remind the station managers to keep the station clean and tidy.  
 
The fuel retailing sector is regulated mainly through the Petroleum Act governing 
how fuels should be stored, transported and sold. The regulations especially on 
safety, environmental standards and land usage in Singapore were more strictly 
enforced from the 1990s. The enforcement resulted in low availability of sites 
designated for fuel retail stations and the closure of unsafe stations. This led to the 
decline in the number of fuel retail stations. The government of Singapore also 
designated parcels of land that can be developed as fuel retail station and leased 
these for 30 years to highest bidder on open tender. Because of the limited number 
of new fuel retail sites available, usually two or three sites annually, the tender 
price was extremely high and as such only oil companies with an established 
network can afford to bid for these sites. This prevented other companies, 
especially non-oil companies, from entering the fuel retailing sector. 
  
The number of fuel retail stations, already very few, went down further from year 
2000 in spite of a steadily growing albeit well-controlled car population (Figure 4). 
The downward trend started when Esso and Mobil merged to form ExxonMobil in 
1999. A few locations with Esso and Mobil stations next to each other were 
consolidated into single fuel retail station and the whole network was rebranded as 
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ExxonMobil. In 2004, BP sold its network of fuel retail stations including its one-
third share of the Singapore Refining Company to the other partners Caltex and 
SPC and withdrew from the market. 
 
The government also instituted regulations to protect the environment by ensuring 
that fuel retail stations are monitored for possible leakage into the ground and that 
the vapour from the delivery of fuels from tank truck is collected under an 
internationally approved process known as Stage-1 vapour recovery. In 2009, fuel 
retail stations located under buildings were removed as the public raised concerns 
about health, safety and security. This further reduced the number of stations in 
Singapore.  
 
By 2011, there were four oil companies operating retail network in Singapore – 
the three major oil companies, ExxonMobil, Shell and Chevron and an 
independent oil company, SPC. There were only 193 fuel retail stations shared 
 
Figure 4 Singapore vehicle and station population 




among them (Table 4). The terms used in this table, COCO for company-owned 
company-operated stations, CODO for company-owned dealer-operated stations 
and DODO for dealer-owned dealer-operated stations will be elaborated in a later 
chapter. 
 
With the above information, I place the starting positions for the major oil 
companies and the independent oil company on the risk matrix under high 
exposure and high impact at the start of the modernization programme to be 
described in the following paragraph (Figure 5 and Table 5). At this stage in early 
1990’s when the oil companies have just brought out the dealers, many fuel retail 
stations would be in a poor state after being badly maintained by the dealers for 
many years. Exposure to risk would be significantly high when these fuel retail 
stations were taken over by the oil companies. By operating the stations directly, 
the oil companies were also fully accountable for all adverse events. 
 
4.1.2 Modernization/direct operations (S1) 
The modernization of the fuel retail network in the 1990s by the major oil 
companies, Esso, Shell, BP and Mobil, brought the fuel retail stations under the 
company’s direct operations with all the station staff controlled and their salary 
paid by the oil companies. By the year 2000, all the oil companies claimed to own 
and operate fuel retail stations directly. The side businesses were stopped and 
servicing of vehicles was limited to changing lubricants, repairing tyres and 




With the whole network using the same company-operated model, the competition 
was truly only among the four oil players as the station manager’s role was only to 
administer the oil company’s procedures at the fuel retail station. Unlike the fuel 
retail network in USA, the station managers in Singapore were not allowed to set 
pump prices.  
 
There could be many reasons that drove all the oil companies to choose company-
owned company-operated as the preferred way to manage the Singapore network. 
Many interviewees cited two reasons: first, the limited availability of sites zoned 
for fuel retail station in Singapore; and second, the increasing risk associated with 
dealers operating fuel retail stations in their own haphazard ways. This 
modernization process coupled with the organizational change to bring the 
 




network under the direct operation of the oil companies lowered the risk exposure 
but did not lower the impact of any adverse event as elaborated below. 
 
The three major oil companies may have common reasons for using the company-
operated model to reduce risk, as adverse events for them could have a global 
impact on their reputation. However, it was unusual for the only independent oil 
company, SPC, to use the same company-operated model. From its first fuel retail 
station in 1984, SPC remained the smallest player with 10 fuel retail stations for 
two decades until it took over BP’s network of 30 fuel retail stations. In 2009, 
PetroChina bought up the network including a 50-percent stake in the SPC 
refinery and delisted SPC from the stock market. Except for changing the 
members of the board of directors, the business structure and the operations 
remained unchanged. Even the brand name of SPC was taken over by PetroChina. 
According to managers at SPC, PetroChina operated the majority of fuel retail 
stations in China with the company-owned company-operated arrangement similar 
to SPC’s. 
 
Three key programmes were initiated during the modernization period. The first 
was the introduction of the company-branded convenience stores that were 
operated directly. The convenience stores were branded “TigerMart”, “Select”, 
“StarMart” and “On the Run” by Esso, Shell, Caltex and Mobil respectively. The 
second was the introduction of the environmentally safer double-walled piping 
and fibreglass-jacketed steel tanks to reduce leaks from underground systems. The 
existing galvanized pipes and coal-tar-epoxy-coated steel tanks were prone to leak 
after more than 15 years in operation. The last was the use of integrated 
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automation to improve manpower efficiency at the station level as well as provide 
transaction-level details back to the central head office.  
 
These programmes added many new players to the fuel retailing sector and 
increased the size of teams in the head office required to support the myriads of 
new activities. An interviewer offered a copy of the organization chart showing 
the team at the head office supervising the network of 40 company operated fuel 
retail stations. Of the 23 staff members in the organization chart, only five persons 
were in direct supervision of the network6 . Other staff members handled the 
centralized activities for the company-operated fuel retail stations which included 
convenience store retailing. The organization also included a position responsible 
for controls of fraud and another position responsible for health, safety and 
environmental issues. These roles showed the oil company’s emphasis on 
managing and mitigating operational risk. 
 
The investments in retail automation and modern underground fuel system 
coupled with direct operations would have reduced the exposure to risk. However, 
any risk event would subject the oil company to bear the full impact because of 
the strict application of regulations and standards in Singapore. The modernization 
and direct operations programme is marked on the risk matrix under “S1” (Figure 
5 and Table 5).  
                                               
6
 The five persons were the retail manager, one business counsellor for company-owned dealer-operated stations (CODO 




The strict application of regulations and standards by the government of 
Singapore was demonstrated by a fuel leak from one of the Shell’s underground 
tanks in May 2013. The entire fuel retail station was shut down by the Singapore 
Civil Defence Force (SCDF) for more than six months for remediation of the site.  
 
Another example of the strict implementation of rules in Singapore was a study 
instituted by government on anti-competitive behaviour. Pump prices were not 
regulated in Singapore but the four oil companies posted the same pump price for 
the same grade of fuel and moved pump prices up and down in tandem with one 
another for many years. The Competition Commission of Singapore concluded in 
its study that “there is no evidence that the petrol players are engaged in anti-
competitive collusive behaviour” (Competition Commission of Singapore, 2011).  
 
Figure 6 Typical MOC retail organization (small COCO & CODO network) 




These two examples show that the governing authority will hold the oil company 
responsible for any wrongdoings at the fuel retail stations. Chevron’s engineering 
manager told me during an interview that Singapore was excluded in the branded 
marketer programme because he was sure that Singapore’s law using a legal rule 
called ‘strict liability’ would not “allow us to avoid responsibility even if we don’t 
own anything”. 
 
4.1.3 Outsourced activities (S2) 
There were several modifications to the organizational structure for direct 
operations implemented prior to 2000 that were used to reduce the impact of risk 
events. The risk mitigation effect of these modifications is marked with the 
number “S2” on the risk matrix (Figure 5 and Table 5).  
 





Demolished and rebuilt fuel 
retail stations with latest 
techniques 
Reduced failure of 
existing equipment 
S1 Retired oil 
industry veterans – 
Esso, Mobil 
Operated fuels and 
convenience stores directly 
Set operating standards 
for backcourt businesses 
S1 Oil industry 
veterans - Esso, 
SPC 
Outsourced delivery of fuels 
to specialist logistic 
companies  
Reduced the impact of 
tanker accident 
S2 Oil industry 
veterans - Esso, 
SPC 
Used contract professional 
station manager in place of 
employee for company 
operations 
Reduced the risk of fuel 
retail station being 
closed from minor legal 
incident 
S2 Interviewees – 
SPC, Esso, Caltex 
Formed alliance with 
convenience store specialists 
Reduced risks by 
sharing with specialist 
on non-core business 
S3 Interviewees –
ExxonMobil, Shell 
Centralized support and use 
of facilities managers for 
construction and 
maintenance 
Reduced risks by using 
specialists to manage 
fuel retail stations 




Table 5 Risk management – Singapore 
Source: Author based on interviews 
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One modification is to mitigate the risk associated with delivery of fuels to the 
fuel retail stations by tank trucks or tanker. The tankers were originally owned and 
driven by drivers hired by the oil companies. For such a small country, all the oil 
companies have their own terminals and dedicated tankers marked with the 
company’s logo to deliver fuels to their fuel retail stations. Even BP, Caltex and 
SPC that shared a refinery equally on an offshore island had separate terminals 
and tankers. The interviewees claimed that to reduce the accountability for tanker 
accidents, the oil companies “sold all the tankers to dealers so that all these 
problems (accidents) were passed to dealers”. However, with the tanker in the 
hand of dealers, there were various ways to steal fuels such as discharging 
incompletely or decanting some of the fuels before arriving at the stations. A 
further refinement to this mitigation of risk was to pass the tanker ownership and 
operations to specialist logistic companies. To prevent theft of the fuel by these 
outsourced partners, the tankers were fitted with special electronic locks in place 
of numbered plastic seals as tampering of the electronic locks can be easily 
detected. The tankers delivering fuels to the fuel retail stations were dedicated to 
each oil company and continued to have the oil company’s logo giving the 
impression that these were still owned by the oil companies. However these 
tankers and drivers were contracted from specialist haulage companies. One 
veteran of the oil company explained that this activity was given to these 
specialist haulage companies after a number of road accidents and incidents of 
cheating involving tankers managed by the dealers. This arrangement with 





Another risk mitigation introduced is the use of contract professional managers to 
manage the station directly. Even though oil companies in Singapore claimed to 
operate all their stations directly, they did not have employees working at the 
station. Instead, each station manager was hired as an unaffiliated agent who was 
asked to form a sole proprietorship company. The team of cashiers and pump 
attendants needed to run the station was hired under this agent’s company but the 
salaries for the cashiers and pump attendants fully were reimbursed by the oil 
company. In this way, the oil companies maintained full control of the operations 
without taking on the risk for minor incidents at the stations. The operation 
manager explained that an example of a minor incident would be violating the 
Health Sciences Authority’s rules of selling cigarettes to minors. The tobacco 
retail license was obtained under the sole proprietor's name to limit the risk since 
the licensee is responsible for the actions and conduct of his employees in selling 
the cigarettes. The manager claimed that “when such [a risk] event occurs, the 
station manager can be replaced without causing the station or the network of 
stations to be closed for the incident”. 
 
4.1.4 Formed alliance/centralized supports (S3) 
A further innovation to the direct operations by oil companies was to outsource 
the complete operations of the stations, including the forecourt activities, to non-
fuel retailers. Large convenience-store or supermarket players were chosen for 
their familiarity with the rules and regulations governing non-fuel retailing 
activities, especially the retailing of food. In 2000s, ExxonMobil outsourced its 
entire network to Fairprice, a local supermarket player, while Shell outsourced its 
network to 7-Eleven. Both oil companies explained that these non-fuel retailers 
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were sufficiently big and well-known so that they could be held accountable by 
the authority for any risk incidents in their area of expertise. Technically, the fuel 
retail stations under this arrangement are not operated directly. This raises the risk 
exposure while lowering the risk impact for non-fuel adverse events for the oil 
company. However, since the custody, management of fuel inventory and pump 
price were still controlled by the oil company, the oil companies considered these 
networks to be still company-operated and bore the risks associated with the fuel 
business. Hence, this modification to the organization structure is shown on the 
risk matrix under “S3” (Figure 5 and Table 5). 
 
The four major oil companies managed the retail networks in SE Asia under 
regional control headquartered in Singapore or Malaysia. Under this central 
management, the construction and maintenance of stations was outsourced to 
facilities managers initially by ExxonMobil and subsequently also by Shell. In 
place of the reduced support staff located in each country, the oil companies set up 
centralized support located in the different countries of SE Asia. So while the 
Singapore networks of fuel retail stations were operated directly, it had to be 
supported, say by a ExxonMobil’s wetstock centre in Bangkok, Thailand, by 
Chevron’s engineering Centre of Excellence in Manila, Philippines, and by 
automation experts drawn from Shell Malaysia. Since this has the effect of 
increasing exposure with indirect and long-distance support but reducing impact 
with the improved response to adverse events by specialists, it is marked on the 







For many years, national oil company Pertamina was the only company allowed 
to retail fuels in Indonesia. Pertamina was also the oil-and-gas regulator for both 
upstream and downstream sectors and therefore controlled the supply of fuels and 
the licensing of participants for the fuel retailing sector. This monopoly by 
Pertamina coupled with the many inconsistent and ambiguous regulations by the 
government kept the fuel retailing sector from improving. As a state-owned 
company in Indonesia, Pertamina operated under the control of a governmental 
ministry with leaders appointed by the ruling political party (Hertzmark, 2007). 
Instead of taking charge of the fuel retailing sector directly, Pertamina passed the 
control of 98 percent of the retail network to dealers and of this more than 85 
percent were operated with the dealer-owned dealer-operated model (Table 6).  
 
Although Indonesia's oil industry is one of the oldest in the world and has been 
producing oil since 1880s, the country became a net importer of oil and had to 
suspend its membership with OPEC in Jan 2009. With declining sources of oil, 
Indonesia could have invested in alternative energy for the transport sector. After 
all, the country has abundant gas which can be used for transportation. However 
Oil Company No. of Sites COCO CODO DODO 
Pertamina 4200 70 600 3530 
Petronas 19 0 19 0 
Shell 45  0 45 0 
Total 13  0 13 0 
Total Count 4277 70 677 3530 
Table 6 Stations by type of operations in Indonesia 
Source: Gilbarco Veeder-Root (Asia) – 2011 Survey 
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Indonesia appeared to have difficulty taking advantage of gas resources for 
transportation as this will require piping the gas across the country and adding 
compressors at fuel retail stations. During a trip to Jakarta, I observed an existing 
fuel retail station that had abandoned a complete set of equipment installed for 
selling compressed natural gas to motor vehicles. Pertamina also tried to 
implement Auto-LPG by selling this fuel within the existing fuel retail network by 
using an expensive combination dispensing pump that can dispense both 
traditional fuels and Auto-LPG. This method minimizes risk impact as the failure 
of the Auto-LPG as an alternative fuel will not render a pump useless. As with 
many other programmes to reform the fuel retail sector, incorporating the Auto-
LPG within existing stations also failed to succeed.  
 
Indonesia has only 4,200 fuel retail stations. This is obviously not enough for her 
more than 17,500 islands, of which about 6,000 islands are inhabited. This 
shortage of fuel retail stations has worsened since vehicle population grew rapidly 
and exceeded 90 million vehicles in 2010 (Figure 7). Of the 4,200 fuel retail 
 
Figure 7 Indonesia vehicle and station population 




stations, 65 percent are on the island of Java and another 19 percent in Sumatra 
(Pertamina, 2011). Without the adequate coverage by proper fuel retail stations, 
fuels are sold from bottles in many of the outlying islands. The inadequate 
coverage also resulted in exceptionally high volume sold at each fuel retail station 
in the city.  
 
The low margin and inadequate station coverage have also emboldened fuel retail 
dealers to find illegal ways to earn more money. A common practice at fuel retail 
stations to cheat customers was by adjusting pumps to deliver 1 to 2 percent less 
than that stated on the display or by adulterating gasoline or diesel with a lower-
cost petroleum product.  
 
An interviewee claimed that Indonesians will find always find a way to 
 





circumvent rules imposed to control them. While taking me on a trip around 
Jakarta to visit fuel retail stations, he cited the example of the “3 in 1” traffic rule 
introduced by the government to reduce traffic congestion for cars travelling 
during peak hours into the city needed to have three passengers. This has resulted 
in a new business in that you can pay a few rupiah for the ‘jockeys’, usually a 
mother with a child, to join you for the ride into the city. He used this example to 
explain why it was difficult for the government to impose new regulations for the 
fuel retailing sector as the fuel retail operators will find innovative ways to 
circumvent the regulations.  
 
Based on the information above, I have placed the starting position for the 
dominant dealer-owned dealer-operated stations of the national oil company, 
Pertamina, in the high-exposure low-impact quadrant in the risk matrix (Figure 8). 
This is based on the Pertamina’s lack of control over the fuel retail network. 
Although there was high exposure from frauds, adulteration and unsafe practices, 
there was minimal impact from these practices and even from adverse events. 
Another reason for the high exposure was the lack of investment by these dealers 
to improve their fuel retail stations and by the Pertamina to increase the size of the 
network.  
 
The deregulation of the oil and gas industry has permitted foreign participation in 
the fuel retailing sector from 2004. These foreign oil companies set up network 
with the company-owned dealer-operated model. These dealers are controlled 
with the foreign companies’ operating processes that will minimize the risk 
exposure. I have placed the major oil companies entering the market using this 
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model to have lower risk exposure but they would be subjected to higher risk 
impact. The reason for the higher risk impact is that the regulatory authorities and 
the public have higher expectations for foreign oil companies, so these companies 
will have to bear full responsibility for all risk events.  
 
The following paragraphs discussed the details of several changes to 
organizational structure made by the oil companies after 2000 in Indonesia (Table 
7).   
 
4.2.2 Deregulation and market entry (I1) 
In 2003, Pertamina was restructured from a state-owned enterprise into a state-
owned limited liability company. The conversion to a limited liability company 
was to make Pertamina function as a commercial entity so as to improve its 
performance. But being state-owned, it will still have the benefits and the 
privileged position with the government. Along with the conversion, the upstream 
and downstream regulatory and supervisory roles of Pertamina were transferred to 
two separate government agencies, BP MIGAS and BPH MIGAS respectively. 
  
The removal of the regulatory power for the downstream sector also ended 
Pertamina’s monopoly of the fuel retailing sector. Private oil companies were 
given permission by the government to enter the retail sector. Although these 
foreign oil companies that came in to set up network of fuel retail stations were 
initially restricted from selling subsidized fuels, they were subsequently allowed 




From 2004, three foreign oil companies, Shell, Total and Petronas started their 
networks and built a total of 77 fuel retail stations by 2011. However, the foreign 
oil companies had difficulties in implementing the full value chain of the 
downstream sector. The foreign oil companies had to import fuels for their fuel 
retail stations because the network did not sell enough volume to justify 
investment in refinery and terminal. They claimed that they could not gain more 
volume as they were not allowed to sell subsidized fuels. Even when they were 
given permission subsequently to distribute subsidized fuel, this was limited to a 
fixed volume per year and could only be sold from designated stations. Petronas 
was the first foreign oil company to take up the offer and was permitted to sell up 
to a limit of 20,440 kilolitres per year of subsidized premium gasoline from four 
fuel retail stations.  
 
Because of the unequal playing field, Total Oil’s manager told me that they had to 
be smarter in setting up the network in Indonesia. They have opted to set up 
company-owned dealer-operated stations recognizing that this would cost them 
more should the business fail. The organization structure based on company-
owned dealer-operated stations was chosen to differentiate them from Pertamina 
with its network of dealer-owned dealer-operated stations. Instead of building its 
own terminals and having its own tankers to supply the network, Total chose to 
lease storage and use fuel delivery service from an oil tanking company Vopak as 
a way to reduce the risk exposure. 
 
In 2011, Petronas, the national oil company of Malaysia, shut down 15 out of its 
19 fuel retail stations in Indonesia because of poor sales. Although the company 
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blamed the poor sales on the anti-Malaysian sentiments by the Indonesian public, 
this may not be the key reason. Petronas has not been successful in deploying fuel 
retail network in any of its neighbouring markets. The 19 fuel retail stations 
Petronas started in Cambodia in 1994 gradually dwindled down to one operating 
station by 2010 when Petronas decided to pull out. Petronas also sold the 100 fuel 
retail stations in Thailand to Susco, a local oil company in 2013. These fuel retail 
stations were acquired from Kuwait Oil in 2005. Petronas’ organization and 
operating model was successful in Malaysia because in its home country, Petronas 
has the advantage of the special relationship with its own government. In applying 
the same model in the neighbouring countries, it could not succeed because it did 
not have the advantage of the connection with the governments in these host 
countries. 
 
I have marked this on the risk matrix as “I1” (Figure 8 and Table 7) for the foreign 
oil companies using the company-owned dealer-operated arrangement in the new 
market and that have mitigated risks by outsourcing terminalling and tanker 
operations to third-parties. This also recognizes the high risk of failure for 
inexperienced oil companies in entering a newly deregulated market as shown in 
the example of Petronas. 
 
4.2.3 Subsidy control/quality audit (I2) 
Indonesia did not have proper monitoring and control in place for its fuel subsidy 
programme. As a result, the programme which was meant to help less fortunate 
citizens in the country was instead enjoyed by both rich and poor citizens alike. 
Both diesel and gasoline for transport were subsidized by an amount equal to the 
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difference between the pump prices set by the government and the reference price, 
calculated as MOPS (Mean of Platts Singapore) plus margin and distribution cost. 
With rising fuel prices, the absolute subsidy amount can be reduced if pump prices 
can be raised in tandem. But each attempt by the government to raise prices has 
been met with protest. This has created a huge difference in the pump price of 
subsidized fuels compared to the market price of fuels.  
 
In 2012, the pump prices for subsidized fuels were raised to 6,500 rupiah 
(US$0.65) a litre for the lowest-grade gasoline and 5,500 rupiah a litre for diesel. 
Both fuels were previously retailed at 4,500 rupiah a litre, which was almost half 
that of non-subsidized fuels at IDR 8,350 and IDR 8,370 for mid- and high-grade 
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Table 7 Risk management - Indonesia 
Source: Author based on interviews and reports 
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gasoline. This explains why only 1.4 million kilolitres of non-subsidized fuels 
were sold compared to 25.5 million and 14.5 million kilolitres of subsidized 
gasoline and diesel respectively.  
 
Interviewees claim that the depressed pump prices and corresponding low margin 
given to dealers did not incentivize the sector to modernize the fuel retail stations 
with automation and latest payment technology or to reorganize the sector to 
incorporate alternative fuels.  Instead, the depressed pump prices were the key 
factor in increasing traffic congestion, smuggling and hoarding of subsidized fuels 
and encouraging frauds. As a national oil company, Pertamina was also not 
willing to change the industry architecture as any attempt to do so was seen by the 
public as trying to remove the subsidy programme. 
 
Pertamina did make several limited and localized attempts to monitor the subsidy 
programme with station-based computer systems linked to a central system. These 
attempts were kept low-key so as to avoid antagonizing the public. These 
solutions controlled smuggling, hoarding and frauds perpetuated by the fuel 
subsidy and therefore reduced the risks for the oil company. This mitigation of 
risks is indicated on the risk matrix under “I2” (Figure 8 and Table 7). In early 
2012, BPMigas, which took over Pertamina as the upstream oil and gas regulator, 
called a tender for a sophisticated computerized system to monitor and ultimately 
control subsidies at fuel retail stations. However, in November 2012, BPMigas 




Another attempt to reduce the risks with the dealer-based network was started by 
Pertamina in 2006. To match the operating standards of foreign oil companies 
allowed into the fuel retailing sector, Pertamina engaged a consultant, Intertek, to 
audit and certify the network of fuel retail stations under a programme called Pasti 
Pas in April 2008 (Intertek Group plc). The fuel retail stations would be regularly 
assessed mainly on the quantity and quality control of fuels sold to customers. The 
auditors would also check that the equipment and facilities in the fuel retail 
stations are properly maintained. This arrangement added a third party to audit the 
network which is an activity usually done by staff from oil companies mainly for 
networks under direct operations. 
 
4.2.4 Matched competitors by using direct operations (I3) 
The three foreign companies, Shell, Total and Petronas, entered the fuel retailing 
sector in 2004 and operated the fuel retail stations using the company-owned 
dealer-operated model. However, these fuel retail stations were built to the high 
internal standards and the operating procedures, especially those of Shell and 
Total, and were based on their successful experience gained from retailing fuels in 
many other countries. Even with the disadvantage of selling only the higher-priced 
non-subsidized premium fuels and having a limited number of stations, Shell and 
Total succeeded in making their branded fuel retail stations more trustworthy than 
Pertamina’s.  
 
Pertamina’s fuel retail stations were perceived by customers to be providing lower 
quality, incorrect quantity and poorer service. This perception of foreign brands 
being better was interpreted by Pertamina’s executives to be the result of the 
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foreign oil companies operating their network under the company-owned 
company-operated model. This is an incorrect interpretation as the interviewees in 
the foreign oil companies in Indonesia confirmed that they were operating under 
the company-owned dealer-operated model. Fearing that this would erode its 
market share, Pertamina added company-owned stations to match the number of 
fuel retail stations by the three foreign oil companies and operated them directly 
(Figure 9). This was in anticipation that Pertamina would be restricted from 
selling subsidized fuels just like the foreign oil companies. Pertamina’s vice 
president for retail fuel Basuki Trikora Putra said that “the company’s COCO 
stations will be ready to implement the restriction because we have a new design 
to accommodate the new regulations” (The Jakarta Post, 2010).  
 
In early 2013, Petronas sold its network to Pertamina. Pertamina’s investment 
planning and risk management director Afdal Bahaudin said that “fuel stations 
formerly belonging to Petronas, acquired by Pertamina would become company-
owned, company-operated stations” (The Jakarta Post, 2013). This showed that 
 
Figure 9 Pertamina's COCO network  




Pertamina considered the company-owned company-operated model to be the 
more superior organization structure. The company-owned company-operated 
stations improved Pertamina’s exposure to risks but would also raise customers’ 
expectation. This would subject Pertamina to greater impact of adverse event. 





Licenses to operate fuel retail stations in Malaysia were issued preferentially to 
local Malays or Bumiputera. Fuel retail stations were regulated by the Ministry of 
Domestic Trade, Cooperatives and Consumerism under the Petroleum 
Development Act. The Act required oil companies to seek approval from the 
ministry to develop new fuel retail stations. In addition, the station operators 
required a license to retail controlled items under the Control Supplies Act 1972 
from the same ministry. Accordingly, oil companies can get approval for one 
licence each to operate a fuel retail station directly. The licenses for the rest of the 
Oil Company No. of Sites COCO CODO DODO 
Petronas 995 0 975 20 
BHP 325 1 272 52 
SMC / Petron (XOM) 558 0 417 141 
Chevron 435 0 221 214 
Shell 1039 1 817 221 
Total Count 3352 2 2702 648 
Table 8 Stations by type of operations in Malaysia 




fuel retail stations in the network went to independent operators as it was the 
government’s policy to grow local entrepreneurs and specifically to increase the 
business participation of local Malays (Lee, 2005). Therefore, most of the fuel 
retail stations were either the company-owned dealer-operated and dealer-owned 
dealer-operated models with the former being the dominant organization structure 
(Table 8). 
 
Shell and the defunct Standard Oil expanded into fuel retailing sector to cater to 
the growth of vehicles when Malaysia became the global source for tin and rubber. 
From the first fuel retail station set up by Standard Oil in KL in 1921, the fuel 
retail network remained for many decades under the control of foreign oil 
companies like Esso, Mobil, BP, Shell and Caltex.   
 
In 1974, the national oil company Petronas was founded and it subsequently grew 
to be a major oil player in the world (Von Der Mehden, 2007). In 1981, Petronas 
 
Figure 10 Malaysia vehicle and station population 
Source: AJTP Information centre (vehicles); Gilbarco Veeder-Root (Asia) (stations) 
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Dagangan Sdn Bhd, a wholly owned subsidiary of Petronas, was formed to 
manage fuel retailing and it has steadily gained position in the fuel retailing sector 
reaching the number two position in network size (PETRONAS Dagangan Berhad, 
2013).  
 
In 1999, Esso and Mobil merged to form ExxonMobil. BP was sold to Boustead 
Holdings and the chain was reimaged and renamed to BHPetrol (Boustead 
Petroleum Marketing Sdn Bhd , 2013). In 2011, the network of ExxonMobil was 
acquired by Petron of Philippines (Petron Malaysia Refining and Marketing Bhd, 
2013). Even with the change of oil companies, the country has managed to grow 
and spread fuel retail stations in line with vehicle growth (Figure 10). There was 
adequate fuel retail coverage throughout the country and there were no unlicensed 
fuel retail stations that were common in the other large SE Asian countries. 
 
Although Malaysia has successfully exploited its own oil resources and elevated 
itself with its oil wealth, this wealth has to be shared with its citizens. Thus 
Malaysia became one of the countries in the world to subsidize fuels sold from 
fuel retail stations. Subsidies were given when the actual price of petrol and diesel 
were higher than the fixed retail pump price set by the government. This pump 
price included both the wholesale and retail margins. One of the reasons the 
Malaysian government had to control the issuance of licences for operating fuel 
retail stations was to stop oil companies being subsidized on both margins7.  
 
                                               
7
 Wholesale’s and dealer’s margins were fixed at M$0.05 and M$0.1219 per litre for petrol 
respectively and M$0.0225 and M$0.07 for diesel respectively. 
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Fuel subsidies in Malaysia were administered reasonably well but the low pump 
prices have resulted in abuse and fraud. With the subsidy making these fuels one 
of the cheapest in the region, vehicles from Malaysia’s northern and southern 
neighbours, Thailand and Singapore, were crossing the border to get its cheap 
fuels. Interviewees also reported that subsidized fuels were also being smuggled 
out of the country but said that this illegal activity was most likely carried out 
from the network of commercial stations selling subsidized fuels to the fishery 
sector. 
 
With the low fuel prices, Malaysia has had difficulty introducing biofuels. 
Ethanol-blended gasoline was not possible as there was insignificant ethanol 
production in Malaysia. While biodiesel from palm oil could be introduced into 
Malaysia, it could not compete with the low subsidized diesel price. In addition, 
Malaysian biodiesel industry could hardly survive because of the high price and 
demand for palm oil internationally. Therefore, there was no network selling 
alternative fuels in Malaysia.   
 
Based on the background information, I place the start positions of the oil 
companies at the centre of the risk matrix (Figure 11). The licencing restriction 
resulted in the enforced company-owned dealer-operated and the dealer-owned 
dealer-operated arrangements, which meant that risks are shared between the oil 
companies and the dealers. Other organization changes to manage risk are 
summarized in Table 9 and elaborated below. 
 
4.3.2 Implemented self-service/ payment at pump (M1) 
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The robust growth of the Malaysian economy over the period 1990 to 1997 led to 
a tight labour market that attracted many foreign workers into the work force. A 
large fuel retail station operating round the clock on three shifts with the fully-
attended model requires a team of more than twenty pump attendants and cashiers. 
These low-paying jobs were not attractive to the local Malaysians and were taken 
up by foreign workers, mainly from Bangladesh. This led to many concerns such 
as the over-dependence on these workers, social issues and illegal migrants. 
Although other sectors such as the construction industry were using more of these 
foreign workers, the government of Malaysia decided to limit the use of foreign 
workers in the fuel retailing sector.  
 
In 1997, the government enforced the use of the self-service model for fuel retail 
stations in the area around the Malaysian capital to reduce the number of foreign 
 




workers coming into Malaysia to work as pump attendants. Foreign workers were 
allowed to do cleaning work but the station operator would be fined if he was 
caught using the foreign workers for other work at the fuel retail stations. 
Following the success with the self-service model for fuel retail stations around 
the Malaysian capital of Kuala Lumpur, the self-service model was enforced 
nationwide. In addition, the minimum wage was raised to discourage the use of 
foreign workers even for other duties at the fuel retail stations. 
 
It is possible to operate the self-service model by requiring the customer to pay at 
a counter first before walking back to fill up his car. However, the oil companies 
opted to automate the payment process instead. As a result, the use of credit cards 
and oil company’s dedicated fuel cards directly at the pump became the standard 
method of payment at fuel retail stations. The use of credit cards was then based 
on personal information recorded on magnetic stripes became a target for fraud. 
By 2005, Malaysia has the highest incidence of credit card fraud and these crimes 
were traced to the fuel retail stations with the use of outdoor payment terminals 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 2004). To combat such crimes, Malaysia became the first 
country in Asia Pacific to adopt the EMV standard for secured card payment in 
2005. The EMV standards introduced by the credit card associations – Europay, 
MasterCard and Visa – use a computer chip on the credit card to prevent fraud. 
Following the successful introduction, the Malaysian government imposed the 
self-service model with the EMV-protected chip-based cards nationwide in 2008. 
This made card payment at the pump a necessity for secured and efficient 




With credit cards now protected by a microchip, fraud from counterfeiting cards 
was reduced by more than 80 percent. The successful implementation of self-
service stations, made possible by sophisticated pay-at-the-pump systems, 
significantly reduces reliance on low-cost foreign labour and brings in new 
players skilled with fraud controls and bank processes, taking a part in the value 
chain. The implementation of the self-service model with payment at the pump is 
shown in the risk matrix as “M1” (Figure 11 and Table 9). 
 
4.3.3 Sale of ExxonMobil network to Petron (M2) 
In 2012, Petron of Philippines acquired Esso Malaysia Berhad and two 
subsidiaries and became a new fuel retailer in the Malaysian downstream sector. 
The details of the handover were provided by the employees who were transferred 
from Esso to Petron. They described the changes made to organization structure 
before and after the transfer. This is marked on the risk matrix as “M2” (Figure 
11). 
 
Prior to selling the network, ExxonMobil introduced a new dealer agreement to 
overcome the restriction on operating licences described in the background. The 
dealers that can get licences were the financially stronger but usually older 
entrepreneurs. These older businessmen were reluctant to follow ExxonMobil’s 
strict operating standards. ExxonMobil introduced a new dealership agreement 
that provided financial assistance to younger entrepreneurs and in return, 
ExxonMobil was allowed to exert greater control over the operations. These new 
dealers paid a multi-tiered licence fee based on per-litre sales of fuel for the use of 
the fuel retail station. This licence fee that was 
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dealers earned an amount that was the same as that of a typical company-operated 
station manager. Unlike an entrepreneur, a station manager under this five-year 
agreement has a much reduced role as many of the traditional duties at the fuel 
retail station were arranged and managed centrally by ExxonMobil. These duties, 
such as ordering for fuels, setting prices and promotions for convenience items 
and monitoring underground tanks for leaks, were done centrally by experts in 
Singapore, Thailand and Hong Kong. There were about 100 fuel retail stations 
placed on this new dealership scheme. This modification to the organization 
structure is shown as dotted line on the risk matrix marked as “M2” (Figure 11 
and Table 9).  
 
When Petron took over the local entity of ExxonMobil, services that had been 
centralized were not part of the sale of the network. These services had to be re-
established by Petron. ExxonMobil has an automated stock replenishment and 
inventory controlled by its centre in Bangkok and these fuels with the special 
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additives were supplied from ExxonMobil’s refineries in Singapore. Since Petron 
could not get its own brand of fuels ready for the market, it had to supply 
ExxonMobil’s Synergy fuels for at least a year after taking over. During this 
period that Petron was supplying Synergy fuels, it had to maintain ExxonMobil’s 
brand at the fuel retail stations. However, these fuels have to be transported in 
plain tankers so as to protect ExxonMobil’s name and reputation in case of road 
accidents. 
  
ExxonMobil has a card processing centre consisting of a high-end computer 
system that provides the payment gateway and the transaction switch for 
automating the credit and fleet card payment at the pumps. This central service 
served the ExxonMobil affiliates in Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Hong 
Kong. Although this card processing centre was located in Malaysia, this centre 
was not sold to Petron as it was not part of the local entity. ExxonMobil has since 
sold this centre to a payment system provider, Logical, and leased back the 
payment processing services for its other networks in the region. Since Petron 
could not issue its own proprietary fleet card, it was forced to continue with 
ExxonMobil’s fleetcard programme and to use the service from Logical. Since 
ExxonMobil Malaysia was the largest network among the other affiliates in SE 
Asia, Petron has to pay proportionally a larger fee for the service. The purchase of 
ExxonMobil’s network put Petron with greater risk exposure and high risk impact 
and is shown on the risk matrix under “M2” (Figure 11 and Table 9). 
 
4.3.4 Maintained model fuel retail station (M3) 
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In 2000, managers in BHPetrol, Shell, ExxonMobil and Chevron claimed to 
operate one company-owned company-operated station for each of their networks. 
This was because each oil company under the Malaysian licencing regulation was 
given one operating licence. But why should they want to maintain a single fuel 
retail station under a model that would need a separate set of procedures, a 
dedicated team to monitor and audit station’s staff on performance and inventory 
control and arrangements with third-party contractors for the upkeep and 
maintenance of company’s infrastructure? According to two of the managers, they 
kept one fuel retail station with this organization structure so that they can use this 
model to set the operating standards for the rest of the stations to follow. They 
trained dealers on new procedures and trialled new concepts at this fuel retail 
station before deploying them throughout the network. This reduced the risks of 
introducing new concepts. ExxonMobil gave up the company-owned company-
operated station when they sold the network to Petron. Chevron gave up operating 
one fuel retail station directly when they introduced the branded marketer concept.  
Petronas as a national oil company chose to operate the network either as 
company-owned dealer-operated or dealer-owned dealer-operated stations. The 
use of a model fuel retail station to set the operating standards is shown on the risk 





Thailand, unlike the Philippines and Indonesia, is not made up of many islands. 
Thus, one would expect that it should be easier to deploy a network of fuel retail 
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stations across the country. However, the country was not adequately covered 
with fuel retail stations. More than 10 percent of the districts in the early 1990s 
were without any fuel retail stations. The fuel retailing sector was for many years 
controlled by four oil companies, namely PTT, Shell, Esso and Caltex. No oil 
trading licences were issued by the government for many years to allow new 
entrants into the fuel retailing sector. The application for the government permits 
to build new fuel retail stations was time-consuming and costly because only 
large-sized fuel retail stations were approved for development.  
 
Following deregulation of the fuel retailing sector in 1991, the Ministry of Energy 
of Thailand registered the number of fuel retail stations growing nearly six fold 
from 3,475 in 1991 to 20,252 in 2011. However, the majority of these fuel retail 
stations could not be found or identified as proper fuel retail stations. A veteran of 
the oil industry commented that these missing fuel retail stations may not have 
been built or were abandoned and that the owners may have failed to deregister 
these defunct stations. The number of fuel retail stations was artificially inflated 
 
Figure 12 Thailand vehicle and station population 
Source: AJTP Information centre (vehicles); Gilbarco Veeder-Root (Asia) (stations) 
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further when those abandoned stations were revived and registered by new owners. 
The actual count of fuel retail stations given by oil companies totalled less than 
5,0008 (Table 10), which was inadequate to serve the large and growing number 
of vehicles that has grown to 27.5 million in 2010 (Figure 12).  
 
The fuel retail stations in Thailand do not have standardized designs even for the 
same oil company. Some fuel retail stations in Bangkok have large toilet facilities 
to cater for busloads of tourists. There are also fuel retail stations surrounded by 
small shops set up as part of the station. As one travels further away from the city, 
there are fewer and smaller fuel retail stations. To supplement the shortfall of fuel 
retail stations in the outskirts, fuels are retailed out of oil drums. With all these 
variations in size, type and design of fuel retail stations around the country, there 
are also no consistent organization structures used for fuel retailing. All the oil 
companies used a mixture of company direct operation and dealer operations with 
company- or dealer-owned sites in varying proportions (Table 10). 
 
Bangkok, the capital of Thailand, experienced serious air pollution problems over 
several decades and transport was identified as the greatest source of air pollutants. 
This is because motor vehicles registered in Bangkok soared from 600,000 in 
1980 to 4,163,000 at the end of 1999. To improve air quality, leaded fuel was 
phased out in 1996. In 2001, Stage 1 vapour recovery was implemented at fuel 
retail stations in four main cities. Stage 1 vapour recovery prevents petroleum 
                                               
8
 Department of Energy Business of Thailand listed additional 14,019 stations under “others” in 
2010 but these could not be located and may not all be real. 
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vapour from being released into the atmosphere when the tanker truck is 
discharging fuel into the underground tank.  
 
In 2007, Stage 2 vapour recovery was implemented in Bangkok and Stage 1 was 
extended to additional ten other provinces. Stage 2 vapour recovery reduces the 
petroleum vapour escaping from the nozzle when a car is being filled. The 
implementation of vapour recovery, especially Stage 2 vapour recovery, brought 
in new players specializing in this field. Besides providing the equipment, these 
new players have the knowledge to adjust the vapour pump to ensure the recovery 
of at least 95 percent of the petroleum vapour.  
 
Among the countries in SE Asia, Thailand is the most aggressive in promoting the 
use of biofuels. Thailand has to import most of the fossil fuels for its domestic 
consumption. While it lacked this precious commodity, it has abundant 
Oil Company Total No. of Sites COCO CODO DODO 
PTT 1200 70 900 230 
Bangchak 1100 215 685 200 
Paktai 460 300 160  0 
SUSCO 144 50 94  0 
Petronas 106  0 50 56 
Chevron 424  0 100 324 
Esso / ExxonMobil 529 200 329 0 
Shell 548  0 348 200 
Rayong pure 78 78  0  0 
PTTRM 147 147  0  0 
Total Count 4736 1060 2666 1010 
Table 10 Stations by type of operations in Thailand 
Source: Gilbarco Veeder-Root (Asia) - 2011 Survey 
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agricultural resources which have been used to make biofuel. The Thai 
government’s policy on the use of biofuels was enacted in 2005 and to promote 
the increased blend of biofuels in gasoline and diesel, the Ministry of Energy 
reduced excise tax and lowered the pump prices for blended fuels.  
 
The two main biofuel blends deployed in Thailand from 2005 are E10, which is 
gasoline with 10 percent of ethanol, and B5, which is diesel with 5 percent of bio-
diesel. By 2007, these two blends were sold at most fuel retail stations through the 
existing fuel dispensing equipment at the station. In 2012, oil companies were 
forced to upgrade the fuel dispensing equipment when the country introduced E20. 
Higher blend of ethanol such as E20 has the problem of phase 2 separation that 
causes the water absorbed by the ethanol blended gasoline to separate from the 
gasoline. This increases the risks of selling E20 at the fuel retail stations as the 
precipitated water may get into customer’s vehicle and damage the engine.   
 
Another alternative fuel, Auto-LPG, was successful as a result of government 
subsidy. Taxis and trucks were converted to use Auto-LPG and the number of fuel 
retail stations providing Auto-LPG rose to 988 stations in 2011. This was still not 
adequate to serve the growing number of Auto-LPG vehicles and stations 
dedicated to selling only Auto-LPG were set up. To sell Auto-LPG in existing fuel 
retail stations, the specialized Auto-LPG dispensing equipment has to be in its 
own forecourt separated from the existing forecourt. This increases operating 





Based on the background information, I place the start positions of the oil 
companies at the top right quadrant of the risk matrix (Figure 13). There are more 
company-owned dealer-operated stations and although there is a lower risk 
exposure with this type of organization structure, the impact of adverse events is 
high. The other organization changes to manage risk are elaborated in the next few 
paragraphs and are summarised in Table 11. 
 
4.4.2 Site staff organization (T1) 
Thailand has full attended service at fuel retail stations. This means that the 
forecourt has a team of pump attendants that fills up the customer car and brings 
the cash paid by the customer to a payment booth manned by a cashier. It was 
cheap to hire pump attendants and cashiers at the minimum wage to provide full 
attended service as a way to compete in the sector. In larger fuel retail stations, 
there is a payment booth at every pump island, each with a dedicated team of 
cashier and pump attendants. Another team of pump attendants and cashiers is 
needed for Auto-LPG that is sold within a fuel retail station as the Auto-LPG 
dispensers have to be installed in a separate forecourt.  
 
To recruit, train and administer the large pool of pump attendants and cashiers, 
PTT, the national oil company, set up a subsidiary company specifically to supply 
manpower for the fuel retail network. This subsidiary company becomes another 
player in the fuel retail sector. The arrangement makes it easier for PTT to control 
manpower expenses and reduces its exposure to the rising minimum wage. The 
minimum wage had been raised several times making the full attended service 
model increasingly expensive to maintain. Major oil company Esso Thailand took 
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a different approach by setting up a fully owned subsidiary, Thai C-Centre, to 
manage the company-owned company-operated stations. This arrangement 
separates the retail operations from the rest of the downstream business and 
reduces the impact of any adverse events at the fuel retail stations affecting the 
rest of the company. These two approaches are marked as “T1” on the risk matrix 
(Figure 13 and Table 11). 
 
4.4.3 Introduced half-self service (T2) 
Thailand’s full service model at fuel retail stations was sustainable because of the 
low wage paid to pump attendants. This operating model with a large team of 
manual workers has become difficult to maintain with rising wage costs. The 
number of pump attendants can be reduced or the role eliminated by introducing 
self-service with the customer filling his own car and making payment directly to 
the cashier. Even with a full size convenience store and an indoor cashier to 
collect payment, there is always a payment booth with a cashier in the forecourt.  
 
In 2009, a steep hike to the minimum wage forced fuel retailers to consider self-
service as an option and by early 2010, a hybrid process known as half self-
service was implemented by PTT. With this half self-service scheme, the 
customer pays at a kiosk while a pump attendant helps to fill the car. This interim 
solution was fairly successful and PTT planned to move to self-service model 
similar to those in Malaysia. However, the poor telecommunication infrastructure 
and the banks’ online payment systems could not support its implementation. 
Implementing half self-service reduces both the exposure from risks and impact of 
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adverse risk events. This is marked as “T2” on the risk matrix (Figure 13 and 
Table 11). 
 
4.4.4 Kept organization structure of acquired networks (T3) 
A number of foreign oil companies that started fuel retail network in Thailand did 
not succeed. The high number of registered fuel retail stations that could not be 
found also indicates that there were many private or independent oil companies 
that did not succeed in setting up fuel retail network. Two foreign oil companies, 
Kuwait Oil and Conoco, started their network of fuel retail stations in 1990 and 
1991 respectively. Kuwait Oil built 100 fuel retail stations branded under “Q8” 
and operated them directly. Conoco built 147 fuel retail stations branded as “JET” 
and was known to have captured significant market share using the company-
 





owned, company-operated model to maintain a high standard of product quality 
and service standards.  
 
In 2007, PTT acquired the 147 fuel retail stations operating the JET and Jiffy 
brands from Conoco. According to the press release on the purchase of these fuel 
retail stations, PTT stated that the two brands have a good reputation for 
cleanliness and high quality service. PTT was impressed with the company-owned 
company-operated model and set up a separate organization, PTT-RM, to keep the 
organizational structure intact for the acquired network (PTT, 2007).  With the 
company-owned company-operated model, PTT lowers its exposure of risks but it 
will be subjected to the full impact of adverse events. I have placed this as “T3” 










Segregated site staff Reduced risk from 
hiring and managing 
large pool of pump 
attendants and cashiers 
T1 Interviewees – 
ExxonMobil, PTT 
Introduced half self-service Reduced risk from 
rising wage costs for 
low cost workers and 
failure from full self-
service implementation 
T2 Interviewees – 
PTT 
Kept organization structure 
of acquired  
Reduced risk by 
keeping  COCO 
operations 
T3 Interviewees – 
PTT-RM, 
archived data 
Table 11 Risk Management – Thailand 
Source : Author 
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The fuel retailing sector of the Philippines was dominated for many years by three 
oil companies, Chevron, Shell and Petron. These oil companies implemented a 
combination of company-owned company-operated, company-owned dealer-
operated and dealer-owned dealer-operated stations (Table 12). The fuel retail 
networks were developed by Shell, Caltex and Stanvac as retail outlets for the 
refined products of the refineries that they had set up in the Philippines. Many of 
the fuel retail stations were deployed in the main cities and the fuels were supplied 
from their oil depots at Pandacan, a district adjacent to the Manila city centre.  
 
In 1960, Stanvac, the joint venture between Jersey Standard and Socony-Vacuum 
broke up and the network of fuel retail stations was divided between Esso and 
Mobil. In 1973, Esso’s fuel retail stations were sold to Petron, a newly organized 
national oil company while Mobil’s fuel retail stations were acquired at a later 
date by Caltex. Since then, ExxonMobil did not participate in the Philippines’ fuel 
retailing sector. Following Chevron and Texaco merger, the company was 
renamed ChevronTexaco and subsequently to Chevron while the name Caltex was 
retained as one of the company’s brand. In 2003, Caltex converted its refinery at 
Batangas, built as the first refinery in Philippines in 1954, into a depot and became 
a purely marketing and distributing company.  
 
By 2011, the three oil companies, Filipinas Shell Petroleum, Petron and Chevron 
Philippines owned about one third of the fuel retail stations and they operated a 
third of these company-owned stations directly. The rest of about sixty percent of 
the fuel retail stations was organized under the dealer-owned dealer-operated 
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model. In total, the three oil companies have more than three quarters of the fuel 
retail stations under their brands. 
  
Following the Oil Deregulation Law passed in Jan 1998, many new fuel retailers 
came in with different ways to organize the fuel retail stations. These were the 
independent fuel retailers who formed an association called the New Petroleum 
Players Association of the Philippines (NPPA) which has since been re-formed as 
the Independent Philippine Petroleum Companies Association (IPPCA). Many of 
these new fuel retailers such as Phoenix Petroleum, Flying V, UniOil and SeaOil 
were originally in niche areas of the oil and gas industry such as in the storage, 
distribution and transportation of fuels and lubricants.  
 
The country did not impose proper design and operating standards for these new 
players or were lax in the way they enforced these standards. While Shell, Petron 
and Chevron implemented the global standards or their higher internal standards, 
 
Figure 14 Philippines vehicle and station population 
Source: AJTP Information centre (vehicles); Gilbarco Veeder-Root (Asia) (stations) 
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there was no pressure for these new independent fuel retailers to do so. This has 
resulted in many poorly designed fuel retail stations, sub-standard equipment and 
bad operating practices in fuel retailing. In 2004, the government restricted the use 
of overhead tanks and regulated the size of the fuel retail stations. As a result, 349 
fuel retail stations were closed (Figure 14). The deregulation of the fuel sector in 
Philippines brought in more competitors but this has not resulted in a more 
developed sector.  
 
Deregulation of the oil sector has also resulted in higher pump prices at the fuel 
retail stations but this increase in price could not offset operating costs resulting 
from rising oil prices. The erosion in margin encouraged those with fewer scruples 
to look for illegal ways to make more money. Fuels were smuggled from Malaysia 
and Indonesia which was easily done because of poor import controls and 
corruption. There was also adulteration of fuels by mixing low grade fuels into the 
more popular fuels. The proliferation of these types of fraud was blamed on the 
Oil Company No. of Sites COCO CODO DODO 
Petron 1900 250 600 1050 
SeaOil  210 15 95 100 
Flying-V 235 150 50 35 
Phoenix Petroleum 220 10 50 160 
Eastern Petroleum 25 20  0 5 
Uni-Oil 50  0  0  50 
PTT 52 2 50  0 
TOTAL 175 25 75 75 
Chevron 850 100 100 650 
Shell 960 150 210 600 
Total Count 4677 722 1230 2725 
Table 12 Stations by type of operations in Philippines 




tax structure that created abnormal price differentials among the different fuels. 
This mismanagement of the fuel retailing sector has been cited as the reason for 
reduced investment in the sector by the major oil companies. 
 
The many islands of the Philippines made it challenging to develop an efficient 
fuel retail network of appropriately sized fuel retail stations that could span the 
entire country. The transportation of petroleum products to the fuel retail stations 
has to be done with a fleet of inter-island tankers, barges, tank trucks and a 
pipeline between Batangas and Manila. With the majority of fuel retail stations 
controlled by the dealers and with the high percentage of dealer-owned dealer-
operated stations (Table 12), these dealers were not keen to develop properly 
designed fuel retail stations and deploy them at rural areas. The fuel retail stations 
at many locations has only a single fuel dispensing equipment offering gasoline on 
one nozzle and diesel on the other. The infrastructure needed to deliver fuels to 
these stations was also sorely lacking. As such, many of these fuel retail stations 
were difficult to support.  
 
The oil companies operating in the Philippines also faced a number of high-profile 
risk incidents. In 2010, a pipeline that brought fuels from Batangas and Limay to 
Pandacan leaked and its use was suspended for almost a year. This created a 
distribution nightmare for the three oil companies using the pipeline. Shell, who 
was part owner of the company that owned and operated the pipeline, was fined 
for the leak. The community around Pandacan, where the depots for the three oil 
companies were located, has grown and they have called for the relocation of the 
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oil depots. In response, the government passed a law to force the relocation of 
these depots.  
 
Based on the background information, I place the start position of the oil 
companies at the bottom left of the risk matrix (Figure 15). The poor state of the 
fuel retail sector and being dominated by dealers including more dealer-owned 
stations raises the risk exposure. The many islands of Philippines that make 
monitoring difficult also reduce the impact of adverse events.  
 
4.5.2 Monitor remote stations using automation (P1) 
The poor infrastructure of the Philippines makes it difficult for oil companies to 
manage their networks of fuel retail stations across the many islands of the 
country. Oil companies were unable to monitor the site operators from committing 
fraud that include adjusting the dispensing meters to under-deliver and 
adulterating fuels with lower-cost substitutes. Site operators will also not report 
operational faults or follow proper procedures at the fuel retail stations. These 
fraudulent activities and faults degrade the oil company’s brand and reputation. 
The traditional approach is for the oil company to deploy large teams with 
regional offices to monitor the fuel retail stations but this is not always cost-
effective.  
 
The two major oil companies, Shell and Chevron, minimize fraud and faults by 
monitoring the fuel retail stations using sophisticated automation solutions with 
the support of regional offices around the country. However, they are only willing 
to implement this for their company-owned company-operated stations. 
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Nevertheless, they believe that using this operating model will subject the oil 
company to direct impact from risk events and that using the other organization 
models would shield them from the full impact of a risk event. So while they 
installed sophisticated automation solution for the company-owned company-
operated stations, they chose to put more of the fuel retail stations under the 
dealer-owned dealer-operated model to manage the risks.  
 
The independent oil companies, Petron, SeaOil and Flying V took a different 
approach to monitoring and controlling their dealer-operated stations. Instead of 
paying for full retail automation, they provided only a key component, the 
forecourt controller. The forecourt controller is a part of the automation hardware 
that is connected to the fuel dispensing pumps in the forecourt to monitor and 
collect all the information on every transaction. The independent oil companies 
provided the forecourt controller to all their company-owned dealer-operated 
stations and paid part of the cost of the forecourt controller for the dealer-owned 
dealer-operated stations. The forecourt controller can be linked to transmit the 
transaction records of the fuel retail stations to a central system. The oil 
companies are therefore able to check from a central location whether their dealers 
are adulterating fuels or buying fuels from other oil companies. One oil company 
even made the forecourt controller tamper-proofed so that the unit can continue to 
collect data offline when the network services fail. With the forecourt controller in 
place, the dealer can pay for other components to get the full retail automation. 
Using this approach, the independent oil companies have a low-cost way of 
monitoring of their fuel retail stations across the country from a central location. 
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This central monitoring lowers their exposure to risk for managing a network of 
fuel retail stations deployed in the many islands of Philippines.  
 
In using the low-cost scheme to monitor its dealers remotely, I have marked this 
organization change as “P1’ on the risk matrix. This recognizes that the risk 
exposure of the independent oil company will be reduced through remote 
monitoring (Figure 15 and Table 13).  
 
4.5.3 Branded Marketer (P2) 
Interviewees pointed to the branded marketer scheme as a way for an oil company 
to share risk with a partner. This scheme was introduced into SE Asia by Chevron. 
Chevron divided each country into areas. For each area, they choose a partner to 
own and operate fuel retail stations under the Chevron’s brand. These partners are 
usually those that have been in other niche areas of the oil and gas business. For 
example, Perry’s Fuel Distribution is given the Eastern Laguna territory and 
Northern Star Energy and Fuel Distribution is made the branded marketer for 
North Luzon.  
 
Chevron’s manager in charge of the regional property and facilities optimization 
explained the branded marketer concept and compared this with the current use of 
dealer-owned dealer-operated station. In contrast, a branded marketer will look 
after 50 to 100 fuel retail stations within a specified region. He claimed that a 
branded marketer can set up and operate fuel retail stations at lower cost by being 
dedicated to a segment of the market better than the major oil companies. In 
addition, the branded marketer will carry all the burden of risk but this is only 
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implementable in countries that do not apply strict liability. With strict liability, 
Chevron is still liable for damage and loss from incidents at the fuel retail station 
even when they do not own or operate the station. 
 
Besides setting up new fuel retail stations to expand the network, Chevron 
encourages these branded marketers to take over the existing dealer-owned dealer-
operated stations in their territory. These operating partners are chosen to be 
financially strong to own the fuel retail stations and reasonably large to absorb the 
risks of operating such a network. This concept vas implemented in Philippines 
because the country does not hold the oil company legally responsible for all the 
adverse events or violations at the fuel retail stations operated by a branded 
marketer. This branded marketer scheme is marked as “P2” on the risk matrix 
(Figure 15 and Table 13). 
 
4.5.4 Micro-filling stations (P3) 
Micro-filling stations (MFS) is a new fuel retailing concept started by two oil 
companies, Petron and Flying V. Petron started building Bulilit stations after the 
oil company was acquired by San Miguel. The other MFS called the Bumble V 






operated stations with 
automation 
Reduced frauds such as  
adulteration by dealers 
P1 Interviewees – 
Seaoil  
Implementation of “Branded 
Marketer” 
Reduced risk from 
owning fuel retail 
station’s physical asset 
P2 Interviewees – 
Chevron’s 
managers 
Set up micro-filling fuel 
retail stations 
Reduced capital 
expenditure and support 
of fuel retail stations 





Table 13 Risk management – Philippines 
Source: Author based on interviews 
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stations were built by Flying V, an independent fuel retailer. During a trip to the 
outskirts of Manila, I interviewed the station manager of a Bulilit station to 
understand this localization concept. He told me that the owner, a relative living 
nearby, invested 2.5 million Pesos with Petron to have the land developed into a 
MFS. Each MFS is about 400 square metres and have two dispensing pumps that 
can each serve two vehicles simultaneously. The typical set up will have only one 
dispensing pump (Figure 16).  
 
The manager said that the use of MFS is to take advantage of the community trust 
in small neighbourhood and to extend the “sari-sari” concept which is the 
dominant form of neighbourhood retailing in Philippines. Pointing to his wife 
serving customers and collecting cash, he confirmed that he hires only relatives as 
employees. The work activities are divided among family members who will work 
 




long hours with little or no salary (Matejowsky, 2007). The MFS thus relies on 
trust between players rather than the proper procedures, processes and contracts. 
This has the weakness in that the arrangement will fail when trust is lost. Thus 
MFS cannot be organized using unrelated employees.  
 
I have placed these dealer-owned dealer-operated micro-filling stations set up by 
independent oil company as having high risk exposure from using a family-run 
organization. However, the impact of adverse events would be resolved quietly 
among the family members and would dampen any impact propagating up the 
network. I have placed the use of MFS as “P3” on the risk matrix (Figure 15 and 
Table 13).   
 
  
         




5 CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS  
 
Although the regulatory, technological, infrastructure and social constraints 
identified in the previous chapter explain to some extent why oil companies adopt 
certain organization structures, these constraints do not adequately explain the 
diversity of organization structures in the region. As such, this chapter analyses 
the fuel retailing sector by categories so as to search for patterns that may explain 
the multiple levels of industry architecture used in SE Asia’s fuel retailing sector. 
The reason for analysing the cases along some specific dimensions or categories is 
to prevent the researcher from jumping to premature or wrong conclusions 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Two dimensions are used in the cross-case analysis of the fuel 
retailing sector. The first dimension is the type of oil companies, namely major oil 
company, national oil company and independent oil company. The second 
dimension is the type of organization structure implemented by the oil companies 
to manage their network of fuel retail stations. 
 
The first dimension, the type of oil company, has not been used in the literature to 
analyse the organization structure of the fuel retail sector. There is no national oil 
company in the USA and as highlighted in the literature review, the researcher 
analysing the fuel retailing sector in Canada also chose not to include PetroCanada 
that was originally a national oil company (Slade, 1998). The analysis in the 
literature is often restricted to the distinction between integrated refiners and non-
refiners operating fuel retail stations. In addition, integrated refiners use many 
different distribution channels including passing the distribution rights to 
“jobbers”. Jobbers are independent players who own fuel retail stations and 
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operate these stations directly or indirectly using franchisees (Kliet, 2005). The 
variety of distribution methods makes it difficult to group fuel retail network 
along this dimension in the US and Canada. However, it is possible to analyse fuel 
retail networks in SE Asia owned by major, national and independent oil 
companies. 
 
The second dimension, the type of organization structure, has been analysed in the 
academic literature and has been based on the interaction between two players, the 
oil company and the dealer. However, these organization structures are not 
defined or referenced consistently. The detailed arrangements of these different 
organization structures were also not fully described in the academic literature. In 
contrast, there are three common organization structures mentioned by the 
interviewees in SE Asia. These are the company-owned company-operated 
stations, company-owned dealer-operated stations and dealer-owned dealer-
operated stations. Since many of the organizational changes impacted the roles 
and players at the level within the organization structure, I have decomposed the 
organization structure into its components and created a tree diagram to portray 
how these components can be reconstituted into the different organization 
structures.   
 
In addition to examining the organization structure along these two dimensions, 
the cross-case analysis scrutinizes the roles in the fuel retail sector and how these 
roles were split, consolidated and eliminated as a result of organizational changes.  
  




There are three types of companies in SE Asia, classified as major oil companies, 
national oil companies and independent oil companies. The first two types of oil 
companies are usually referred in the trade literature by the acronyms MOC and 
NOC respectively. The classification of the oil companies chosen for this research 
is given in Table 14. The websites of these oil companies that were the sources for 
archive information are listed at the beginning of this document.  
  
5.1.1 Major Oil Company (MOC) 
Major oil companies or MOCs are publicly owned oil-and-gas groups that operate 
in most countries in the world. They are also called Oil Majors and International 
Oil Companies (IOC). They participate in every part of the value chain including 
the fuel retailing sector which was initially organized with almost every role 
handled internally. The MOCs that operated the fuel retail network in SE Asia 
were BP, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell, Total and ConocoPhillips. These MOCs 
were consolidated from numerous oil companies spawned from the seven pioneer 
oil companies known as the “Seven Sisters”  (Sampson, 1975; Wilkins, 1975). 
The “Seven Sisters” are the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Gulf Oil, Socal, Texaco, 
Royal Dutch Shell, Esso and Mobil. These major oil companies are known by the 
brands and the logos that they have promoted over the years. Most drivers in SE 
Asia would easily recognize the trademarks of the fuel retail stations belonging to 




A key strength of major oil companies is that they know exactly how to run their 
businesses. Through the use of standardized operating procedures, best practices 
and brand image, they can operate networks of different sizes across multiple 
countries. As you approach any fuel retail station under their direct care, there will 
be the signage on the canopy and on a tall frame with their unmistakable brands 
such as a yellow scallop shell, a red Pegasus or a blooming sunflower. At the 
entrance into the fuel retail station, one can intuitively get to any pump without 
the help of station staff by following the directional signs. The pumps are laid out 
in either in a square grid or in rows similar to starting gate of a horse-racing track 
that had been refined over the years to optimise traffic flow. The pumps, placed on 
100mm high platform called pump islands, are bought from specialist pump 
suppliers and dressed up to the nines to promote the fuel products and the oil 
company. If the fuel retail stations have attendants to help with filling up the car, 
the oil companies even specify the phrases, such as “Full tank, sir?” or “V-power, 
madam?” for the pump attendants to use to greet each driver.  
 
The standardized station design and operating procedures based on best practices 
allow major oil companies to scale easily from a small network of less than a 
hundred fuel retail stations in one country to a network with few hundreds fuel 
retail stations in another country. These MOCs are also expert in organizing the 
Major Oil Companies 
 
Shell, ExxonMobil, Chevron, Total 
National oil companies Pertamina, Petronas, PTT, Bangchak, 
PTT-RM 
Independent oil companies SPC, BHPetrol, Paktai, Petron, SeaOil, 
Flying V 




fuel retailing sector and they adjust the organizational structures to match the 
constraints of each host country. Standard Oil Trust, the predecessor of at least 
three of the current major oil companies, claimed that “(n)ational customs, mores, 
regulations, legislation, and administration caused the establishment of a 
remarkably varied pattern in Standard Oil operations abroad and the variety 
persists in a large measure even today” (Hidy, 1952, p. 423). 
 
However, operating a large retail network and spanning many countries multiplies 
the exposure to risk simply because there would potentially be a higher number of 
failures and faults with more equipment and higher incidence of frauds and 
accidents with a larger pool of staff. At the fuel retailing sector where they sell to 
end customers, the major oil companies were organized to have almost every role 
internally within the firm’s boundaries. For example, Esso once owned Gilbarco, 
the company that designed and built fuel dispensing pumps for its fuel retail 
stations (Gilbarco Inc, 2013). The fuel retail stations operated directly by the 
company even employed in-house mechanics to service and repair these fuel 
dispensing pumps, a job that would typically be given nowadays to contractors.  
 
Every staff member in each fuel retail station can be a source of risks for faults, 
frauds and non-compliance with regulatory requirements. As oil companies 
expand their networks, they multiply their risk exposure. Among the major oil 
companies, ExxonMobil is the strictest when it comes to complying with 
regulations and upholding standards to meet safety, security, health and protection 
of the environment. As an example, ExxonMobil subject their staff and 
contractors to regular check for drug and alcohol abuse. This is the counter-
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measure to mitigate risks, which is based on lessons learnt from the major spill 
from crude carrier, Exxon Valdez, an accident claimed to be due to the negligence 
of the drunken captain (Hosmer, 1988; Harrald, Marcus, & Wallace, 1990).  
 
MOCs apply internal standards that are higher than globally known standards 
when operating in a host country especially in countries that have ambiguous 
standards and regulations. Some of the standards applied by MOCs seem extreme. 
For example, MOCs ban anyone climbing on to the top of tanker to verify the fuel 
level before the unloading process, a procedure common among dealers worried 
that they may not receive the correct amount of fuels from the terminal. Another 
example is to prohibit the use of mobile phones in fuel retail stations based on the 
unproven concerns that mobile phones pose a fire risk (Burgess, 2007).  
 
The MOCs will not compromise on standards or violate local regulations as any 
faults or deviations can be costly and have enormous consequences (The 
Hazardous Waste Consultant, 1999; 2007). But it can be difficult for oil 
companies to ensure that their standards are not compromised in a fuel retail 
network spread across a country. This is especially difficult in countries that are 
lax in enforcing regulations and allow violations by site operators to be easily 
regularized. This is the reason given by the interviewees that both Esso and Mobil 
chose not to be in the Philippines and Indonesia’s fuel retail sector even though 
they are active participants in the upstream sector.  
 
The MOCs have progressively removed many internal roles and given them to 
third-party providers. Some of the maintenance firms taking up roles were formed 
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by the employees who were retrenched when Esso gave up the mechanic role. 
Another example is the case of two Shell’s employees who were responsible for 
managing fuel inventory and losses. They resigned from Shell and set up a service 
to provide underground tank integrity and took the role of monitoring 
underground tanks for leaks out of Shell (Leighton O'Brien Pty Ltd, 2013). They 
have since expanded their business to manage underground tanks for other oil 
companies in the region. 
 
The MOCs have been very successful with their own branded convenience stores. 
The convenience store as part of the fuel retail station brought convenience to the 
drivers but within the oil companies, the selling of convenience goods with the 
multiple suppliers, myriads of items and a different set of regulations is at odds 
with the retailing of fuels. ExxonMobil and Shell has chosen to resolve this 
dilemma by using large convenience store retailers for their convenience store 
operations. They have even expanded the scope of the duty such that these non-
fuel retailers are operating the forecourt for the oil companies.    
 
A new industry architecture called the “asset-light model” has emerged in SE Asia, 
creating a new role of branded marketer. Chevron started this asset-light model by 
dividing the network in a large country into a number of smaller networks and 
giving each of these networks to a third party or branded marketer to own and 
operate. Every asset within the fuel retail station is to be owned by the branded 
marketer. Only the signage and displays associated with branding are paid for by 
Chevron. This arrangement allows Chevron to pass all the responsibility and risks 
to the branded marketers but this can only be implemented in countries that will 
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not hold the oil company responsible for the sites bearing the brand as an 
advertisement. This model was possible in Malaysia and Philippines but not in 
Singapore9. 
 
Each branded marketer was given an area to operate with full responsibility. An 
example of a successful branded marketer is Pen Petroleum that has been given 
the rights to distribute Chevron’s fuels and lubricant in Malaysia. Under the 
agreement with Chevron, Pen Petroleum constructs and maintains the network of 
fuel retail stations according to the operating standards set by Chevron and 
organizes the activities from getting fuels from the terminal to delivering these 
fuels to the customers. In the Philippines, Chevron set up several branded 
marketers, such as Perry’s Fuel, Southern Cross Distribution and RSL 
Construction, with each branded marketer operating within a specific geographic 
area. 
  
5.1.2 National Oil Company (NOC) 
For many years, the countries in SE Asia were dominated in both upstream and 
downstream activities by the foreign oil companies such as the major oil 
companies. The national oil companies were set up by the governments initially to 
exert control in the development of the country’s oil and gas sector, especially in 
the more lucrative upstream sector. When they were formed, national oil 
companies, either partly or fully owned by the governments, chose to collect 
money while allowing foreign oil companies exploit the country’s natural 
                                               
9
 Chevron was also not able to pass risks and responsibilities to branded marketers in Hong Kong 
and so this model was also not deployed in Hong Kong. 
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resources. It was only after the 1970s following the two major global oil crises – 
the OPEC oil embargo against the USA in 1973 and the energy crisis in 1979 – 
that national oil companies rose to become dominant oil players by being actively 
involved in both the upstream and downstream sectors.  
 
The national oil companies included in this study are Petronas of Malaysia, 
Pertamina of Indonesia, PTT of Thailand and Petron of Philippines. However, 
Petron is no longer a national oil company as the Philippines National Oil 
Company, a government entity, sold its entire stake in Petron to Ashmore Group, 
a British investment company. San Miguel Corporation subsequently took 
controlling interest of Petron in 2008.  
 
There are advantages for national oil companies operating in their own countries. 
They are better at interpreting government policies and are more prepared in 
implementing new measures introduced by regulators. In Indonesia and Malaysia, 
regulations on ways to control of fuel subsidy are a source of difficulties for major 
oil companies. As mentioned in the case study on Indonesia, foreign oil 
companies were initially restricted from selling subsidized fuels. Even when this 
restriction was later lifted, there were limits on the quantity that can be sold and 
only at particular fuel retail stations. This restriction was specifically imposed on 
foreign oil companies to allow Pertamina more time to improve its fuel retail 
stations. This type of restrictive regulation is only possible when Pertamina is also 




However, advantages from political connections are often eroded by national oil 
companies having to serve non-commercial interests and to support policies of the 
government. The non-commercial interests include supporting plans to control 
fuel subsidy, improving local employment, promoting welfare and building fuel 
retail stations in areas that may not be commercially viable. For example, PTT has 
to set up fuel retail stations in remote area like the northern states of Thailand and 
Petronas has to deploy fuel retail stations in the border state of Perlis.  
 
As NOCs are part of the government, the organization structure set up by NOCs 
for fuel retailing is bureaucratic and inefficient. Pertamina operated with the same 
bureaucratic engine of the government and many schemes to control fuel subsidy 
or deploy alternative fuels did not succeed. When compared against MOCs, NOCs 
are known to be inefficient especially when the comparison is analysed from a 
purely commercial viewpoint (Eller, Hartley, & Medlock III, 2007).  
 
5.1.3 Independent Oil Company 
Independent oil companies are private entities that have operations in terminal or 
niche areas of the oil and gas business. They came into the fuel retailing sector 
when the fuel retail sector in SE Asia was deregulated for them to participate. 
Independent oil companies range from reasonable large entities such as those that 
took over the network of major oil companies in Singapore and Malaysia to 
smaller entities such as those have emerged after deregulation in Thailand and 
Philippines. Paktai Oil started business by operating tank farms and distributing 
petroleum products to fishing industry and factories in South Thailand. SeaOil of 
Philippines, started as a storage company for petroleum and petrochemical 
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products, developed a niche in wholesaling of petroleum before taking up retailing 
of petroleum products. SPC started as a small independent oil company in 
Singapore sharing a refinery with Caltex and BP. In Malaysia, BHPetrol started 
fuel retailing by taking over the network of BP. As the participation in the fuel 
retail sector by private companies was restricted in Indonesia, there were no 
independent oil companies in Indonesia before 2004. 
  
Independent oil companies use different strategies to develop their networks of 
fuel retail stations. The smaller and usually localized players use the low-cost 
approach in building and operating fuel retail stations while the bigger players 
copy some of the processes of the MOCs. Paktai Oil of Thailand buys divested 
sites, typically small outlets in the outskirt, and revives them by making low cost 
changes to brand the fuel retail station with its identity. SeaOil of Philippines 
builds bigger sites that are located in the city and claims that these are more 
effective than having many sites of smaller size and located outside the city. Their 
smaller competitor Flying V has taken the opposite tack by building a chain of 
micro-filling stations in the villages. However, a common trend among these 
smaller independent oil companies is to build fit-for-purpose fuel retail stations 
and run them with minimal amount of staff and support. There is no consistency 
in the appearance of the fuel retail stations across the network.   
 
Two independent oil companies, SPC and BHPetrol, have grown by acquiring fuel 
retail stations from the major oil company BP. In absorbing the staff left behind 
by BP, these two oil companies inherited some attributes of the major oil company. 
When BP moved out, SPC took over the network of fuel retail stations and 
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retained some of the operating staff. It has since mirrored whatever the major oil 
companies did such as operating their Singapore network under the COCO model 
as well as managing their own branded convenience store, Choice, with in-house 
staff. Similarly to SPC, BHPetrol inherited some of the BP’s staff including top 
level managers and adopted some of BP’s processes such as managing risks.  
 
Petron, classified in this study as a NOC because of its history, was bought out by 
San Miguel Corporation, a food and beverage company well known for selling 
beers. That makes Petron an independent oil company and it was under the new 
management that it started growing a network of fuel retail stations called Bulilit 
stations, which are very small fuel retail stations located in remote community. 
This micro-filling station concept extends the retailing strategy of San Miguel 
Corporation that has been very successful in selling beers and food items to the 
small remote communities across Philippines.  
 
Independent oil companies also combined roles especially at their central offices, 
resulting in smaller management teams. They are less rigorous in their approach in 
managing risks. They allow their dealers to reuse existing old underground tanks, 
measure and reconcile underground tank inventory manually and operate without 
automation systems knowing that these approaches will not meet safety, accuracy 
and environmental standards. As an example, Paktai Oil of Thailand spent money 
to rebrand stations and replace dispensing pumps when they bought divested sites 
and gave these to dealers. However, they chose not to replace the old underground 
tanks and pipes. This is because independent oil companies believe that they will 












higher level of mistrust between independent oil companies and their dealers. 
Some dealers will collect the fuels from the terminals to ensure they get the right 
quantity instead of letting oil companies deliver the fuels to them. 
 
5.1.4 Composition of the types of oil companies across SE Asia 
The cross-case analysis shows that the three types of oil companies take different 
approaches in organizing their respective networks. The major oil companies 
deploy their networks using the organization structures based on their global 
experience and then adjust the organization structures in each country according 
to the constraints imposed on them. National oil companies guided by government 
policies maintain the organization structures of the networks that they have taken 
over or copy the organization structures of major oil companies. Independent oil 
companies are prepared to take more risks and implement simplified organization 
structures by consolidating tasks so as to lower operational costs. Since the 
organization structure of SE Asia would be influenced by the particular type of oil 
companies dominating the fuel retailing sector, I have collated numeric data to 




Figure 18 Number of oil players from 1990 to 2012 
Source: Gilbarco Veeder-root (Asia) 
1990 2000 2010 2012
MOC 15 17 14 13
NOC 5 5 6 6
























The fuel retail networks in SE Asia were started by the major oil companies at the 
time when there were no national and independent oil companies. Since the 1970s 
a number of national oil companies with governmental support became more 
aggressive in growing their network of fuel retail stations in their respective 
country. By 2011, the national oil companies controlled 60 percent of the fuel 
retail stations in the five case-study countries (Figure 17). Following the 
deregulation of the fuel retailing sector, niche players from the oil and gas 
industry were allowed into the fuel retailing sector and these new players became 
the independent oil companies. By 2011, the independent oil companies have 
taken up 10 per cent of the share of fuel retail stations (Figure 17). Accordingly, 
the share of the fuel retail stations of the major oil companies withered to 30 per 
cent. Thus the national oil companies have the major share of fuel retail stations 




The number of oil players in SE Asia went up because of the increase in 
independent oil companies that joined the fuel retailing sector after the 
deregulation of the sector in Thailand and Philippines. The number of major oil 
companies went down due to the consolidation of oil and gas players and the 
withdrawal of BP and Conoco from the fuel retailing sector in the region. National 
oil companies remained stable except for the addition of PTTRM in 2007. PTT, 
the national oil company of Thailand, created the separate entity, PTTRM, to take 
over the fuel retail network vacated by Conoco. In this evaluation of oil players in 
the fuel retailing sector, the oil companies for each country are treated as separate 
entities. For example, Chevron Singapore, Chevron Malaysia, Chevron Thailand 
and Chevron Philippines are counted as four separate entities. National oil 
companies are classified as NOCs only in their respective home country and these 
are classified as independent oil companies when they set up network in another 
country. The oil players active from 1990 to 2012 were plotted (Figure 18). By 
2012, there were as many independent oil companies as there were major oil 
companies and twice as many of them as national oil companies. 
 
The types of oil companies exhibit different characteristics in the way they 
organize their networks. These characteristics that have been gathered from the 
cases are summarized in Table 15 and are elaborated upon in the following 
paragraphs.   
 
The major oil companies adhere strictly to regulations and standards imposed on 
them. This is done to protect their global brand and to manage risk in operating in 
a host country. However, they also control the industry architecture to capture 
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additional value from innovations. Examples of innovation introduced by MOCs 
are the addition of the convenience store as a backcourt business and the use of 
self-service with payment made by drivers directly at the pump.  
 
The national oil companies have the advantage of government support including 
being privy to new regulations and restrictions when they operate in home country. 
However, this advantage is offset by the needs to serve non-commercial interests. 
Generally, the national oil companies maintain the existing industry architecture 
making small incremental improvements to increase market share.  
 
The independent oil companies often choose the low-cost approach. This includes 
reviving divested fuel retail stations using minimal investments. This approach 
can be risky but this type of oil companies, especially the smaller entities, appear 
to be less concerned with regulations and standards. They choose to combine roles 
so as to operate their networks with minimal staff. Thus the independent oil 








• Strict adherence to regulations 
and standards to protect global 
brand and manage risk 
• Control industry architecture 
to capture value from 
innovation, e.g. adding 
convenience stores, outdoor 
payment 
 
Innovated by changing business and 
organization structure to introduce new 
features to fuel retailing – convenience 
store and pay-at-the-pump 
 
Invested in high-end equipment 
including monitoring systems to 
minimize exposure to risk, especially 
for dispersed network with large 
number of staff 
 
Changed organization structure to pass 
risk to third parties through 




• Benefit from governmental  
support but need to serve non-
commercial interests  
• Maintain existing industry 
architecture with incremental 
improvements to increase 
market share  
 
Operated with organization structures 
that support and promote government 
policies 
 
Kept the more superior organization 
structure of acquired networks 
 
Supported non-commercial interest by 
deploying fuel retail stations in rural 
areas 
 
Independent oil company 
• Driven mainly using low cost 
approach with less concern on 
risk 
• Modify industry architecture 
for cost purpose 
Less concerned with regulations and 
standards 
 
Low-cost approach with smaller and 
localized network such as buying over 
divested sites 
 
Operated with minimal staff with 
combined roles in fit-for-purpose fuel 
retail stations 
 
Table 15 Characteristics of oil companies 
Source: Author from interviewees 
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NOCs have the largest share of fuel retail stations deployed in SE Asia and would 
presumably have the greatest influence in the organization structure of the fuel 
retail sector. However, in term of the number of entities, there are more entities 
operating as independent oil companies and as such these may exert more 
influence on the type of organization structure. Their more aggressive low-cost 
approach may have a greater impact in changing the industry architecture of the 
sector. Although the MOCs have reduced their share of the market, they exert 
considerable influence within the sector because of their global experience. Their 
methods of organizing the sector are seen by the other oil companies as superior 
than their own ways. As the sector evolves, the characteristics of the different 
types of oil companies will also changes and the indication is that NOC and 
independent oil companies tend to converge to the characteristics of the MOC.    
 
 Organizational structures 5.2
 
The interviewees and the trade literature refer to three base organization structures 
commonly found in SE Asia’s fuel retail by the acronyms COCO, CODO and 
DODO. These are the company-owned company-operated stations, company-
owned dealer-operated stations and dealer-owned dealer-operated stations 
respectively. Shell uses CO and DO for company-owned company-operated and 
dealer-owned dealer-operated respectively and RBA (Retail Business Agreement) 
for contract with dealers to operate its company-owned stations. Chevron prefers 
the acronyms COCO, CORO and RORO instead of COCO, CODO and DODO by 




The naming convention implies that the organizational structures are only based 
on two contractual agreements, one for ownership of the land and infrastructure, 
the other for managing the site operations. The fuel retailing sector in SE Asia is 
thus based on the combinations of these two contractual agreements. But a 
deconstruction of the organization structures shows that there were at least four 
levels of contractual agreements in SE Asia. These four levels result in several 
variations to the three base organization structures. These four levels and the three 
base organization structures are described below followed by a summary of the 
variants commonly found in SE Asia. 
 
5.2.1 Base organization structures  
The four levels of contractual arrangements that make up the organization 
structures in SE Asia are the wholesaler supplying the fuels, the owner of the 
station, the operator and the site-level operating team. 
 
1. Wholesaler: This is the owner of the brand that distributes fuels to the fuel 
retail stations. It is usually the marketing subsidiary or a department of the 
oil company. It serves as the central control of the network. 
 
2. Asset owner: Assets such as land and infrastructure can be owned or 
leased by either the oil company or a third-party investor designated as the 
dealer. 
 
3. Operator: If the oil company owns the assets, it may choose to operate the 
fuel retail station directly or pass the rights to a dealer. In the latter case, a 
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dealership agreement defines the terms and conditions on operating the 
fuel retail station including ownership of inventory of fuel at the station. If 
the dealer owns the assets, similar dealership agreements for dealer-owned 
stations may include compensation to the dealer to upkeep the oil 
company’s brand image. 
 
4. Site-level operating team: If the oil company retains operating rights, the 
oil company can appoint an employee or contract an agent as a station 
manager. Similarly, if the dealer has the operating rights for more than one 
station, he may employ a manager for each fuel retail station. Otherwise, 
the dealer is also the station manager. The staff consisting of pump 
attendants and cashiers may be hired by the contracted agent or the dealer. 
If an oil company retains operating rights, the staff could even be 
employees of the oil company or be supplied by a subsidiary providing 
manpower. 
 
There can be many different organization structures by having different 
arrangement of these four levels. Through the different permutations of the first 
three levels, we have the base organization structures commonly used in SE Asia 
(Figure 19). These are the fuel retail stations owned and operated by the oil 
company (COCO), fuel retail stations owned by the oil company but operated by 




As mentioned in the literature review, the three base organization structures are 
referred in academic journal with generic terms as company-owned, 
commissioned-agent, lessee-dealer, open-dealer, dealer-owned  (Shepard, 1993; 
Slade, 1998; Blass & Carlton, 2001) or simplified as refiner-owned and 
independent retailer (Vandergrift & Bisti, 2001). Lafontaine and Slade (2007) 
used the terms, CC, CD and DD contracts that are similar to the terms, COCO, 
CODO and DODO generally used within the fuel retailing sector domain 
(Kaumanns, 2010; OECD, 2008). The defintions given below for these three 
arrangements are consolidated from oil-companies’ website and the contracts 
between oil companies and dealers.   
 
1. Company-Owned, Company-Operated (COCO) 
These are fuel retail stations where the oil company owns the assets consisting of 
land and infrastructure. Traditionally, the oil company operates the station directly 
with its own employees, but over time, variants of the COCO model have 
 
Figure 19 Base organization structures 
Source: Author – derived from interviews 
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emerged in which station staff may no longer be the employees of the oil company. 
The oil company also owns the inventory of fuels and convenience store goods. 
  
2. Company-Owned, Dealer-Operated (CODO) 
These are fuel retail stations where the oil company owns station assets including 
land and infrastructure but delegates the operations to an unaffiliated dealer 
through a dealership contract. Typically, the dealer has to pay a rental fee for the 
use of the assets. The dealer owns the fuel inventory once it is delivered into the 
underground tanks. 
  
3. Dealer-Owned, Dealer-Operated (DODO) 
These are fuel retail stations where the dealer owns the assets consisting of land 
and infrastructure and controls the operations. The oil company provides the brand 
and advises the dealer on the design of the fuel retail station and how to operate 
the station according to the oil company’s standards. The dealership contract will 
restrict the dealer from getting fuels from other oil companies.  
 
5.2.2 Variants to the base organization structures 
The organization arrangements formed by permuting the first three levels gives 
the three familiar base organization structures, COCO, CODO and DODO. The 
fourth level specifies the ways the manager and staff are employed at the fuel 
retail stations and determines how each station is operated. It is this fourth level 
that results in a number of variants to the base organization structures (Figure 20). 
However, oil companies usually refer to the base organization structures without 




There are three variants of the COCO model. The Thai C-centre in Bangkok, a 
fully owned subsidiary of ExxonMobil covering part of its network in Thailand, 
has direct employees operating the fuel retail stations. These are the true COCO 
stations according to the definition. PTT has modified the COCO structure by 
assigning employees as the station managers and having another subsidiary 
provide the pump attendants and cashiers. The third variant is found in Singapore. 
The station manager operating the COCO station in Singapore is an unaffiliated 
sole proprietor tasked to hire a group of staff whose salaries are fully reimbursed 
by the oil company.  
 
There are two variants of the DODO model. This depends on whether the dealer is 
operating a single fuel retail station or multiple fuel retail stations. The dealer of a 
single station typically operates the fuel retail station directly and retains the role 
 
Figure 20 Variants of base organization structures 
Source: Author – derived from interviews 
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of the station manager. There are dealers with more than one fuel retail station and 
these are supported by professional station managers appointed by the dealer to 
look after each station. These are also called “super dealers”. A “super dealer” 
generally operates all the fuel retail stations under the same brand. However, 
interviewees mentioned that there were such dealers operating with multiple 
brands in Singapore. 
 
Some variants of the CODO model are difficult to distinguish from the variants of 
the COCO model. Interviewees of Chevron mentioned the use of commission 
agents in their company-operated site and called this type of operations the 
company-owned commission-agent or COCA model. This scheme appears to be 
similar to the sole proprietor engaged by Esso for its company-operated stations 
although a commission agent is treated by Chevron as another type of dealer. The 
difference appears to be the way this manager is compensated. The commission 
agent receives a variable income based on sales while the Esso-style station 
manager has a fixed income with a small variable component. 
 
5.2.3 Mix of organization structures in SE Asia 
The high-level cross-case analysis above shows that while there are three base 
organization structures in SE Asia fuel retailing sector, these organization 
structures are implemented with variations on contractual arrangement between 
the oil company and the station staff comprising the station manager, the pump 
attendants and the cashiers. Although each oil company implemented only a 
selected number of variants for each network, these variants make comparison 













networks are organized across the cases is done using the base organization 
structures. 
     
The oil companies in SE Asia operate 46 percent of the fuel retail stations with the 
DODO model, 42 percent with the CODO model and 12 percent with the COCO 
model (Figure 21). The combined data for COCO and CODO shows that the oil 
companies own 54 percent of the fuel retail stations and allow 78 per cent of these 
company-owned stations to be operated by dealers. Although the dealers under 
CODO model operate under different contract terms from those dealers under the 
DODO model, both types of dealers are essentially independent businessmen. By 
grouping all the fuel retail stations operated by both types of dealers, the data 
shows that 88 per cent of the fuel retail stations are operated by dealers. Thus the 





Figure 22 Organization structure by country 








Indonesia Philippines Thailand Malaysia Singapore
COCO CODO DODO
  
When the data of organization structure is collated for the case-study cases, each 
country shows a different mix of organization structures (Figure 22). Singapore is 
organized exclusively on the COCO model, which represents the vertically 
integrated organization structure centred on the oil company. Indonesia is on the 
other extreme of having 80 percent of the fuel retail stations organized on DODO 
model and 18 percent with the CODO model. The DODO model represents the 
vertically disintegrated organization structure. The CODO model is between the 
COCO and DODO models in term of its disintegrated structure. The other three 
countries have a mix of the three base organization structures. Malaysia has 
almost 80 percent of fuel retail stations under the CODO model. The other two 
remaining countries have a mix of all three models but show differences with 
Philippines having more DODO-type fuel retail stations and Thailand having 




Oil companies in Singapore claim that the COCO model is used because of the 
limited number of sites assigned for fuel retail stations and the high land price. 
Pertamina, the national oil company of Indonesia, with a monopoly of the retail 
sector, is not keen on managing the fuel retailing sector and thus employs mainly 
the DODO model. Besides having no competitors until recent years, the low 
margin from selling subsidized fuels also did not incentivize the Indonesian 
dealers to modernize the operations nor Pertamina to change its organizational 
structure. The restriction on operating licensing forces the oil companies in 
Malaysia to use the CODO model. This restriction will not change unless the 
formula on subsidizing the wholesale and retail margins is changed. 
 
The different organization structures across countries indicate that the structures 
are influenced by country-specific factors. It is true from the within-case analysis 
that each country has imposed different constraints on the fuel retail sector. Even 
 
Figure 23 Shell’s organization structure by country 












MOCs that have networks in the different countries have to implement different 
organization structures. One explanation is that the oil companies deployed in 
different countries are different commercial entities even though they operate 
under the same brand. For example, Shell Singapore is a different commercial 
entity from Shell Filipinas. Even though they take guidance from common 
regional managers, each entity has to implement the organizational structure that 
fits within the constraints of the country.  
 
The mix of organization structures within a country is harder to understand. There 
is more than one organization structure used in each of the case-study countries 
with the sole exception of Singapore. This mix is especially notable in the case of 
Thailand and Philippines which have all three base organizational structures. Both 
countries have deregulated the retail sector within the last few years and 
encouraged the entrance of new independent oil companies. The different 
independent oil companies were more varied in their strategies, with some taking 
a low-cost approach to manage a larger network with less staff and others trying to 
 












match the bigger players and by being more nimble. The mix within a country is 
therefore the result of the different types of oil companies deploying their choice 
of organization structures. 
 
Another interesting view from the data is that an oil company may deploy more 
than one type of organization structure within a country. Shell has fuel retail 
networks in each of the five countries and 15.4 percent of the fuel retail stations 
under its brand. Yet it did not deploy a standard organization structure across all 
these countries and within each country. Instead, Shell implemented different 
organization structures in each of these five countries (Figure 23) that mirrored the 
mix by country for the consolidated oil companies (Figure 22). A similar mix of 
organization structures is observed for Chevron across SE Asia. Chevron has 10.3 
percent of the fuel retail stations and deploys networks in four countries (Figure 
24). The implementation of a mix of industry architecture within a single country 
by the same oil company indicates that country-specific constraints cannot be the 
only reason driving organization structure in a sector. 
 
 Industry Architecture of the fuel retailing sector 5.3
 
While the use of the three base organization structures is convenient way to 
classify the contractual arrangements of the fuel retailing sector, the organizational 
structures are more complex and have multiple players assigned to different roles 
within the industry architecture. These roles vary across networks as well as 
among fuel retail stations of the same brand and some roles can be split among 
more than one player. For example, the oil companies have a retail manager 
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handling both the commercial arrangements and running the day-to-day processes. 
In other usually larger oil companies, the duty of the day-to-day operations is 
undertaken by another person, typically called the retail operations manager. And 
when the operation is outsourced to a convenience store specialist or a branded 
retailer, the role of this retail operations manager does not disappear but is taken 
over by the convenience store specialist. The responsibility of the retail manager 
is also significantly reduced as part of his duties has also been removed. For 
example, when ExxonMobil gave the job of managing their fuel retail network in 
Singapore to FairPrice, a local supermarket retailer, the whole retail team at the 
head office was disbanded. A similar change at the Shell’s corporate office 
happened when the operations of the network was outsourced to 7-Eleven.  
 
5.3.1 Centralized roles 
A central head office with a team led by a retail manager is often considered to be 
an indispensable part of a fuel retail network. The type, size and location of the 
network determine the roles and complexity of the head office. For example, the 
regional office of the major oil company, ExxonMobil, in Singapore supported the 
fuel retail networks in Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand, Guam and 
Japan with each country operating with a different mix of COCO, CODO and 
DODO models. Each regional office has a team of managers, each overseeing an 
area and supported by roles such as area managers and territory managers. In 
contrast, the head office for SeaOil, an independent oil company, combines 
several roles into a skeletal team that is sufficient for running its small network of 
210 fuel retail stations in Philippines, operating mainly with the CODO and 
DODO models. The evolution of the fuel retailing sector has undermined the need 
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for the head office and all the roles within, as oil companies evaluate whether 
these roles are necessary and whether these roles can be centralized and 
outsourced. 
 
When non-fuel activities are added to the fuel retailing sector, the head office has 
to be expanded and roles added to manage these activities that are traditionally not 
part of fuel retailing. It was still possible in the past for dealers to manage the non-
fuel activities that are closely related to fuel retailing such as such as lube bay and 
car wash services without head office support, as many of the dealers were 
mechanics by training. The move to include convenience stores into fuel retailing, 
however, is a different matter. A new role of a convenience store management at 
the head office is needed to support dealers with the logistics of managing 
thousands of convenience store items, seasonal promotions and inventory controls. 
Many existing roles at the head office that are used to deal with the four or five 
fixed fuel products have to be supplemented to support convenience store 
operations with its changing list of products.  
 
Card payment at fuel retail stations has gained popularity in some countries, with 
increasingly more complex payment arrangements including promotional and 
discount vouchers, stored value cards, fleet and loyalty cards. This raises the need 
for the role of card operations which has found its way into the head office. Oil 
companies such as ExxonMobil, Shell and BP have set up their own card 
processing centres to process their own fleet and loyalty cards, which need a large 
supporting staff and specialized equipment. Besides processing their own issued 
cards, credit card transactions are also routed through their own card centre before 
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being forwarded to the banks. This is done so that the oil companies can use the 
card transaction volume of their networks to negotiate with the banks for a lower 
merchant fee. For those oil companies that are not keen to have such in-house 
capabilities, the card processing function can be outsourced to banks or third-party 
acquirers so that only the business functions of dealing with fleet and loyalty cards 
are kept within the oil companies. This has the advantage of passing the risks 
associated with card processing to the banks. 
 
Terminal operations are usually centralised and the team managing this for a 
country is located at one of the terminals. The two main players are the terminal 
superintendent and the tanker operator. Almost all the big oil companies have 
outsourced the tanker operations to logistics specialists because tanker operation is 
not considered a core business activity. However, in the past, tankers were owned 
and operated by oil companies directly. To reduce the risks associated with 
accidents, the tankers were sold to logistics specialists and leased back by the oil 
companies for exclusive use, so that these tankers were parked in the evening at 
the terminal. Some independent oil companies that started as terminal or tanker 
operators continued to maintain their own fleet of tankers to service their networks 
of fuel retail stations. 
 
Even in small countries like Singapore, each oil company has its own dedicated 
terminal even though doing so does not make economic sense. Similarly, large 
countries with many islands like the Philippines can provide better coverage by 
sharing terminals, yet each oil company has its own dedicated terminals across the 
country. Although they do occasionally borrow supplies from each other and use 
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third-party terminals, these companies will not forge long-term sharing 
arrangements. Obviously, the terminal is considered to be a core function of fuel 
retailing. 
 
The terminal serves more than just the network of fuel retail stations. They 
provide bulk supply of fuels to commercial facilities serving construction, bus and 
taxi companies. This business, usually termed as “Commercial and Wholesales”, 
is not part of this research. However, the introduction of branded marketers could 
potentially skew the business of fuel retailing more towards the wholesaling of 
fuels, making the terminal superintendent’s role more critical than the retail 
manager’s. 
 
5.3.2 Other roles 
A number of roles vacillate between being handled in-house and being outsourced 
to third parties. Although treated by oil companies as non-core activities, these 
roles exist in the industry architecture in some form or are subsumed under other 
roles. These are often targeted by oil companies as roles that could be outsourced 
to third parties.  
 
The network manager seeks land for the deployment of fuel retail stations and is 
very important when oil companies are growing their networks of fuel retail 
stations, but his role can be given to real estate specialists. Similarly, the brand 
manager’s job is threatened by the advertising specialists. To avoid keeping the 
roles needed to maintain or supervise the maintenance of station equipment with 
in-house staff, the oil companies are willing to pay equipment suppliers for 
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extended warranty and post-warranty support for equipment. PTT in Thailand has 
even opted for a rental scheme for automation equipment so that they have to pay 
only for reports without having to own the hardware. 
 
Two roles taking care of management controls and health, safety, security and 
environment advisory (HSSE) have become increasingly important in bigger oil 
companies, especially for company-operated stations. These roles help to manage 
the risks faced by the oil companies operating a network of fuel retail stations. 
The control advisor assists the retail manager by providing guidance on fraud and 
non-compliance with regulations. The HSSE manager looks after risks associated 
with health, safety, security and environmental protection. 
 
Third-party service providers and suppliers such as contractors and convenience 
goods suppliers are not usually considered as part of the value chain. They are 
also not considered as being specific to any particular sector. In reality, many of 
these roles have become very specific to the fuel retailing sector. There are several 
ancillary roles and corresponding actors such as fuel equipment suppliers, non-
fuel equipment suppliers and contractors. A few new roles were added after year 
2000 when there was significant consolidation of the fuel retailing sector. The 
new actors for these roles included facilities managers that were contracted to 
reduce the need for in-house engineering expertise.  
 
5.3.3 Managing the industry architecture 
A characteristic of the fuel retail sector is that not all the roles described above are 
present in the different organization structures in SE Asia. On one extreme, a 
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major oil company operating a large network of fuel retail stations with its own 
branded convenience store and full-attended service configuration operating 24 
hours using the COCO model will have most of these roles, with each role taken 
up by an individual or a team. On the other extreme, an independent oil company 
operating with DODO model and with its station selling fuels and accepting cash 
during retail hours will have the dealers at the fuel retail stations and a small team 
at the head office taking on multiple roles. Between these two extremes, we have a 
variety of combination of roles as a result of the different type of oil companies, 
the different configurations of fuel retail stations and the base organization 
structures.  
 
The original roles when the fuel retail sector started in SE Asia were the oil 
company as the wholesaler and the dealer as the operator (Figure 25). The role of 
 




the operator became differentiated as a result of the oil company taking the 
operator’s role with its own employees and with two kinds of dealers, one 
operating its own sites and the other operating sites owned by the oil company. 
Other roles were added when minor activities grew to be significant with more 
fuel retail stations added to the network, more types of fuel products were offered 
and higher volume of transactions were sold from each fuel retail station. 
 
The evolution of the fuel retail sector has changed the relative importance of each 
role. The retail manager role has been reduced significantly while the roles of 
terminal, alliance and asset managers gained prominence with the move towards 
the branded marketer model. The use of the self-service model made the 
specialists providing and supporting the automation and the payment processing 
more important. An increasingly percentage of the operator’s margin is also being 
deducted by these service providers. The rearrangement of players in the industry 
architecture has resulted in station operators building stronger links to third-party 
players such as those providing support services, equipment maintenance and 
automation solution and reducing their reliance on the team at the central head 
office. The result of the rearrangement is that the oil companies, especially the 
bigger oil companies, have inserted a layer of players between themselves and the 
fuel retail operators (Figure 25).  
 
 Impact of institutional environment  5.4
 
Although the oil companies should, for efficiency reason, operate with the same 
organization structure across all their networks, the within-case studies by country 
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showed that this was not possible with each country imposing its own set of 
regulations and standards that differs with other countries. Furthermore, 
regulations in some country can be biased against a particular form of 
organization structures, especially when such organizational form may not be in 
alignment with the country’s economic and political agenda. Technological 
advancement has made it possible to improve productivity by allowing customers 
to fuel their own vehicles and to make payment directly at the pump without help. 
The use of this self-service model can improve productivity by eliminating the 
pump attendants and cashiers at fuel retail station. However, this improvement can 
be blocked by players in the sector or end customers intending to keep to existing 
social norms.    
 
5.4.1 Biased regulations and standards 
Biased regulations and standards impact industry architecture by excluding certain 
players while enabling other players to develop relevant capabilities. 
 
First, controlling and restricting participation allow players with insufficient 
capabilities taking up roles within a sector. Regulations that control participation 
can skew the industry architecture by mismatching capabilities and roles. 
Controlling participation in a sector can range from making it illegal for a refiner 
to participate in fuel retailing, restricting the number of stations operated by a 
single entity, restricting the use of the COCO model or controlling the issuance of 
operating licences. The issuance of operating licences was not transparent in 
Indonesia and Philippines and was stringently controlled in Malaysia. With 
reference to the case study on Malaysia, the licence to operate stations was 
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preferentially given to certain groups of Malaysians to encourage local 
entrepreneurship and to prevent oil companies from earning both the retail and 
wholesale margins. This licensing restriction had several implications for the 
industry architecture of the fuel retail sector. On one hand, dealers who could get 
licenses, usually older but financially stronger, did not have the skills to operate 
modern, highly automated stations. On the other hand, younger and better 
educated Malaysians who could get licences did not have working capital, had to 
be sponsored but loan arrangement by oil companies were deemed as attempt by 
oil companies to set up COCO operations and circumventing the regulation. 
Under this regulation, the fuel retail sector in Malaysia settled on a combination of 
CODO and DODO with a higher proportion of CODO as the next best choice 
under this constraint. And as reported in the case study of Indonesia, the fuel retail 
sector was closed to foreign participation until year 2000. Even after deregulation, 
the country did not allow participation for the full downstream sector forcing 
foreign oil companies to import fuel and have these stored and distributed out 
from third party depots, a role that these foreign oil companies considered as a 
core activity and usually done in-house.  
 
Second, lenient application of standards enables new entrants to gain capabilities 
required to play specific roles within the sector. The use of common set of 
technical standards in an industry ensures that products or services that have to 
work together in a shared environment are compatible and interoperable. It was 
important in the fuel retail sector to have standards that ensure that the fuels are 
handled safely and that these will not leak into the ground or into the atmosphere. 
When these standards and the regulations enforcing these standards were not 
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established, the fuel retail sector was dominated by incumbent oil companies that 
claimed to have the specialized domain knowledge on the retailing of fuels. Many 
standards were established as a result of painful experiences. Once these standards 
became established globally, it was subsequently adopted in SE Asia. However, 
the lenient way these standards were enforced led to lower capability requirements 
for players especially for those outside of the domain seeking a role in the industry 
architecture of the sector. New players such as convenience store specialists, taxi 
fleet operators and logistics managers profess to have the necessary skills to 
operate fuel retail stations by claiming to follow these standards. The case studies 
of Singapore reported that the Shell and ExxonMobil networks were given to 7-11 
and Fairprice respectively. Even without domain knowledge, these convenience 
store retailers can operate the fuel retail stations because many of the equipment 
and processes have been standardized and implemented by the oil companies. 
Roles such as the construction and maintenance of fuel retail equipment were also 
no longer considered specialized and these were outsourced to facility managers 
by ExxonMobil and Shell in the case studies. Even the system specialists 
providing support for fuel retail automation were roped in to support the fuel 
dispensing pumps.   
 
Third, price control encourages players to adopt organizational arrangements that 
condone the use of unconventional methods including frauds. Regulating pump 
prices distorts normal market mechanisms and dampens the competitive spirit. 
Conversely, the freedom to set pump price made fuel retailing profitable even 
under intense but unimpeded competition. To capture the full margin, fuel 
retailers opted to have all the roles contained within the oil company. Singapore 
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did not control pump price and accordingly, the COCO model was chosen by all 
the players in Singapore to maximize profitability. However, two countries, 
Malaysia and Indonesia were burdened by ever-increasing fuel subsidies because 
of their policy of depressing local fuel prices. Generally, under competitive 
pricing, the pump price of a fuel would rise above the cost price of the fuel, thus 
allowing the difference to cover both the wholesale margin and dealer margin. By 
setting the selling price of fuels at the fuel retail station below the cost price, the 
oil companies had to be subsidized for the difference between fixed selling price 
and market price. This subsidy can be kept small if the pump price can be raised 
in tandem with the market price for the fuel. While it was possible for Malaysia to 
increase pump price, it was extremely difficult to do so in Indonesia as this would 
be raised as a political issue during elections. Thus, the retail margin remained 
small in Indonesia and at about half that of Malaysia. Limited by the small margin, 
oil companies in Indonesia chose to use the DODO model, engaging dealers to 
own and operate fuel retail stations. Although the higher and more predictable 
margin was sufficiently attractive for Malaysia to use more of the CODO, the 
profitability of the smaller and less popular fuel retail stations was not certain. 
Hence, to maximize profit, retailers in Malaysia and Indonesia, especially DODO 
dealers, supplemented their income by adulterating fuels, smuggling and 
tampering pumps to under-deliver. These frauds also brought in new players into 
the sector that provided the oil companies and regulators with services to control 
such frauds. An example of fraud bringing in new players is the case of Malaysia 
having to implement the secured EMV card payment. This implementation 





5.4.2 Shifting social norms 
Customer acceptance of novel customer service paradigms in the fuel retail sector 
drives the reorganisation and elimination of certain roles within the sector. Novel 
customer service paradigms such as the self-service model or adding a 
convenience store as a backcourt business can be difficult to introduce in countries 
where there are ingrained attitudes on how customers should be treated and what 
businesses can be combined with fuel retailing.  
 
While the self-service model is acceptable in Malaysia and Singapore, it has 
limited acceptability in Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia because of different 
customer expectations of service in these countries. In Thailand, Philippines and 
Indonesia, the customers sit in their cars expecting everything from filling up the 
fuel tank and collecting payment to be done by the pump attendant. In Malaysia, 
customers have to make payment at the pump or at a counter before filling up 
their tank. In Singapore, customers made payment at the indoor counter after 
getting his car filled by the pump attendant. The different social norms and 
difficulty in deploying self-service stations resulted in the different industry 
architectures for deploying stations under self-service or full service modes. The 
full service model was sustainable in Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia which 
have abundant low-skill workers willing to work as pump attendants at minimum 
wage. With the steep increase in minimum wage in Thailand, it was more cost-
effective to move to the self-service model. However, this model could not find 
acceptance and a compromised arrangement known as half self-service model was 
implemented in a small number of fuel retail stations. In this arrangement, the 
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customer pays at the payment booth set up near the pump while the pump 
attendant fills up the car. The full service model and the unwillingness of drivers 
to leave their vehicle also make it impossible for convenience store retailing to be 






The research question is “Why are there multiple levels of industry architecture of 
the fuel retail sector in SE Asia?” The literature review shows that the academic 
theories use a model based on two economic players which is then used to analyse 
the characteristics peculiar to the North American markets. These theories are 
therefore inadequate to explain organization structure of the fuel retail sector in 
SE Asia that has evolved to include multiple players within the sector. The fuel 
retail sector in the countries of SE Asia also has characteristics that are different 
from that of North America. Another gap in academic literature is that there was 
no attempt to explore the effect of risk management on the organization structure 
of the fuel retail sector. Therefore this research has to induce a different theory 
from the information and numerical data in SE Asia’s fuel retail sector to explain 
the phenomenon of the multiple levels of industry architecture. 
 
The following chapters in the discussion show how the theory is induced. This is 
summarized as follows. I first identify that the organizational changes show a 
consistent pattern when plotted on a risk matrix across the 5 cases. This pattern 
indicates the impact of risk management as a cause of the multiple levels of 
industry architecture. I looked at why risk management has become more 
important and how the practice of risk management has been delegated upwards to 
higher management. I showed that there are differences between standard 
technical approach and the higher management approach in managing risk. In the 
latter approach, the players in the sector can modify their organization structures 
to manage risks by selectively integrating roles or segregating roles, sharing risk 
158 
 
and centralizing services. This is shown when the organization structures of the 
fuel retail sector are analysed down to the role level. Therefore this research 
suggests that the fuel retailing sector in SE Asian countries operates with multiple 
levels of industry architecture as a result of organizational changes made by oil 
companies to manage risk. 
 
Jacobides (2005) suggests using an inductive analysis to understand how a sector 
evolves to include new economic players and how vertical disintegration emerges. 
The inductive process or inductive reasoning is the process of gathering 
information from observations and looking for patterns of regularity in these 
observations to infer an emergent theory (Yin, 2002; Ketokivi & Mantere, 2010; 
Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). This is done by reviewing the within-case analysis 
and cross-case analysis until themes, concepts and relationships between variables 
begin to emerge (Eisenhardt K. M., 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). There 
are advantages and disadvantages for an industry participant in looking for 
patterns of regularity. One advantage is that once a pattern of regularity is picked 
up during field observations and interviews, he can check for the same pattern at 
other networks quickly through his contacts and from archived data. However, the 
disadvantage is that his long-term immersion in the sector may desensitize him 
such that he can easily miss or dismiss some patterns of regularity as unimportant, 
which is a form of information-processing bias (Eisenhardt K. M., 1989, p. 540).     
 
While gathering information from the field, a recurring theme did emerge. A 
number of interviewees explained that the organizational changes or at least 
several organizational changes implemented by the oil companies during the 
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period of the research were for the oil companies to manage risk. They implied 
that the organizational structures were modified to reduce the exposure to 
operational risks or to reduce the impact of a risk event when the exposure of such 
risks cannot be reduced at reasonable cost. But at that stage of the research, there 
was no distinct pattern when comparing the organizational changes across the 
countries to put risk management as the intended purpose for these changes.  
 
To make it easier to visualize the risk management approaches taken by the oil 
companies in making organizational changes, the effects of these changes are 
plotted on the risk matrix for each case and described in the within-case analysis. 
This graphical technique makes it easier to compare and explain the pattern of 
regularity than using tables to categorize the organizational changes (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007). The pattern of regularity is not immediately apparent from the 
individual cases but the pattern is more evident when the risk matrices for the five 
cases are placed side by side (Figure 26). The meaning of the pattern shown on the 
risk matrices will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
 Risk management  6.1
 
Risk management has become increasingly more important in business because of 
greater risk exposure from increased regulatory requirements, competitive 
pressures, improving technology and changing consumer habits. What is even 
more important and difficult to manage is the impact from an adverse risk event. 
A business can suffer serious consequences if an adverse event is not properly 
contained or mitigated. Besides financial costs, a risk event can cause long lasting 
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damage to the reputation of a company. Risk is an inescapable part of business 
and even though operational risks from faults, frauds and accidents cannot be 
predicted, they should be prevented or their consequences lessen to an acceptable 
level (Boodman, 1987).  
 
While there are many types of risks and many ways to classify risks, the main type 
of risks faced by a mature fuel retail sector in a politically stable region is 
operational risk. Risk management, especially for operational risk, is often 
delegated to down the organization hierarchy. At the lower level of the 
organization hierarchy, the approach to risk management is usually the three-step 
process of identifying the risk, measuring the risk and handling the risk, with the 
last step being the main focus (Close, 1974). Thus the main trust of risk 
management at this organization level is to reduce the probability of incidents 
primarily by adding hardware, systems or processes. These approaches are usually 
not designed to contain the impact or consequence of a risk event when it occurs. 
 
Risk management has since been elevated upwards the organization hierarchy 
with the new roles of the chief risk officer and the chief compliance officer 
although these positions are more common in the financial sector than the other 
sectors (Accenture, 2011; Corbett, 2004). Following BP’s Deep Horizon disaster 
in the Gulf of Mexico, the CEO of the company announced “a major 
reorganization, aimed at averting yet another disaster. He created a new safety 
division with broad powers to intervene in company operations. And BP finally 
appointed a board member with expertise in process safety” (Burke, 2011). The 
higher level of oversight to risk management allows managers more ways to 
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manage risk such as creating or modifying organization structures that will lower 
the probability of risk events as well as reduce the impact of risk event when these 
events occur.  
 
In a recent article, Kaplan and Mikes (2012) place risk under three categories and 
suggest different approaches to manage them. The first risk category, preventable 
risks, is to be managed through guidance and monitoring. The second risk 
category, strategy risks, is to be managed by reducing the probability that the 
assumed risks actually materialize and to contain the risk events should they occur. 
The third category, external risks, is to be managed by focusing on identify the 
risk and mitigating the impact. It is this comprehensive managerial approach to 
risk management that I suggest as the reason behind the changes to the 
organization structures for the fuel retailing sector that led to the multiple levels of 
industry architecture. 
 
6.1.1 Pattern from risk matrices 
The risk matrix for each of the five cases developed during the within-case 
analysis shows the effects of organizational changes made by the oil companies 
with respect to risk exposure and risk impact (Figure 5, Figure 8, Figure 11, 
Figure 13 and Figure 15). These changes are not plotted for the individual oil 
company but are grouped under the types of oil companies. The types of oil 
companies, MOC, NOC and independent oil company, have been described in the 
cross-case analysis and summarized in Table 15 on how they manage risk. The 
initial points marked on the risk matrix represent the risk positions of the oil 
companies prior to the organization changes. These initial placements are 
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supported by the background details of the fuel retailing sector that took into 
account the constraints placed by the country on the oil companies. 
  
Examining the risk matrices across the cases, these initial placements are in the 
low-risk-exposure, high-risk-impact quadrant for those operating COCO model 
(eg: Singapore S1 - Figure 5), low-risk-exposure, high-risk-impact quadrant for 
the DODO model (eg: Indonesia I2 and Philippines P3 - Figure 8 and Figure 15) 
and in the middle of the risk matrix for the CODO model (eg: Malaysia M2 and 
Thailand T1, T2 - Figure 11and Figure 13). This is consistent with the general 
view by interviewees that the risk positions of the COCO and DODO models are 
at the extreme ends and that the CODO model is in between these two models. 
The initial placements show that oil companies avoided two quadrants on the risk 
matrix, the high risk quadrant and the low risk quadrant. 
 
The effects on risk management of the organization changes are shown on the risk 
matrix by the shift in positions as indicated by the direction of the arrow. A shift 
to the right or left indicates that the change in the organization structure lowers or 
raises risk exposure respectively. A shift downwards or upwards indicates the 
change in the organization structure lowers or raises risk impact respectively. The 
risk matrix shows that the organization changes for the five cases generally lower 
the risk exposure or lower the impact from risk events. This pattern is more 
obvious with the risk matrices of five cases are placed side by side (Figure 26), as 




The correlation from the pattern is not perfect as there are anomalies with the 
organizational changes for two cases. The first anomaly is the use of alliances in 
Singapore such as using convenience store specialist to operate the fuel retail 
stations. This organizational change increases the risk exposure for the oil 
company (Singapore S3 - Figure 5 and Table 5). However, this organizational 
change is implemented to lower the risk impact by getting these alliance partners 
to absorb the risk impact associated with convenience retailing. The other 
anomaly is the case of the sales of ExxonMobil’s network to Petron in Malaysia 
(Malaysia M2 - Figure 11 and Table 9). The sales did not include many of the 
supporting roles which have been centralized by ExxonMobil. As a result, Petron 
ended up in a worst position on the risk matrix relative to ExxonMobil’s original 
position.     
 
 





This pattern of regularity observed with the risk matrix is unlikely to be observed 
by the existing empirical studies attempting to find the relationship between 
organizational structure and risk or uncertainties. This is because the existing 
studies try to classify risk preferences of the players or the type of risks faced by 
the players in the sector. For example, one of the academic approaches is to 
associate the risk preferences of the economic players to the choice of 
organizational structures (Cheung, 1969; Hanumantha Rao, 1971). Since the 
economic players are not individuals but firms with multiple decision-making 
individuals, it is unrealistic to aggregate the risk preferences of multiple 
individuals to represent the risk preference of a firm (Simon, Herbert and 
Associates, 1986).   
 
6.1.2 Dealing with risk  
The pattern that emerges from these cases highlights an approach to dealing with 
risk that is very different from the typical approach of risk mitigation. Typically, 
when the risk matrix is used to mitigate risks, a risk assessment is first performed 
to identify situations in the high-risk zone. Technology and hardware are then 
added to resolve the situations in the high-risk zone and moving them to a low-
risk zone(Figure 27). For example, a steel tank has greater risk of leaks from 
corrosion with increasingly more years underground and the risk assessment under 
the Underground Risk Management (URM) programme will place older steel 
tanks in the high-risk quadrant. The risk exposure is lessened by replacing the 
steel tank with a double-walled tank. A double-walled tank has the steel tank 
wrapped completely with a fibre-glass jacket that will reduce the corrosion of the 
steel tank. This lowers the probability of leak and hence this improvement moves 
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the risk away from the high risk zone. If the tank cannot be replaced or it is too 
expensive to do so, the alternative method would be to put sensors underground 
near the tank that can detect the presence of fuel. This sensor tied to an alarm then 
alerts the site operator in the event of a leak for quick corrective action. This limits 
the size of the leak and reduces the impact of the adverse event by restricting the 
leak to the fuel retail station.  
 
In summary, the action to reduce risk exposure is shown visually on the risk 
matrix by moving its position from the left side towards the right. The action to 
reduce the impact of risks is represented on the risk matrix by moving downwards. 
The aim of risk mitigation is to eliminate the source of the risks, control the 
exposure to risks or provide barriers to avoid the risks so as to move the situations 
towards the low-risk zone, the quadrant at the bottom left of the risk matrix 
(Figure 27). 
 






In contrast, the pattern that emerges from the five cases shows that the initial 
organization structures are not in the high-risk and low-risk quadrants. Subsequent 
organizational changes are implemented by the oil companies to reduce risk 
exposure and minimize risk impact but these are still implemented to keep the 
risks outside the high-risk and low-risk quadrants. This initial and final positions 
after organizational changes are within the shaded oval area on the risk matrix in 
Figure 28. 
 
This approach to risk management through the use of organizational structures as 
observed from the risk matrices and within-case analysis differs from the typical 
approach of risk mitigation in two ways. The first difference is that the base 
organization structures are already designed to avoid the high-risk and low-risk 
quadrants. The second difference is that the changes to the organization structure 
  





to avoid are made to reduce risk exposure and minimize risk impact but not to the 
extent of moving the risk position of the oil companies into the low-risk quadrant.  
 
Although being in the high-risk quadrant provides the best financial returns for the 
players willing to take higher risk, the returns can be easily wiped out by a bad 
incident with high impact. Likewise, being in the low-risk quadrant may not give 
any financial returns to each player as the earnings are diluted by sharing the 
revenues with more players taking up the additional roles needed to reduce the 
impact of risk events. Rather, players modify their organization structures to 
manage risks by selectively integrating roles, segregating roles, sharing risk with 
specialists and centralizing services. As a result, this approach results in the 
organization structure of the sector having multiple and different endpoints on the 
risk matrices after the organization changes. 
  
 Managing risk leads to multiple level of industry architecture  6.2
 
The pattern that emerges from the cases plotted on the risk matrices suggests that 
risk management is the reason for the vertical disintegration of the sector. But this 
inference from the pattern has to be supported by the evidence provided by the 
cases and replicated across the cases. The following discussion summarizes the 
details of the within-case and cross-case analyses. I argue that the vertical 
disintegration of the sector is the result of risk management by the players in the 




The fuel retail sector did not start with one integrated organization structure but 
from three base organization structures, COCO, CODO and DODO with each 
structure having a different risk-sharing proportion among two players, the oil 
company and the station operator. There are also three types of oil companies, 
MOC, NOC and independent oil company, operating in SE Asia and each has 
different ways to organize the sector to manage risk. There is more than one way 
to modify the organization structure to manage risk such as integrating roles, 
segregating roles, sharing risk with specialist and centralizing services. There is 
also a trade-off from either reducing the risk exposure or by minimizing the 
impact should a risk event occurs. The result from the combinations of the types 
of oil companies, the base organization structures and the different ways of 
modifying the organization structure to manage risk has led to the vertical 
disintegration of the sector.  
 
6.2.1 The base organization structure and types of oil companies 
The cross-case analysis also shows that the organization structures in SE Asia are 
based on the three base organization structures, COCO, CODO and DODO. Each 
of these organization structures has a different proportion of risk-sharing among 
the players. In SE Asia, the COCO model is perceived to be more superior 
especially in reducing risk exposure. The COCO organizational structure has 
incorporated the procedural checks, engineering controls and periodic audits that 
identify and stop potential risk events. These processes to manage risk are 
possible because all the roles are kept within the COCO organization. Unlike the 
COCO model, the DODO model permits the dealers to own the fuel retail stations, 
pay for the fuels upon delivery and use their own procedures to manage the fuel 
169 
 
retail stations. The oil companies can therefore detach themselves from any 
involvement with the DODO stations such that any risk incidents are borne by the 
dealers. The traditional risk-sharing organizational arrangement for fuel retailing 
is the CODO model. Under this model, the oil company invests in all the land, 
structure and equipment and appoints a dealer to operate and be fully responsible 
for all the operational risks at the stations. In other words, the risks associated with 
fraud, leaks and accidents are borne by the dealer. The oil companies only have to 
bear the risks associated with equipment failure. 
 
The cross-case analysis also shows that the three types of oil companies operating 
in SE Asia, MOC, NOC and independent oil companies react differently to the 
constraints imposed on them. The constraints especially those from regulations are 
not only different across the countries but these are also imposed unequally in 
some countries on each type of oil companies. These constraints are perceived as 
operational risk and accordingly, each type of oil companies will take different 
routes in organizing their network of fuel retail stations to manage this risk. MOCs 
proactively modify the organization structure to manage risk in order to protect 
their global brands. Even with preferential governmental support, NOCs have to 
protect their networks in their home country against operational risks. This is 
especially important when the deregulation of the fuel sector allows competitors 
into the sector. The independent oil companies may have less concern about risk 
when they are small and thus modified the organization structure so as to reduce 
investment and recurring operating costs. But as they gain bigger share of the 




6.2.2 Role of the oil companies as guarantors of quality 
The main business line of fuel retailing has remained essentially the same even 
though the sector has evolved to be more complex with the addition of new 
backcourt businesses and adoption of new technologies. Therefore, the addition of 
new players to handle these new activities and tasks into the sector seems obvious 
as the reason for the vertical disintegration of the sector. However, this reason 
does not “ask the question of whether firms can choose whether to make or buy” 
(Jacobides, 2005, p. 467). This simplistic reason is insufficient as the analyses of 
the fuel retail sector shows that the oil companies can choose not to add new 
players and instead take up the new activities and tasks as internal functions.  
 
But why should this choice of allowing or disallowing new players into the sector 
be up to the oil companies? To answer and support this, we have the suggestion 
that participants in sector fought to be the guarantors of quality so as to “keep a 
large part of the industry profits by carving out a comfortable position in their 
sector” (Jacobides, Knudsen, & Augier, 2006, p. 11). The academic literature and 
trade literature both show that the oil companies fought to be in this role (Hidy, 
1952; Dixon, 1964; Bougrine, 2006; Kliet, 2005; Reid, 2004).  
 
The players in their role as guarantors of quality, while receiving the larger 
proportion of the profits, are also responsible for the larger proportion of risk in 
the sector. In the case of the fuel retail sector, oil companies in this role as the 
guarantors of quality have to undertake a larger proportion or even all the risks. 
But as discussed earlier, managing risk may entail carving up roles, including 
internal roles, to be given to the third parties so that impact from a risk event can 
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be shared. But this means that there is a trade-off between reducing risk exposure 
and minimizing risk impact and that making the wrong trade-off may undermine 
the oil companies’ positions as guarantors of quality.  
 
6.2.3 Modifying organization structure to manage risk  
As discussed in the cross-case analysis, new roles are added when the fuel 
retailing sector evolves to include backcourt businesses, incorporate increased use 
of technology and cater to new consumer’s habits. These additional roles provide 
the oil companies with the opportunity to organize the structure of the fuel retail 
sector. The oil companies can have these roles added internally as a function 
within their organization or have these roles taken up externally by third parties. 
The pattern on the risk matrices shows that the organization structures are 
modified by the oil companies at the level of roles in order to manage risk. There 
are several ways detailed in the analysis on how the oil companies modify their 
organization structure at the role level to manage risk. These are summarized 
below. 
 
a) Integrating control and supervisory roles to reduce risk exposure 
The COCO organization structure is designed with internal supervisory roles in 
the oil company that reduce the exposure to risk. This model is described in the 
within-case case of Singapore (Singapore S1 - Figure 5 and Table 5). This model 
is considered to be more superior by many oil companies in SE Asia. For example, 
PTT continued with this model when they bought over the network from Conoco 
(Thailand T3 - Figure 13and Table 11). Pertamina added fuel retail stations under 
the COCO model to match the competitors following deregulation of the sector 
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(Indonesia I3 - Figure 8 and Table 7). These COCO model has the roles that 
provide the monitoring, training, coaching and auditing of employees deployed to 
operate the fuel retail stations. These roles help to reduce the exposure to the risk 
from frauds, faults and accidents. Such roles are frequently omitted in the CODO 
and DODO arrangements as the CODO and DODO dealers are given the task to 
implement these activities for their fuel retail stations. Instead of moving to the 
COCO model, NOCs and the independent oil companies adds these supervisory 
roles for their CODO and DODO fuel retail stations to get the same protection 
against frauds, faults and accidents. An example would be Pertamina using an 
external auditor to monitor their DODO stations (Indonesia I2 - Figure 8 and 
Table 7). In the case of Malaysia where the oil companies are restricted from 
operating the network directly, MOCs maintain one station each under the COCO 
model to set the operating standards and trial new business concepts at this fuel 
retail station before deploying them throughout the network. This is done to 
reduce the risk of introducing new business concepts (Malaysia M3 - Figure 
11and Table 9). 
 
b) Segregating roles to minimize risk impact 
By segregating the staff at the fuel retail station from the station operator or the oil 
company, the oil companies can reduce the full burden of risk when operating 
directly. An example is the use of professional station manager to handle station 
operations under the COCO model in Singapore (Singapore S2 - Figure 5 and 
Table 5). In Thailand, the risk associated with manpower is reduced and mitigated 
by using a separate subsidiary to provide the pump attendants and cashiers 
(Thailand T1 - Figure 13 and Table 11). In Philippines, the micro-filling station 
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concept reduces risk impact by having each small fuel retail station operated under 
a family arrangement (Philippines P3 - Figure 15 and Table 13). Other 
arrangements to reduce operating risk include using security guards to collect, 
count and deposit cash and logistics-company to handle fuel delivery and 
(Singapore S2 - Figure 5 and Table 5).     
 
c) Sharing risk burden with specialists 
Another way to reduce risk is to insert a role between the oil company and the 
myriad of supporting players. This new role is usually assigned to a specialist that 
can undertake the burden of risk on behalf of the oil company. An example of this 
is the use of asset managers by two MOCs, ExxonMobil and Shell, to handle the 
construction and maintenance of station equipment for their networks in SE Asia 
(Singapore S2 - Figure 5 and Table 5). This same approach can also be used for 
managing day-to-day operational activities. These two MOCs have also formed 
alliances with convenience store specialists to operate entire stations in Singapore 
(Singapore S3 - Figure 5 and Table 5). An extreme case of this approach would be 
the use branded marketers by Chevron (Philippines P2 - Figure 15 and Table 13). 
In this case, Chevron introduces these third parties to take over all the retailing 
activities under its brand. This can only be implemented in countries without the 
strict liability of making the oil company answers for every adverse event.   
 
d) Centralizing roles to offload risks to third parties 
The use of modern technology such as communication over the internet has 
provided new ways for oil companies to manage a network of fuel retail stations. 
Many common services for a fuel retail network can be centralized so that these 
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tasks are handled remotely. The centralization of services is no longer 
implemented simply for efficiency as they are often done to reduce risk exposure. 
This is illustrated by the organization of regional support services such as the 
wetstock centre in Bangkok by ExxonMobil and Centre of Excellence by Chevron 
(Singapore S3 - Figure 5 and Table 5).  Third party service providers are also 
coming in to take over the complete support services such as wetstock monitoring 
and help desk for retail automation. In taking up the services provided by these 
third party service providers such as the professional card processing centres, oil 
companies can offload the risk that they face in keeping these services in-house 
(Malaysia M1 - Figure 11 and Table 9).  
 
6.2.4 Concluding remarks  
The high-level differences from the types of oil companies and the base 
organization structures indicate that risk management as the motive in structuring 
the organization in the fuel retail sector. Although the three base organization 
structures are contractually different especially in terms of the oil company’s 
responsibility for adverse events, the fuel retail stations are not differentiated 
clearly to the public. This is because in trying to project their brands and to 
maintain the role as the guarantors of quality, oil companies create the impression 
that every detail at the fuel retail station is mandated by them. This public image 
makes it difficult for the oil companies to avoid responsibility, especially moral 
responsibility, when an adverse event occurs at the fuel retail station regardless of 
the organizational structure. In addition, the regulations in some countries do not 
separate the station operator from the brand provider even when the burden of 
risks is clearly delineated in the contract. As the sector evolves and matures, this 
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need to manage risk becomes more important. Accordingly, this research shows 
that the oil companies modify the organization structure to reduce risk and 
minimise risk impact. 
 
An oil company can use more than one organization structure in a single country 
as a way to manage risk. It can also manage risk by modifying the organization 
structure at the role’s level. Roles can be modified to be taken up by players to 
lower exposure to risk or inserted between existing roles to minimise risk impact. 
This provides many possibilities in arranging the players and roles in the sector.  It 
is the combination of the different approaches to lower risk exposure and to 
minimize risk impact that led to the multiple levels of industry architecture.   
 
This research suggests and supports with the evidence presented in the cases that 
the fuel retailing sector in SE Asian countries operates with multiple levels of 
industry architecture as a result of organizational changes made by oil companies 
to manage risk.  
 
 Contributions and limitations 6.3
 
6.3.1 Contributions 
This research makes the following contributions. The existing literature is focused 
on the characteristics and issues of the North American fuel retail sector. I have 
provided the characteristics and issues that are observed in SE Asia’s fuel retail 
sector. I have introduced into the cross-case analysis the different types of oil 
companies operating in the fuel retail sector and the constraints placed upon them 
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by the host countries. I have detailed the roles of many other players in the fuel 
retail sector contributing to the value chain. I have argued that it is insufficient to 
analyse the fuel retail sector on a model based on two economic players consisting 
of the dealer and the oil company. Therefore my contribution is to change the 
approach when evaluating the effect of risk and uncertainty on organizational 
structure. Instead of focusing on the type of uncertainty or the risk preferences of 
the players, this research focuses on the oil companies’ approaches in managing 
risk.  
 
The study reveals that there are many ways to organize the fuel retail sector to 
reduce exposure to risk and to minimize the impact should such adverse event 
occurs. It is these different ways of organizing to minimize risk by the different 
types of oil companies operating under different constraints that led to the sector 
having multiple economic players combined in different ways. The study also 
suggests that an oil company can use more than one organization structure in a 
single country as a way to manage risk even under the same constraint of the host 
country.  The oil company can modify the organization structure at the level of 
roles. Roles can be split or consolidated in such a way that the modified roles can 
be taken up by players to lower exposure to risk. Alternatively, roles can be added 
and inserted between existing roles so as to minimise risk impact. The key 
contribution of the research is to suggest that the oil companies modify the 
organization structure in order to manage risk. It is the combination of the 
different approaches to lower risk exposure and to minimize risk impact that led to 





This study has several limitations as this research is based on the qualitative 
approach for a specific business sector in a region with information gathered 
through interviews by a single researcher. The research may also be biased 
because of the experience and qualifications of the researcher. The interpretation 
may be skewed towards a technical viewpoint because of the current job role of 
the researcher.    
 
The analysis is based on the fuel retailing sector and risk management may not be 
as important in other business sectors or even in other retailing sectors. Fuel 
retailing is unique and different from general retailing in that it involves 
specialized equipment in dedicated locations to sell and deliver a product that is 
potentially combustible and dangerous into the customer’s vehicle. This makes 
risk management a critical requirement in the fuel retail sector. Since risk may be 
less important in other sectors, this result cannot be generalized to all other sectors.  
  
The study compares the information from five countries with fuel retail networks 
that were established more than fifty years ago. The characteristics and issues of a 
matured sector in these countries are certainly different from the characteristics 
and issues of the sector in countries that are just starting to develop their fuel retail 
industry. The risk exposure and impact of a risk event faced by a newly developed 
sector will be different and risk management may not be as important. Therefore 
the findings cannot simply be extrapolated to another region that has fuel retail 




The study may be limited by the period of the study and may be relevant for this 
period only. The period from 2000 to 2013 marks the era when the MOCs were 
shifting their priorities to the upstream segment which resulted in the 
consolidation of the downstream segment and that included the consolidation of 
the fuel retail sector. It is also during this period that the national oil companies 
gained prominence operating in their home country. Thus, the effect of the risk 
management is relatively weighted towards the changes by outgoing MOCs and 
strengthening NOCs. The cross-case analysis also points to the growing number of 
independent players and as such the future effect of organization changes may be 
skewed towards the actions of these independent oil companies.  
 
6.3.3 Alternative explanations 
 
There are other explanations offered by the interviewees as possible reasons for 
the organization changes. It is not unusual to get very diverse views from 
interviewees and Jacobides suggests several techniques to deal with these 
“unsupported arguments” (Jacobides, 2005, p. 469). The two usual reasons offered 
are efficiency improvements and the gains from specialization. These were the 
official reasons given by the interviewees for some of the organizational changes 
during formal interviews. During informal discussions, these same interviewees 
offered risk management as the alternative reason for the same organizational 
changes. The discussion here will explain why risk management is the more likely 




6.3.4 Efficiency reason 
The efficiency reason is often given for organizational changes accompanying 
increased use of retail automation and centralized services. However, retail 
automation and centralized services for the fuel retail sector were introduced 
together with an even larger support and monitoring team.  Many tasks such as 
monitoring the inventory of the fuels in the underground tanks are part of the 
station operators’ original duty and the procedures have been perfected over the 
years. Monitoring fuel inventory serves two purposes. One purpose is to plan for 
fuel replenishment of the fuel retail stations. A central location receiving 
inventory data from the fuel retail stations can use the information to improve the 
efficiency of the terminal such as optimizing the despatching of tankers to 
replenish fuels for the network. The other purpose is to monitor the inventory 
variance between the amount of fuel received from the terminal and the amount of 
fuel sold. The station operator monitors the inventory variance to ensure that the 
underground system is not leaking, the meters at the station are calibrated and 
fuels are not being stolen. Having the variances for all the fuel retail stations sent 
to a central location does not improve efficiency since the inventory variance of 
one station is usually not useful for another station.  
 
In summary, the centralized monitoring of the underground tanks from Bangkok 
by ExxonMobil’s own wet-stock centre adds more recurring costs, specialized 
equipment and increases manpower. Similar programme by Chevron and 
Pertamina incur even higher recurring costs as this task is outsourced to third 
party. Therefore this type of organizational changes cannot be done for efficiency 
reasons. It is done primarily to manage risk especially when the programme is 
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implemented only for stations operated directly by the oil company and is not 
extended to dealers that have the legal responsibility for ensuring the integrity of 
their underground tanks.  
 
The efficiency reason is also not supported by the retail automation programme 
implemented by the independent oil companies in Philippines that have smaller 
networks. These independent companies have implemented systems that allow 
them to retrieve transactions across their networks and gather them in a 
centralized location. The purpose of such systems is primarily to monitor fraud 
and adulteration of fuel. The savings from efficiency for a small network cannot 
offset the initial investments and recurrent costs of a centralized system.  
 
6.3.5 Gains from specialization 
The other reason for the organizational changes is the gains from specialization by 
forming alliances with specialist players and outsourcing tasks to third parties. 
The oil companies have successfully introduced and managed their own brands of 
convenience store. While these oil companies originally did not have the skills to 
operate convenience retailing, they have acquired those skills by hiring and 
forming teams internally that specialize in convenience retailing. Thus the motive 
for forming alliances with convenience store specialists to take over the operations 
of the fuel retail network cannot be to realize the gain from specialization. In 
giving up this role to form alliances with convenience store specialists, the team 





Common services can be shared among the oil companies and there are gains 
from specialization with a single party providing the same service to all the oil 
companies. However, this is not the case in actual practice. An example of 
realizing gains from specialization would be getting a specialist to operate a 
common terminal and using a logistics company to deliver fuel to the fuel retail 
stations. But terminals in SE Asia are considered core business by the oil 
companies and are not shared. Although tanker trucks are outsourced to logistics 
companies, these trucks are dedicated to each oil companies and have to follow 
the exact procedures dictated by the oil companies. The restrictive arrangement 
shows that the oil companies outsource the task in order to manage risk rather than 
to gain from the specialized skills of logistic companies. 
 
 Implication of research findings  6.4
 
The research shows that oil companies can implement more than one organization 
structure in a single country as a way to manage risk. The larger players, 
specifically the major oil companies, are increasingly organizing the fuel retail 
networks preferentially to avoid the impact of risk incidents instead of organizing 
the network to reduce the probability of incidents occurring. These oil companies 
spread the impact of risk events by sharing this with multiple specialist players, on 
the assumption that these specialist players will be responsible in the event of a 
risk incident.  
 
However, letting third parties monitor and respond to risk event especially those 
risks relating to safety and environmental protection can be potentially dangerous. 
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These third parties may not be as competence as the oil companies and the 
division of responsibility among multiple players may result in some areas of risk 
being neglected or left unmanaged. Thus, policymakers and regulators must take 
this restructuring approach into account when setting and implementing policies 






This research covers the industry architecture of the fuel retailing sector across 
five SE Asian countries. While it may not be surprising that the industry 
architecture would be different among the heterogeneous countries, what is 
unusual is that it is also different within a single country and that an oil company 
will also use a mix of organizational structures or multiple levels of industry 
architecture within the same country. The research shows that oil companies 
organize the network as a way to manage risk. Risk can be managed by lowering 
the likelihood of a risk event happening and by minimizing the impact should 
such an event occur.  
 
The oil companies do not have to bear the full burden of risks. An industry 
architecture that is structured to predominantly lower the likelihood of a risk event 
is very different from industry architecture structured to shield itself from the full 
impact of risk events. In the example of the fuel retailing sector, risk exposure was 
reduced by operating fuel retail stations directly whereas impact from risk was 
lowered by operating with multiple independent partners. Similarly, risks can be 
shared among equal partners by bearing responsibilities according to their 
respective areas of expertise. But there is a trade-off in each of the choices such as 
the amount of revenue and profit that have to be shared or in the amount of cost 
and effort expended to keep the risk at bay. It is this balancing act that oil 





As the fuel retailing sector evolves, the supporting roles may become more 
prominent. The emergence of convenience stores in the fuel retail station has led 
to the convenience store operator replacing the dealer as the key role at a fuel 
retail station. Similarly, the trend for customers to use payment cards at the pump 
may result in the financial industry taking a higher profile at the fuel retail station. 
Even the telecommunication sector may play a bigger role when the more secured 
payment using the near-field communication (NFC) feature of mobile phones 
becomes prevalent.  
 
The move to an asset-light operating model has also crystalized the concept of 
renting assets instead of paying for the assets needed to operate a fuel retail station. 
Some oil companies are looking at paying a per-transaction fee for cloud-based 
information system so as to move away from owning and having to regularly 
upgrade their automation systems. This suggestion of lowering investment capital 
can be extended to a network of fuel retail stations with all equipment and land 
funded by a financial investor, thus replacing the traditional concept of a network 
of fuel retail stations owned by an oil company or his dealers dedicated to the sale 
of fuels.  
 
This research shows that the academic model of the two economic players in the 
fuel retail sector consisting of the oil company and the station operator is less 
useful in explaining organizational structure as the sector evolved. The fully 
unattended fuel retail station is already a reality in some countries. The oil 
company has gone back to the old days of being a wholesaler and it is no longer 
necessary for the dealer to be physically present at the fuel retail station. Those 
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support roles have taken over the main roles in recognition of the importance of 
operational tasks such as replenishing the tanks with fuels, keeping the retail 
automation system running, monitoring the underground fuel system, moving the 
payments to the banks and ensuring that the equipment are well maintained. The 
fully unattended fuel retail station is therefore operated by the set of players taking 
up these support roles and eliminating the role of the dealer. 
 
The impact on industry architecture uncovered by this research may be applicable 
to other industries. A number of industry sectors have also evolved similar models 
to manage their outlets spread across nations. The hotel industry has moved from 
the traditional company-operated hotel chains to the franchise model. The 
franchise arrangement for hotel is not unlike the DODO model in fuel retailing. 
Besides company-operated and franchised hotels, the brand owner of hotel chain 
also manages hotels owned by individual investors or investment funds that lack 
the skill to do so. This is different from the CODO model in fuel retailing in that 
ownership and operatorship are swapped and may be appropriately termed as 
DOCO. Franchising has become a popular model for players in the retail sector 
such as McDonalds, 7-Eleven and Subway to expand their network and avoid the 
investments and liabilities associated with a traditional company-owned, 
company-operated chain. 
 
Just as in the fuel retailing sector, examining the business models of the sector 
does not give a complete explanation of vertical disintegration. Only through a 
close examination of the industry architecture can we see that some roles are 
under threat of being taken over by other firms. For example, “The Economist” 
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described a virtual hotel that was leased from a property firm by an individual or 
an investment fund who then engaged a well-established hotel franchisor or a 
hotel management firm to operate the hotel, with staff supplied by a manpower 
firm and with a restaurant under the care of an external caterer (The Economist, 
2009). 
 
Going forward, there are four case studies that may prove fruitful for future 
research. The first would be a detailed case study on the takeover of the 
ExxonMobil network in Malaysia by Petron (San Miguel Corporation, 2011). The 
second would be a case study on the takeover of BP network in Malaysia by 
Boustead Holding and renamed BHPetrol. These two case studies can be 
contrasted for the organizational differences between independent oil companies 
after taking over the network and staff of the major oil companies. Can Petron 
compete by imposing the Philippines’s industry architecture against BHPetrol 
maintaining the already tested and localized industry architecture?  The third 
would be the takeover of the Conoco-Philips retail network by PTT and renamed 
PTT-RM. This will show up the organizational differences between a major oil 
company and a national oil company within the country. Lastly, there were a few 
failures of oil companies setting up fuel retail networks in SE Asia, Conoco-
Philips in Thailand and Malaysia and Petronas in Indonesia, Thailand and 
Philippines, and these cases may be used to understand the negative consequences 
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APPENDIX A  
1. Request for access into company’s database of information 
2. Request for interview 





4. Sample:Transcript of a formal interview 
Interviewee: G*** P*** 
Present Company: Chevron 
Present position in company: **** 
Company in fuel retailing: Chevron 
Position in fuel retailing: **** 
Date of interview: 2nd Aug 2011 
Time of interview: 3:00pm – 5:30pm 
Place: Chevron House, Singapore 
 
 
Q. Please explain the term RORO that you have been using.   
A. Three are 5 business models that we apply to retailing of fuel. These are  
1) COCO – Company Owned Company Operated 
2) COCA – Company Owned Commission Agent 
3) CORO –  Company Owned Retailer Operated 
4) RORO –  Retailer Owned, Retailer Operated 
5) Branded Marketer 
 
The COCO model is the same COCO model used by the other oil majors, namely ExxonMobil. 
We own the land and operate the site with our own staff. 
 
The COCA model, Company Owned Commission Agent, addresses the issues relating to 
permitting and labour. We have an agent, basically a person who is assigned to hire a bunch of 
workers to operate the site. We pay these staff indirectly through this agent. [Comment from 
interviewer during conversation – Esso still uses the term COCO for this type of operations, even 
though it is clear that the agent, usually the station manager, and all the staff are not Esso 
employees.]  This agent has to take up all the permits needed to operate the station. An example 
would be for him to take up the license to sell cigarette. He has to enforce the rules to maintain 
these licenses. If he breaks the law, say selling cigarettes to under-aged person, he gets thrown out 
and we find a replacement agent. We can continue to operate the site with the new retailer. The site 
is not barred from selling cigarette. [Comment from interviewer: In other words, the difference 
between this and COCO is to remove the risks associated with employment and licenses. <Agreed 
by interviewee>]. 
 
The CORO model, Company Owned Retailer Operated, is the typically dealer operated station 
with the land and structure still owned by us. This key to this model is that the station operator 
now owns the fuel, which is delivered to him. The fuel is at his risk but since we owned the site, 
we are responsible for the clean up. 
 
The RORO model, Retailer Owned Retailer Operated model is similar to the DODO used by other 
oil majors. The site and the inventory of fuel belong to the dealer. However, fuel is still delivered 
to the station by Chevron. We use a third party hauler to do this but we have the liability for the 
fuel before it reaches the station. 
 
Branded marketer is the way we are pushing into our network that can accept this model. This is 
not permitted in some countries where the law did not allow us to avoid responsibility even though 
we don’t own anything. We do not even deliver fuel to these branded marketers. In other words, 
we collect money when they come and pick up fuel from the rack. In USA, they are called jobbers. 
The difference between branded marketer is that this is a player that may owned 50 to 100 sites 
while the RORO is typical a single site player. We can get the branded marketer to arrange for 
trucks to collect fuel from us. 
 
Q: What the reason for moving into the branded marketer model? 
A: I have been through the debate covering the vertically integrated oil business. Here, I mean the 
upstream and downstream. One school of thought is that the average weighted cost of funds is 
higher for the higher risk business and vice versa. Obviously the upstream has the higher risk. The 
theory is that the application of a single cost of fund would appear low for the upstream but high 
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for the downstream. For us in Engineering, this makes the appropriation of CAPEX for 
downstream harder. By the way, I was told ExxonMobil did not buy this theory. 
 
This theory does apply to branded marketer model. The branded marketer has a lower cost of fund 
for being dedicated to this segment of the market. A further cost efficiency for them is that they 
can keep the network of sites to a locality. By having a HQ surrounded by sites that are within 
reach, these branded marketer can improve their cost position better than us as the oil major since 
we have to attend to a larger geographical spread.  
 
We are also not subjected to any risk. There has been debate as to whether we can since our brand 
is still at the station. However, our lawyers have looked at this issue and found the differences in 
the application of liabilities. An example, say Canada, would make the oil company liable even 
though they claimed to have no ownership and do not participate in the operations of the site. 
Under this type of condition that we cannot escape the liability (the term used by the lawyer is 
strict liability), we will not have this arrangement as we are better off running the site to prevent 
incident. This can even be for a locality within a country. We have to operate directly in California 
because of the liability. We don’t have to do in Nevada. Here, the branded marketer will have the 
advantage. 
 
So, in summary, a branded marketer will have a lower average cost of fund, have a lower 
compliance cost and generally more efficient. 
 
Q: Is this branded marketer model applicable for all the countries here? 
A: No. This cannot be applied to Singapore and HK. The rules in these countries are well 
established and we don’t want to change the stability of these operations. We will apply this 
branded marketer concept for Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. The lawyer considered this to be 
of normal liability and if any incident happens, we may suffer some for our brand image but the 
people seem to have short memory. 
 
We still will maintain a few COCA, CORA. This is to maintain expertise within the company.  
 
Q. Why don’t you sell off if this preferred model cannot be applied in, say HK? Is this because this 
would be too expensive to attract buyers? 
A. Actually, I did propose that we sell off HK. Sinopec was outbidding everyone for sites in HK. I 
thought that we should sell and get out with a good price. 
 
Q: What is your assessment on whether this model will be successful here? 
A: It is hard to tell now. We have seen this applied in USA and the branded marketers are 
successful. They can even provide better service. One of the views was that the service level is 
worst in non-COCO sites. But this turn out not to be true. When the branded marketer becomes 
successful, they will start buying up the RORO.  
 
Q: Do you mandate the equipment that the site has to buy? 
A: No. That is why we are arranging for our suppliers to meet these investors (brand marketer 
owner) so that they can make their own decision on what to buy. The only thing we will mandate 
is the use of the POS system. The reason is that the common POS system will give the retailer the 
advantage of having a common fleet card and loyalty scheme. We can also use this to check on 
whether the branded marketer has been selling our oil. 
 
Q: With the fuel being sold at the rack, there is no way you know if the branded marketer has been 
buying from others and selling under your brand. 
A: Yes, but if they are caught doing this; we will dismiss them and remove our signage. Yes, the 
signage belongs to us. We will also mark our fuel. As you know, each oil company have special 





5. Transcript of a chat session  
/// Start of chat message done via facebook on 23 Oct 2013.  
Hi Anwar  
 I did my thesis defence and encountered this question: 
This is regarding stations under DODO that I believe XOM Malaysia and now Petron have a few of 
these in Malaysia. If the DODO dealers are not happy with the commercial terms working with, in 
your case, XOM and now Petron, cant they just switch to another oil company, say Shell or 
Petronas? What is stop them from taking fuels from the cheapest suppliers and do this as and 
when they like since they owned the site.Regards 
Tay Kwong Kiat.... 
1:19pm 
DODO dealers are bounded by the DODO agreement. In the case of DODO, we give them the 
brand to sell our products. Therefore they can only sell our products. The agreement is normally 
signed for 10 years. DODO dealers has to abide by this agreement.  Normally we will caveat the 
land to ensure that dealers don't renege on their word. The terms are normally negotiated and 
trashed out before the agreement is signed..... 
1:20pm 
If they are not happy, they cannot walk away as we have caveated the land.... 
1:22pm 
They cannot even sell the land?.... 
1:22pm 
Not before the agreement expires and the caveat lifted.We invest in signages and some 
equipment like POS so investment is substantial.Cannot allow them to walk away like that.... 
1:24pm 
So switching cannot and has not been happening, even they find a better deal say with 
Petronas..... 
1:25pm 
R u thinking of doing a DODO in Malaysia? It is viable u know. U can set up a Malaysian Pte Ltd 
company with some Malaysian share holders like me to do a DODO.Cannot switch flag before 
agreement expires.... 
1:26pm 
No. Just to answer an academic question. Thanks..... 
1:27pm 
By the way Petronas don't do DODO.... 
1:28pm 
Is this caveat way not too legal like the NDA?.... 
1:29pm 
Caveat is a legal instrument that u put on a land that does not belong to you but you hv an 
interest.... 
1:30pm 




Those are not DODO. They are mini outlets or "white stations". We have them too and they come 
under our I&W business..Govt request Petronas to "adopt" them bcoz they serve the rural 
community..... 
1:32pm 
Oh the white pumpers. No brand on it, right..... 
1:33pm 
They used to hv no brands but when Petronas adopted them, they are now branded Petronas.But 
their retail std is still lagging. Bcoz these are mom pop operations.... 
1:35pm 
With the brand, that force them to sell only Petronas. But being rural, I guess they can cheat..... 
1:36pm 
That is the problem. All oil cos don't like dealing with these mini outlets bcoz of the inherent risks 
like environmental hazards. But Govt has other priorities.... 
1:38pm 
Thanks. Good info for me. 
 
 
 
 
